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Abstract 
This thesis discusses the relationship between human rights in armed conflict and 
international humanitarian law. The topic has the appearance of being somewhat of 
a Gordian knot in international law scholarship. However, the longstanding character 
of the dispute surrounding the topic does not diminish its importance. An agreement 
to disagree is not an option when considering the practical consequences. While it 
is unsatisfactory from an academic view that a workable solution on applying both 
legal regimes to armed conflict settings is still lacking, it is deeply troubling on a 
practical level. The current situation means no less than an uncertainty concerning 
legal norms in armed conflicts. This has adverse effects on the protection of legal 
interests such as life, liberty, and due process in the most extreme circumstances, 
but it also poses the danger of undermining the acceptance of legal standards.  
Borrowing from recent judicial developments especially in the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights, this thesis first outlines the background of the 
topic and then attempts to reconcile the two main opposing theories, one focussing 
on the complementary relationship between the legal regimes and one focusing on 
the lex specialis characteristic of international humanitarian law, by integrating both 
into a two-step-approach. This approach features first the attempt to harmonize two 
applicable norms by way of interpretation and it sees lex specialis proper as a 
subsidiary measure to be applied, when such harmonization fails. However, the 
respective lex specialis maintains a higher weight on the interpretation stage as well. 
The thesis then tests the approach by applying it to the human right to life and the 
human right to liberty in international armed conflicts and the much more 
problematic field of non-international armed conflicts. 
This thesis is guided by the hope, that the current state of affairs may offer fertile 
ground for an end to the decade-long dispute, as state parties now tend to accept 
the need for legal clarity in armed conflicts and have given up their fundamental 
opposition towards applying human rights in extraterritorial settings and national and 
human rights courts have growingly acknowledged that they are not fostering legal 
protection by treating the actions of armed forces on the battlefield settings like 
police operations in peacetime.  
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1. Hypothesis and structure 
Applying human rights law in armed conflicts has drawn intense criticism from state 
actors. Recently, the UK Government even deemed it necessary to announce a 
future derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, 19501) 
in order “to protect Armed Forces from persistent legal claims in future overseas 
operations” and to end an “industry of vexatious claims” against military members, 
which supposedly may “stop our Armed Forces doing their job”.2 A Policy Exchange 
paper that fuelled this development proposed that the armed forces needed saving 
“from defeat by judicial diktat” and saw international human rights law (IHRL) as 
benefitting the “country’s adversaries”.3 In such overly hyperbolic and dramatic 
statements lies if only a grain of truth. They highlight that the question, which legal 
standard applies to the conduct of hostilities needs answers. It is not the threat of 
legal claims that may compromise operational capabilities but the continued 
uncertainty regarding the applicable standards4 – as is evidenced by the western 
response to hybrid warfare, a tactic thriving on the exploitation of legal grey areas.5 
This uncertainty may at worst lead to a decreasing acceptance of legal standards in 
the armed forces community.  
Armed conflicts need clear rules. The law of armed conflicts needs to bellow 
normative instructions loud and simple enough for everyone to hear and follow 
despite the chaotic and life-threatening situations in which they apply. On this basis, 
                                            
1 ETS 5, entry into force 3 September 1953. 
2 Quotes from UK Ministry of Defence & Rt Hon Sir Michael Fallon, ‘Government to protect 
Armed Forces from persistent legal claims in future overseas operations’ (UK Government 
4 October 2016) <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-to-protect-armed-
forces-from-persistent-legal-claims-in-future-overseas-operations> last accessed 20 June 
2017. 
3 Richard Ekins, Jonathan Morgan, and Tom Tugendhat, ‘Clearing the Fog of Law’ (Policy 
Exchange 2015); see also the open letter of five former UK military chiefs of staff, ‘Combat 
Zones’ (The Times 7 April 2015) <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/combat-zones-
r6k0zjc20wx> last accessed 20 June 2017, calling “the government to recognise the 
primacy of the Geneva Conventions in war by derogating from the European Convention 
on Human Rights in time of war and redefining combat immunity through legislation to 
ensure that our serving personnel are able to operate in the field without fear of the laws 
designed for peacetime environments.”; see also the discussion in Marko Milanovic, ‘UK to 
Derogate from the ECHR in Armed Conflict’ (EJIL:Talk 5 October 2016). 
4 See also Thomas Winkler, ‘The Copenhagen Process on Detainees: A Necessity’ (2010) 
78 Nord. J. Int’l L. 489, 491. 
5 See Aurel Sari, ‘Legal Aspects of Hybrid Warfare’ (Lawfare 2 October 2015). 
3 
 
the modern law of armed conflict has stood firmly for decades. The internationally 
accepted rules of the law of armed conflict have been strongholds, protecting 
fundamental rights in dire circumstances, even though there are deficits in 
compliance. The unique ratione materiae of international humanitarian law (IHL), 
which gives this body of law the challenging mandate to regulate circumstances 
seemingly beyond regulation, must be born in mind when discussing the relationship 
of both fields of law, IHL and IHRL. As it stands, to apply human rights fully and 
without any reservation in situations of armed conflict means to factually overrule 
IHL by a body of law much vaguer and not at all designed to regulate the very special 
circumstances of armed strife. However, not to apply IHRL in armed conflicts at all 
runs counter to international law as well. The comparatively new regime of IHRL 
achieves its radiance not through its normative clarity, but because of its vagueness 
and the all-encompassing universality of its guarantees. After its rise, post-1945, it 
quickly became clear that the universality of human rights guarantees does not stop 
short of armed conflicts. Indeed, it is part of the DNA of IHRL to protect fundamental 
rights in every possible circumstance, including and especially in armed conflicts, 
since the world wars were the main contributing factor, if not the sole cause, for the 
rapid rise of human rights. 
Thus, it is unsurprising that IHL and IHRL are at odds with each other and their 
relationship and its translation into practice is complicated at best, as evidenced by 
the long-lasting academic dispute on the topic.6 The conflicting positions are easily 
explained. One group accentuates the special circumstances of armed conflict and 
the other insists on the universality of human rights law. The position one takes on 
the topic tends to depend on the interpretative community one is a member of.7 IHL 
experts tend to argue for a replacement of IHRL by the applicable IHL or for IHRL’s 
inapplicability in armed conflicts, while IHRL scholars will argue for IHRL maintaining 
a decisive role in armed conflict situations, often regarding IHL as antiquated, 
ineffective, and thus deserving to be side-lined. Both parties have their set of 
                                            
6 For examples of early works see e.g. Franciszek Przetacznik, ‘Protection of Human Rights 
in Time of Armed Conflict’ (1974) 13 Mil. L. & L. War Rev. 315-65; ‘Human Rights in Armed 
Conflict’ (1964) 21 Bull. I.C.J. 1-5. 
7 For an analysis of interpretative communities see e.g. Michael Waibel, ‘Interpretative 
Communities in International Law’ in Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat, and Matthew Windsor 
(eds), Interpretation in International Law (OUP 2015) 147-65. 
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arguments and the deadlocked discussion sometimes seems to consist of their 
regular repetition. 
The guiding hypothesis of this analysis will not be one or the other. It is accepted 
that IHRL generally applies in situations of armed conflict, as soon as a state actor 
exercises jurisdiction, even if this exercise should be extraterritorially. The 
hypothesis regarding its relationship to IHL is the following:  
The relationship between IHL and IHRL in armed conflicts is one of 
coexistence. However, IHL generally takes precedence whenever norms of 
both bodies of international law conflict – be it in letter or concept. 
The long-standing nature of the discussion has caused observers to describe it as 
“well-worn”8. Yet, after a long time of deadlock, recent cases have breathed back 
some life into the topic and once again a controversial academic discussion ensued. 
The bottom line is that answers to the relationship between both fields of law are 
needed, which enable a swift translation into practice and clear guidance on how to 
apply both bodies of law to a situation in an armed conflict. After all, the law 
applicable in an armed conflict is not applied by peacetime public administration, 
where legal uncertainty may be driven back step by step with trial and error and 
regular assistance of the judiciary, but by armed forces on the battlefield, where 
there is little room for error or hindsight.  
To support the hypothesis, this thesis will first briefly examine the history of both 
areas of law (2.) and derive from it the development leading up to the status quo. In 
addition, the practice of the United Nations (UN) and the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) will be introduced (3.). This will give the necessary background to 
understand the controversial nature of the discussion and the following theory 
concerning the relationship between both bodies of law.  
Furthermore, it will be outlined in which situations the relationship between IHRL 
and IHL is not problematic, either because one of those regimes is inapplicable or 
because their relationship is determined by international law itself (4.). Afterwards, 
the normative relationship between both regimes will be analysed and ways will be 
identified to solve potential conflicts between IHL and IHRL (5.). In the following, the 
findings will be applied in case studies focussing on the rights to life and liberty in 
                                            
8 Marko Milanovic, ‘Two Articles on the Relationship between IHL and IHRL’ (EJIL:Talk 14 
July 2014). 
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international armed conflicts (IAC) and non-international armed conflicts (NIAC), 
outlining the way to translate the normative findings of the previous section into 
practice (6.). This part will also include the current practice of courts on the topic at 
hand.  
The thesis ends with an outlook on the topic including policy considerations the 
author deems important to ensure continued compliance and international 
acceptance of legal standards as the academic discussion proceeds.  
This work builds upon prior research of the author undertaken for the Deutsches 
Institut für Menschenrechte in 2015 and publications in German.9 
 
 
2. Historical development of the relationship between IHL and IHRL 
The law of war in the sense of ius in bello – although applying even more for ius ad 
bellum10 – precedes human rights law by many centuries. From time immemorial, 
there have been violent conflicts between groups and since the creation of nations 
there have been armed conflicts between nation states. Such conflicts have been 
governed by ideas, concepts, and traditions, which precede even our modern 
understanding of law. As such, the law of land warfare has been called “one of the 
oldest subject-matters of public international law.”11 Without venturing too far into 
history, rules limiting the conduct of armed hostilities can be found in the traditions 
of most ancient cultures and have been formulated on this basis in the texts of 
modern religions, including the Bible, the Qur’an and scriptures of Buddhism as well 
                                            
9 Tim R. Salomon, ‘Die Anwendung von Menschenrechten im bewaffneten Konflikt‘ (2015) 
53(3) ArchVR 322-59; Tim R. Salomon, ‘Zum Verhältnis von Menschenrechten und 
Humanitärem Völkerrecht‘ (2015) 4 HuV-I 153-62. 
10 See David J. Bederman, International Law in Antiquity (CUP 2001) 76: “All ancient 
civilizations had ceremonies for the proper sanctioning of war […] These customs centred 
around two distinct, but obviously interrelated, tasks. The first was to decide if war would be 
sacred, good, and just or if it would be profane, evil, and unjust. Their second duty was to 
oversee the rites that would invoke the gods’ support for war, and to ensure victory. In the 
Roman tradition, this procedure was governed by the ius fetiale.” 
11 Robin Geiß, ‘Land Warfare‘ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), MPEPIL (OUP online edition 2009) 
para. 4. 
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as Hinduism.12 Some of these ancient rules include early formulations of the 
prohibition of perfidy13, early concepts of reciprocity14, and the protection of those 
not bearing arms.15 These traditions, however, were too diverse and widespread to 
form into a set of coherent law over time.16 It took catalysts to form truly universal 
norms.  
One such catalyst was Dunant’s experience on the “field of honour” after the Battle 
of Solferino in 1859, which birthed organized humanitarian efforts and eventually 
led to the adoption of the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded in Armies of the Field17.18 Parallel to this, then US President Abraham 
Lincoln signed the Lieber Code19 into effect, which proved to be influential in 
                                            
12 Hans-Peter Gasser and Daniel Thürer, ‘Humanitarian Law, International’ in Rüdiger 
Wolfrum (ed), MPEPIL Vol. V (OUP 2012) 59, 60 (para. 7); see for an in-depth review David 
J. Bederman, International Law in Antiquity (CUP 2001) 242 et seq. 
13 Ambrosius, De officiis (first published 340-397) L. I. c. XXIX, para. 139: “Even warring 
parties maintain its importance: so, if it has been decided with an enemy that battle will take 
place at a particular place or on a particular day, it is regarded as a violation of justice to 
arrive at the place in advance or to bring forward the time.”, translation in Ivor J. Davidson 
(ed), Ambrose, De officiis, Vol. I (OUP 2002) 197. 
14 Ambrosius, De officiis (first published 340-397), L. I. c. XXIX, para. 139: “for on fiercer 
enemies, those who prove treacherous and those who are guilty of greater crimes, fiercer 
vengeance is taken.”, translation in Ivor J. Davidson (ed), Ambrose, De officiis Vol. I (OUP 
2002) 197. 
15 Xenophon, who proposes the universality of the law of war by the phrase “law established 
for all time among all men” (Xen. Cyrop. 7.5.73, english translation taken from: 
<http://data.perseus.org/citations/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0032.tlg007.perseus-eng1:7.5.73> 
last accessed 20 June 2017) lets his model king Cyrus the Great propose to his enemy “to 
leave in peace the labourers tilling the land and to do them no harm”, if he in turn “would be 
willing to allow those farmers who had transferred their allegiance to him to work their farms” 
(Xen. Cyrop. 5.4.24, english translation taken from: 
<http://data.perseus.org/citations/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0032.tlg007.perseus-eng1:5.4.24> 
last accessed 20 June 2017), see David J. Bederman, International Law in Antiquity (CUP 
2001) 246. 
16 Wilhelm G. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law (De Gruyter 2000) 105. 
17 Signed 22 August 1864, entry into force 22 June 1865, reproduced in Dietrich Schindler 
and Jiří Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts (A. W. Sijthoff 1973) 203-206. The Convention 
was later rewritten twice, first to the 1906 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, signed 6 July 1906, entry into force 9 August 
1907, 11 L.N.T.S. 440, and second to the 1929 Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, signed 29 July 1929, entry into 
force 19 June 1931, 118 L.N.T.S. 303. 
18 See Hans-Peter Gasser and Daniel Thürer, ‘Humanitarian Law, International’ in Rüdiger 
Wolfrum (ed), MPEPIL Vol. V (OUP 2012) 59, 61 (para. 8 et seq.). 
19 Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, reproduced 
in Dietrich Schindler and Jiří Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts (A. W. Sijthoff 1973) 3-
 
7 
 
formulating basic pillars of today’s IHL.20 This development ultimately led to the 
codification of the law of armed conflict in the process of the Hague Peace 
Conferences of 1899 and 1907, including the convention that proved most influential 
concerning modern day IHL, the Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land21 and its annex Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land, which for the first time laid down a specific set of universally 
acknowledged rules regulating the conduct of armed forces during hostilities. The 
preamble of the convention was home to the original Martens Clause22, an 
acknowledgment that the rules codified were just the beginning and would not 
render void prior usages and the laws of humanity as well as public conscience 
protecting inhabitants and belligerents during hostilities.23 
Of the two World Wars, World War II proved to be a very effective catalyst, as the 
international community witnessed violations of the law of war and of public 
conscience on such an immense scale and of such intensity that there was 
agreement on the need for significant change. First, the Nuremburg Trials saw the 
1907 Hague Convention as being “by 1939 […] recognised by all civilised nations, 
                                            
23, see also Patryck I. Labuda, ‘Lieber Code’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), MPEPIL (OUP online 
edition 2014). 
20 Principle of military necessity (articles 14-16); treatment of prisoners of war (articles 49-
80); differentiation between combatants and partisans (article 81); protection of civilians and 
private property (articles 31-47); prohibition of certain methods of warfare (article 16 
[poison], articles 16 and 80 [torture], articles 16, 63, 65, 101, 117 [perfidy]).  
21 Signed 18th of October 1907, entry into force 26th of January 2910, 187 Consol. T.S. 
227. 
22 “Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting 
Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted 
by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the 
principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized 
peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.”, see for an 
extensive assessment, Rhea Schircks, Die Marten’sche Klausel (NOMOS 2001). 
23 For a discussion of the Martens Clause and its influence of the relationship between the 
two legal regimes see Hans-Joachim Heintze, ‘Theorien zum Verhältnis von 
Menschenrechten und humanitärem Völkerrecht’ (2011) 24(1) HuV-I 4 et seq.; for a 
discussion of the principle of humanity see Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, ‘Some 
reflections on the principle of humanity in its wide dimension’ in Robert Kolb and Gloria 
Gaggioli (eds), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Edward 
Elgar 2013) 188-197; with a critical assessment Yoram Dinstein, ‘The Principle of 
Proportionality’ in Kjetil Mujezinović Larsen, Camilla Guldahl Cooper, and Gro Nystuen 
(eds), Searching for a ‚Principle of Humanity‘ in International Humanitarian Law (CUP 2013) 
72-85. 
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and […] regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war”.24 Thus the 
convention’s norms were seen to be customary law, in effect independent from a 
state’s consent, signature, and ratification and there were to be individual 
consequences for violations. Secondly, the four Geneva Conventions of 194925 
were adopted as a reaction to the horrors of the war that was just witnessed, further 
developing the protection of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked, of prisoners of 
war, and – newly added and greatly needed – of civilians in times of war.  
Post-1945 is the time, in which the seed for the problematic relationship between 
IHL and IHRL was sown. While the Geneva Conventions were negotiated under the 
umbrella of the ICRC, the United Nations set the foundational stone for the transition 
of human rights from the national to the international level with the Charter of the 
United Nations26 and the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
in 1948.27 Both regimes developed independently with no real link between the two 
– even the members of the delegations negotiating the instruments at around the 
same time were different.28 Seemingly, the international community failed to see the 
need to harmonize both regimes, delineate their areas of application or at least 
address their relationship.  
                                            
24 Nuremberg judgment, France and ors v Göring (Hermann) and ors, Judgment and 
Sentence (1946) 41 Am. J. Int’l L. 172, 248-49. 
25 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva Convention I), 5 U.N.T.S. 31, entry into force 21 October 
1950; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva Convention II), 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 
entry into force 21 October 1950; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention III), 75 U.N.T.S. 135, entry into force 21 October 
1950; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
(Geneva Convention IV), 75 U.N.T.S. 287, entry into force 21 October 1950. 
26 Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter), 24 October 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI; see Gary 
D. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict (CUP 2010) 24 et seq. 
27 UNGA Res 217 A (III) (10 December 1948) UN Doc. A/RES/217 (III); see Gregor 
Schotten, ‘Das Verhältnis von humanitärem Völkerrecht und Menschenrechten aus 
historischer Perspektive‘ (2013) 3 HuV-I 112, 113 et seq. Human rights did not suddenly 
come into existence after World War II, but rest on a long tradition including the Magna 
Charta of 1225. The new aspect that came to pass post-1945 was the internationalisation 
of human rights, see e.g. Ute Erberich, Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr und Europäische 
Menschenrechtskonvention (Carl Heymanns 2004) 37. 
28 See Gregor Schotten, ‘Das Verhältnis von humanitärem Völkerrecht und 
Menschenrechten aus historischer Perspektive‘ (2013) 3 HuV-I 112, 113 et seq. 
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The 1949 Geneva Conventions set a sudden end to the drastic development of IHL, 
which after having twice failed to effectively govern behaviour in armed conflicts fell 
from the international community’s grace, as its attention shifted to IHRL as a new 
body of law in place to prevent war from now on. This new ius contra bellum followed 
the equally new paradigm of international law as not merely governing the relation 
of states and affecting individuals merely in a mediated sense through the proxy of 
a state actor e.g. pursuant to the rules of diplomatic protection.29 With the rise of 
IHRL, the individual was all of a sudden more or less recognized as a carrier of 
rights under international law and its rights were codified by a growing number of 
treaties – chief amongst them being (from a European perspective) the ECHR 
(1950), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 196630) and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (196631). These 
human rights were universal not only in the sense that everyone falling under the 
jurisdiction of a signatory would enjoy them, but they also quite clearly would not fall 
short of regulating situations of armed conflict.32  
The fact that they do not contain explicit rules concerning armed conflicts, apart from 
the rules on derogations to be addressed in due course, was owed to the very 
understandable and humane fact that human rights were supposed to prevent war. 
It was the unequivocal focus on peace of the United Nations and the international 
community in the time after 1945 that let them shy away from dealing with 
guarantees in situations of armed conflict, not wanting to undermine the peace 
agenda by acknowledging the possibility of another war.33 Nevertheless, article 4 of 
                                            
29 See Thomas Buergenthal, ‘Human Rights’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), MPEPIL Vol. IV (OUP 
2012) 1021-1031. 
30 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entry into force 23 March 1976. 
31 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entry into force 3 January 1976. 
32 Today this view is beyond major discussion. Of the two voices that have until recently 
disputed that human rights apply in armed conflicts, the USA has recently admitted to their 
application in armed conflicts under the administration of President Barack Obama, 
‘Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 40 of the Covenant, 
Fourth periodic report, United States of America’ (22 May 2012) UN. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/4, 
para. 507. As of today, only Israel seems to uphold the view that human rights are indeed 
peacetime-law and do not govern situations in armed conflicts, a view that is in stark 
contrast to the practice of the United Nations but also to the normative content of both IHL 
and IHRL, see e.g. Ilia Maria Siatitsa and Maia Titberidze, ‘Human Rights in Armed Conflict’ 
(2012) 3(2) J Int’l Human. Legal Stud. 233, 238 et seq. 
33 Hans-Joachim Heintze, ‘Theorien zum Verhältnis von Menschenrechten und 
humanitärem Völkerrecht’ (2011) 24(1) HuV-I 4, 5; Godofredo Torreblanca, ‘The ICRC and 
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the ICCPR and article 15 of the ECHR bear unequivocal witness that at least the 
non-derogable guarantees of IHRL apply in times of public emergency (see para. 2 
of both norms), even if states declare a state of emergency and derogate from other 
human rights in accordance with the procedure outlined in para. 3 of both norms.34 
Article 15 para. 1 ECHR even explicitly mentions “war” as an example of such public 
emergency.35 Article 15 ECHR was introduced at a later stage during the treaty 
negotiations not to clarify that IHRL applies in times of war – this was seen as self-
evident –, but to offer a process to attenuate the human rights guarantees in 
situations of war so that states would not arbitrarily – and illegally – waive their 
obligations in such cases. A previous draft did not leave any room for derogating 
from the ECHR guarantees in those circumstances.36 The continued applicability of 
                                            
human rights law’ in Robert Kolb and Gloria Gaggioli (eds), Research Handbook on Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Law (Edward Elgar 2013) 540, 550. See the ‘Annotation on the 
Draft International Covenants on Human Rights prepared by the United Nations Secretary-
General’ (1 July 1955) UN Doc. A/2929, 65, 67: “While it was recognised that one of the 
most important public emergencies was the outbreak of war, it was felt that the covenant 
should not envisage, even by implication, the possibility of war, as the United Nations was 
established with the object of preventing war.” 
34 See Godofredo Torreblanca, ‘The ICRC and human rights law’ in Robert Kolb and Gloria 
Gaggioli (eds), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Edward 
Elgar 2013) 540, 551 on the original intention that IHRL would apply in times of war; see 
Richard Ekins, Jonathan Morgan, and Tom Tugendhat, ‘Clearing the Fog of Law’ (Policy 
Exchange 2015) 9, 26 et seq. and the justifiably critical answer thereto Eirik Bjorge, ‘The 
Fogmachine of War’ (EJIL:Talk 13 April 2015); some authors indeed maintain that the 
drafters and state parties deemed the ICCPR to be inapplicable during war, see e.g. 
Christian Tomuschat, ‘Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law’ (2010) 21 Eur. J. 
Int’l L. 15, 16. The proximity of these treaties to the time of World War II as well as the 
wording of the ECHR as well as the travaux préparatoires, which clearly dealt with the 
application of IHRL during wartime strongly suggest otherwise. See the ‘Annotation on the 
Draft International Covenants on Human Rights prepared by the United Nations Secretary-
General’ (1 July 1955) UN Doc. A/2929, 65, 66 (para. 37): “The opinion was expressed, 
however, that it was necessary to envisage possible conditions of emergency in which 
States would be compelled to impose limitations upon certain human rights. In time of war, 
for example, States could not be strictly bound by obligations assumed under a convention 
unless the convention contained provisions to the contrary.” 
35 Article 4 ICCPR is read along the same lines, see Human Rights Committee, ‘General 
Comment No. 29’ (2001) UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, para. 3 “The Covenant 
requires that even during an armed conflict measures derogating from the Covenant are 
allowed only if and to the extent that the situation constitutes a threat to the life of the 
nation.”; see also OHCHR, ‘International Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed 
Conflict’ (United Nations 2011) 46 et seq. The drafters thought it inappropriate to include 
the word “war” for the reason mentioned above (fn 34). 
36 See Heike Krieger, ‘Notstand‘ in Oliver Dörr, Rainer Grote, and Thilo Marauhn (eds), 
EMRK/GG Konkordanzkommentar Vol. I (Mohr Siebeck 2nd ed. 2013) 417, 418 with further 
references. 
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human rights guarantees even during times of war was thus an agreed upon position 
in the negotiations, which found a clear expression in article 15 ECHR.  
Consequently, the problems that exist today concerning the relationship between 
IHRL and IHL are due to a birth defect of human rights instruments. Whilst they quite 
clearly are meant to govern the conduct of states in armed conflicts, they are mostly 
silent on their interplay with the already existing rules governing state conduct in 
such situations – those of the Hague and Geneva conventions and the customs and 
rules preceding and applying parallel to those treaties. However, the same defect is 
part of modern IHL, since at the time when the 1949 Geneva Conventions were 
negotiated, the rise of human rights could have been anticipated. Yet no rule on the 
interplay of both regimes was conceptualized – apart from the already mentioned 
Martens Clause, which, however, predated IHRL significantly and thus can hardly 
be seen as being specifically designed to solve conflicts between the two regimes. 
In hindsight, the state parties negotiating the 1949 Geneva Conventions seem to 
have deliberately put their conventions on a collision course with human rights by 
altering the direction of humanitarian law from a state-centred approach to a 
conception closer to IHRL. This is especially clear in Common article 3, which – just 
as human rights – regulates first and foremost the relationship between a state and 
its nationals.37 The outside factor that aggravated the situation even further was the 
rising number of internal and non-international conflicts – situations representing not 
really peace and not really war in the traditional sense.38  
Facing this situation, progress in the development of IHL, this time fuelled by the 
Vietnam War39, provided for a slight harmonization of the relationship of both legal 
                                            
37 The character of Common article 3 as a minimum standard does, however, alleviate the 
tension with the parallel human rights regime, see also Cordula Droege, ‘The Interplay 
between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situations 
of Armed Conflict’ (2007) 40(2) Isr. L. Rev. 310, 313. 
38 See e.g. Godofredo Torreblanca, ‘The ICRC and human rights law’ in Robert Kolb and 
Gloria Gaggioli (eds), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law 
(Edward Elgar 2013) 540, 553. 
39 See Gerd Oberleitner, ‘Humanitarian Law as a Source of Human Rights Law’ in Dinah 
Shelton (ed), The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law (OUP 2013) 275, 
290. 
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regimes with the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Conventions (AP I40, AP II41). 
AP I continued along the route of the Martens Clause by opening IHL towards 
human rights in its article 72 providing that  
“[t]he provisions of this Section are additional to the rules concerning 
humanitarian protection of civilians and civilian objects in the power of a Party 
to the conflict contained in the Fourth Convention, particularly Parts I and III 
thereof, as well as to other applicable rules of international law relating to the 
protection of fundamental human rights during international armed conflict.”42  
In its article 75, AP I quite plainly adopts fundamental guarantees otherwise found 
in IHRL treaties, specifically important in situations of armed conflicts and – because 
the concept of derogation is foreign to IHL – fully non-derogable.43   
Along the same lines, modern human rights treaties have included provisions 
dealing with armed conflict. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC, 
198944) may serve as an example, although its references to armed conflicts add 
little to IHL, as they mostly just refer to IHL rules.45  
Despite these slight developments towards a harmonization, which arguably has not 
become a trend,46 the general relationship between both fields of law is still unclear 
                                            
40 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, entry into force 7 
December 1978. 
41 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, entry into 
force 7 December 1978. 
42 Article 72 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (AP I, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3) 
(emphasis added); cf. also Article 49 para. 4 AP I, see Hans-Joachim Heintze, ‘Theorien 
zum Verhältnis von Menschenrechten und humanitärem Völkerrecht’ (2011) 24(1) HuV-I 4. 
43 See Kenneth Watkin, Fighting at the Legal Boundaries (OUP 2016) 142-3 for a further 
discussion. 
44 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, entry into force 2 September 1990. 
45 See e.g. article 38 paras 1 and 4 CRC; for an in-depth analysis see J. A. Robinson, 
‘Children in Armed Conflict’ (2002) J. S. Afr. L. 697; Heintze seems to see more in the CRC 
rules on armed conflicts, see Hans-Joachim Heintze, ‘Veränderungen im Verhältnis von 
Humanitärem Völkerrecht und Menschenrechtsschutz’ (2015) 28(4) HuV-I 149, 150-51; see 
also the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement 
of children in armed conflict (UNGA Res 263 (25 May 2000) UN Doc. A/RES/54/263, entry 
into force 12 February 2002) which, however, does not so much contain regulations 
regarding the behaviour of state parties in armed conflicts rather than measures to prevent 
involving children in armed conflicts, e.g. by raising age limits for recruitment. 
46 Kenneth Watkin, Fighting at the Legal Boundaries (OUP 2016) 143-52, who sees the 
1977 Additional Protocols as a high-water mark for the integration of IHRL concepts into 
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and has been so since the rise of IHRL. Do both systems apply in armed conflicts, 
which one takes precedent when two norms give conflicting directions? Do IHL and 
IHRL ever conflict at all?  
 
 
3. The practice of the United Nations and the ICJ regarding IHRL in 
armed conflicts 
The international community and the United Nations have begun to deal with the 
armed conflict dimension of IHRL about twenty years after the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights47.48 However, they have failed to give guidance on how to solve 
conflicts between IHRL and IHL or clarify the relationship between both legal 
regimes. In 1967, the United Nations Security Council, while addressing the Six Day 
War decided that “essential and inalienable human rights should be respected even 
during the vicissitudes of war.”49 In 1968, the International Conference on Human 
Rights used the Proclamation of Teheran to draw attention to the fact that: 
“[m]assive denials of human rights, arising out of aggression or any armed conflict 
with their tragic consequences, and resulting in untold human misery, engender 
reactions which could engulf the world in ever growing hostilities.”50 The General 
Assembly reacted by putting on its agenda the topic “Respect for human rights in 
armed conflicts”51 and acknowledging in 1970 that “[f]undamental human rights, as 
accepted in international law and laid down in international instruments, continue to 
                                            
IHL, after which a new divergence took place, followed by a somewhat more reconciliatory 
phase. 
47 UNGA Res 217 A(III) (10 December 1948) UN Doc. A/RES/3/217 A. 
48 See Elisabeth Strüwer, Zum Zusammenspiel von humanitärem Völkerrecht und den 
Menschenrechten am Beispiel des Targeted Killing (Peter Lang 2010) 189-91. 
49 UNSC Res 237 (14 June 1967) UN Doc. S/RES/237, preamb. para. 2; see Cordula 
Droege, ‘The Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and International Human 
Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict’ (2007) 40(2) Isr. L. Rev. 310, 315. 
50 ‘Proclamation of Teheran, Resolution XXIII’, International Conference on Human Rights 
(12 May 1968) UN Doc. A/CONF.32/41, para. 10. 
51 UNGA Res 2444 (XXIII) (19 December 1968) UN Doc. A/RES/2444.  
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apply fully in situations of armed conflict.”52 This statement has been echoed in 
substance by the UN Security Council, which regularly stresses the importance of 
IHRL and IHL in armed conflict scenarios53 and by other international organs and 
institutions.54 This practice evidences the solidified acknowledgment of the 
continued application of human rights in situations of armed conflicts. It does, 
however, little to clarify the relationship between IHL and IHRL.  
An early statement going beyond the mere acknowledgment of a continued 
application of IHRL was a report of the UN Secretary General, as he then was, Sithu 
U Thant, who in 1970 argued that there were human rights norms that overlap IHL 
in armed conflicts, e.g. the prohibition of retroactive criminal laws, the prohibition of 
slavery and the prohibition of the death penalty vis a vis pregnant women and 
children.55 However, the real catalyst for the academic discussion on the relationship 
between IHL and IHRL was the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion of the ICJ, in 
which the court famously acknowledged that the ICCPR governs situations of armed 
conflict, unless the state party issued a derogation, but explaining 
                                            
52 UNGA Res 2675 (XXV) (9 December 1970) UN Doc. A/RES/2675; for an assessment of 
the development see also OHCHR, ‘International Legal Protection of Human Rights in 
Armed Conflict’ (United Nations 2011) 93 et seq. 
53 See extensively OHCHR, ‘International Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed 
Conflict’ (United Nations 2011) 97 et seq. with an assessment of the resolutions regarding 
Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Congo, Somalia, and Darfur; for an assessment concerning the 
practice concerning UN missions Daphna Shraga, ‘The interplay between human rights and 
international humanitarian law in UN operations’ in Erika de Wet and Jann Klefner (eds), 
Convergence and Conflicts (PULP 2014) 211-226; in its very recent practice, the Security 
Council has given IHL a sometimes greater emphasis, see UNSC Res 2286 (2016) UN Doc. 
S/RES/2286 op. para. 2 “Demands that all parties to armed conflicts fully comply with their 
obligations under international law, including international human rights law, as applicable, 
and international humanitarian law”. 
54 See e.g. OHCHR, ‘International Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict’ 
(United Nations 2011) 104 et seq.; UNHCHR, ‘Report of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights’ (13 March 2015) UN Doc. A/HRC/28/18, para. 13 the report mentions violations, but 
does not state under what regime (para. 50 et seq.); ‘Reports of the UN Support Mission for 
Libya, Overview of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law during 
the Ongoing Violence in Libya’ (4 September 2014) and ‘Update on Violations of 
International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law during the Ongoing Violence in Libya’ 
(23 December 2014); ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on 
the Syrian Arab Republic’ (5 February 2015) UN Doc. A/HRC/28/69. 
55 UN Secretary General ‘Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict’ (18 September 
1970) UN Doc. A/8052, paras 27 et seq. (especially concerning NIACs). See also OHCHR, 
‘International Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict’ (United Nations 2011) 
101. 
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“[t]he test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be 
determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in 
armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus, 
whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in 
warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 
6 of the Covenant can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in 
armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself.”56  
It developed on its position in 2004 in its Advisory Opinion Legal Consequences of 
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory by again 
acknowledging that IHRL protection applies in armed conflicts, but  
“[a]s regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and 
human rights law, there are […] three possible situations: some rights may 
be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be 
exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both 
these branches of international law. In order to answer the question put to it, 
the Court will have to take into consideration both these branches of 
international law, namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, international 
humanitarian law.”57  
The ICJ reiterated the latter part in its judgment in Armed Activities in Congo in 
2005.58  
It is safe to say that the ICJ has not answered all the questions concerning the 
interaction between IHL and IHRL – especially with its sibylline statement “some 
rights may exclusively be matters of international humanitarian law; others may 
exclusively be matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these 
branches of international law.” However, the ICJ has unequivocally supported the 
continued applicability of IHRL in armed conflict situations, while upholding the 
                                            
56 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, 
240 (para. 25). 
57 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
(Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136, 178 (para. 106). 
58 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v 
Uganda) [2005] ICJ Rep 168, 242-3 (para. 216). With a critical assessment of the ICJ‘s 
jurisprudence on the issue see John Tobin, ‘Seeking Clarity in Relation to the Principle of 
Complementarity’ (2007) 8 Melb. J. Int’l L. 356; Naz K. Modirzadeh, ‘The Dark Sides of 
Convergence: A Pro-civilian Critique of the Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Law 
in Armed Conflict’ (2010) 86 US Naval War College ILS 349, 368; Francoise J. Hampson, 
‘The relationship between international humanitarian law and international human rights 
law’ in Scott Sheeran and Sir Nigel Rodley (eds), Routledge Handbook of International 
Human Rights Law (Routledge 2013) 185, 192 et seq. 
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material principles of IHL, which it explicitly categorizes as lex specialis. The ICTY 
has treated the relationship between IHL and IHRL similarly.59 
Following those leading cases from the ICJ, the Human Rights Commission and the 
Human Rights Committee have argued for a complementary relationship between 
IHL and IHRL, where both legal regimes are “not mutually exclusive”, but possibly 
“mutually reinforcing”, while accepting that the rules of IHL, if applicable, bear a 
significant importance when interpreting IHRL norms.60  
All these statements are helpful to a certain degree, however, they are easily made 
in the abstract and limited insofar as they do not actually shed light on the question, 
how the relationship between both regimes would translate to practice.  
The practice of bodies that work a little closer to the practical situations shed a little 
more light on the topic. An example is the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza 
Conflict, which in its 2009 report analysed specific conflict situations.61 It examined 
both IHL and IHRL guarantees, but went beyond only mentioning them as applicable 
guarantees. When examining the use of missiles in densely populated areas, it saw 
a violation of IHL due to insufficient precautions against civilian casualties. Following 
this, it also accepted that the human right to life was violated by the same act.62 
                                            
59 “The laws of war do not necessarily displace the laws regulating a peacetime situation; 
the former may add elements requisite to the protection which needs to be afforded to 
victims in a wartime situation.”, Prosecutor v Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic (Appeals 
Chamber), ICTY-IT-96-23& ICTY-IT-96-23/1-A (12 June 2002) para. 60. The ICTY 
sometimes goes further than that into the direction of a convergence between both regimes 
(Prosecutor v Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, ICTY-IT-96-23 & ICTY-IT-96-23/1-T (22 
February 2001) para. 467); see Gentian Zyberi, ‘The Jurisprudence of the International 
Court of Justice and International Criminal Courts and Tribunals’ in Erika de Wet and Jann 
Klefner (eds), Convergence and Conflicts (PULP 2014) 395, 401; Robert Cryer, ‘The 
Interplay of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: The Approach of the ICTY’ (2010) 14(3) 
J. Conflict & Sec. L. 511. 
60 ‘Resolution 2005/63 on Protection of the Human Rights of Civilians in Armed Conflicts’ 
(20 April 2005) UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/63; see OHCHR, ‘International Legal Protection 
of Human Rights in Armed Conflict’ (United Nations 2011) 102 et seq.; see also UNHRC 
‘General Comment No. 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States 
Parties to the Covenant’ (2004) UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para. 11: “While, in 
respect of certain Covenant rights, more specific rules of international humanitarian law may 
be specially [sic] relevant for the purposes of the interpretation of Covenant rights, both 
spheres of law are complementary, not mutually exclusive.” 
61 ‘Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’ (25 September 
2009) UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, paras 294 et seq.  
62 ‘Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’ (25 September 
2009) UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, para. 496. 
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Likewise, the use of mortar in densely populated areas was held to violate article 57 
para. 2 lit. a (ii) und (iii) AP I as well as the human right to life.63 As such, human 
rights violations were held to have taken place when IHL was violated. 
Consequently, the UN Fact Finding Mission seems to see IHL as a body of law that 
takes precedent in the situations it governs, one may say lex specialis to a certain 
degree. Where IHL is violated, IHRL is violated likewise, however, if IHL is followed, 
the mission does not seem to see human rights guarantees overlapping the 
applicable IHL. The statement of the Human Rights Council in its resolution 9/9 that 
“conduct that violates international humanitarian law […] may also constitute a gross 
violation of human rights”64 goes into a similar direction. 
 
Consequently, the history of IHL and IHRL as well as the UN practice on the topic, 
while being largely inconclusive concerning a detailed approach to the relationship 
between both bodies of law, suggest a parallel application of both regimes in armed 
conflicts. This illustrates the potential for conflict between IHL and IHRL.  
 
 
4. Applicability of IHRL and situations of potential conflicts with IHL 
However, such conflict between both regimes is not automatic. There are instances, 
in which conflict is either prevented or solved by existing international law before it 
can cause problems. Accordingly, in the following it will be outlined in which 
situations the relationship between IHRL and IHL is not problematic either because 
one of those regimes does not apply or because their relationship is determined by 
international law itself.  
With the rise of universal and regional human rights instruments came about 
stronger and more specific guarantees and the growing acceptance that such 
instruments apply to the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction and are not limited to 
the acts of a member state on its territory. If it was not for this extraterritorial 
                                            
63 ‘Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’ (25 September 
2009) UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, para. 701. 
64 ‘Protection of the human rights of civilians in armed conflict’ (18 September 2008) UN 
Doc. A/HRC/RES/9/9, op. para. 1. 
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application of human rights law, the relationship between IHRL and IHL would rarely 
cause problems, at least for European states. European armies have recently been 
deployed mainly in scenarios, in which they act outside of their territory. A lot has 
been written on the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties65 and similarly 
on the issue of when to attribute a certain action to a nation state and when to an 
international organization, e.g. in NATO or UN deployments.66 This thesis will not 
delve deeper into the interpretation of “jurisdiction” pursuant to article 1 ECHR and 
the ICCPR‘s “within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction” (article 2 para 1 
ICCPR), but will – if only for the sake of the argument – accept in the following that 
human rights do in fact apply extraterritorially in many instances, so that there are 
potential conflicts between norms of IHL and IHRL. This mirrors the controversial 
tendency of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).67 IHL is not subject to a 
comparable applicability test, but will apply, whenever armed forces act in an armed 
conflict regardless of jurisdiction exercised or not.68 Most would agree that the force 
with which IHL and IHRL concepts collide in modern-day deployments of armed 
forces was not foreseeable by the parties to the IHRL instruments at the time of their 
drafting, since the extraterritorial application of IHRL was hardly anticipated to the 
extent it is presumed to exist today.  
Apart from its extraterritorial application, the better arguments support the position 
that IHRL continues to apply in situations of armed conflict, as analysed above. As 
stated, this is evidenced most clearly by the norms allowing for derogations of 
certain human rights in times of war and has been almost universally acknowledged 
by state actors and international organizations as well as national and international 
                                            
65 See e.g. Ralph Wilde, ‘Human Rights Beyond Borders at the World Court’ (2013) 12 Chin. 
J. Int’l L. 639-77; Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties 
(OUP 2011). 
66 See e.g. Julia-Pia Schütze, Die Zurechenbarkeit von Völkerrechtsverstößen im Rahmen 
mandatierter Friedensmissionen der Vereinten Nationen (Duncker & Humblot 2011); André 
Nollkämper, ‘Dual Attribution’ (2011) 9 J. Int'l Crim. Just. 1143-57. See also Responsibility 
of international organizations (27 February 2012) UN Doc. A/RES/66/100; for a further 
assessment see Tim R. Salomon, Die internationale Strafverfolgungsstrategie gegenüber 
somalischen Piraten (Springer 2016) 291-3. 
67 For a quick overview of the court’s jurisprudence see ECtHR Press Unit, ‘Extra-territorial 
jurisdiction of States Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights’ (February 
2016). 
68 See e.g. Peter Rowe, The Impact of Human Rights on Armed Forces (OUP 2006) 122 et 
seq. 
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courts. This result also goes in accord with the object and purpose of IHRL.69 The 
main objectors regarding the application of human rights in armed conflicts have 
traditionally been the USA and Israel; however, the USA has shifted toward 
accepting that the ICCPR indeed does apply in armed conflicts under the Obama 
administration.70 The “displacement-theory” advanced by Israel and formerly by the 
USA to establish the primacy of IHL is based on an overly aggressive application of 
the lex specialis concept, proposing the displacement of IHRL by IHL in all situations 
of armed conflict.71 However, lex specialis is in place to solve conflicts of single 
norms not to brush aside whole legal regimes, whose norms may or may not conflict 
with more specific rules of another regime.72 The only way leading to the a priori 
primacy of IHL over IHRL would be to support the (antiquated) position that all 
treaties – including IHRL treaties – are implicitly restricted to peacetime.73 This is 
unconvincing in itself, but all the more so since the derogation clauses quite clearly 
speak for an explicit inclusion of armed conflicts into the ratione materiae of human 
rights.  
In the same vein, the derogation clauses also speak against the sometimes-
proposed teeter-totter-relationship between IHRL and IHL. Proponents of this 
position answer the question, whether IHL or IHRL apply in a given armed conflict 
                                            
69 See Marko Milanovic, ‘Norm Conflicts, IHL and IHRL’ in Orna Ben-Naftali (ed), 
International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law (OUP 2011) 95, 97 et 
seq. for further reference.  
70 For the traditional view see the U.S. submission in Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights Coard et al. v United States of America (29 September 1999), Report N. 109/99 - 
Case 10.951, para. 38; see also ‘Reply of the Government of the United States of America 
to the Report of the Five UNCHR Special Rapporteurs on Detainees in Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba’ (May 10, 2006) 16; see however now the ‘Consideration of reports submitted by 
States parties under article 40 of the Covenant, Fourth periodic report, United States of 
America’ (22 May 2012) UN. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/4, para. 507: “it is important to bear in mind 
that international human rights law and the law of armed conflict are in many respects 
complementary and mutually reinforcing”, see also Kenneth Watkin, Fighting at the Legal 
Boundaries (OUP 2016) 124 with a discussion of the US approach. 
71 See Kenneth Watkin, Fighting at the Legal Boundaries (OUP 2016) 124. 
72 See Marko Milanovic, ‘Norm Conflicts, IHL and IHRL’ in Orna Ben-Naftali (ed), 
International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law (OUP 2011) 95, 98 et 
seq. 
73 See article 3 of the Draft articles on the effects of armed conflicts on treaties (UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.777) and the commentary (<http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/ 
commentaries/1_10_2011.pdf> last accessed 20 June 2017); for a discussion see Silja 
Vönecky, ‘Armed Conflict, Effect on Treaties’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), MPEPIL (OUP online 
edition 2011). 
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scenario by reference to the proximity of the situation at hand to a typical situation 
of armed conflict or to a situation of peacetime administration. If a given situation 
would be close in nature to peacetime administration then IHRL would apply fully 
even in armed conflict settings, whereas IHL would apply when the situation at hand 
is one of armed combat. However, at the same time IHL and IHRL are supposed to 
remain distinct and separated without one having a bearing on the other.74 This 
position is unfounded in law and would clearly cause more problems than it solves. 
Most situations in the reality of armed combat are not clear-cut and such a solution 
would result in grave uncertainties as to which legal regime applies when. This 
uncertainty contravenes the object and purpose of IHL and IHRL to effect a practical 
protection of life, bodily integrity, etc. It has to be underlined that such “to’ing and 
fro’ing between different regimes is completely unworkable in practice.”75 Moreover, 
there is simply no rule, written or unwritten, which would back the replacement of 
either IHRL or IHL with the other regime if the situation at hand is comparable to 
peacetime administration or armed combat, apart from the application threshold of 
IHL.76 With its rules on occupation, IHL quite specifically regulates situations close 
to peacetime administration, which begs the question, why in such a case, which is 
specifically regulated by IHL, IHRL should replace IHL.  
Consequently, IHL and IHRL generally apply parallel in situations of armed conflict. 
Yet, there are situations in which IHRL and IHL will collide neither in letter nor in 
concept. A case in point is the conduct of armed opposition groups involved in armed 
conflicts. While such groups are bound by IHL by virtue of being a party to the 
conflict, they are not (yet) widely held to be bound by IHRL as those obligations 
address state actors first and foremost.77 
                                            
74 See e.g. Pascal Hector, ‘Das Humanitäre Völkerrecht als lex specialis‘ in Christian 
Calliess (ed), Herausforderung an Staat und Verfassung, Liber Amicorum Torsten Stein 
(NOMOS 2015) 956, 971.  
75 Francoise J. Hampson, ‘The relationship between international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law’ in Scott Sheeran and Sir Nigel Rodley (eds), Routledge 
Handbook of International Human Rights Law (Routledge 2013) 185, 211. 
76 For the same reason, the distinction based on the actor (if police then law enforcement 
and IHRL; if military then conduct of hostilities and IHL) is widely rejected, see e.g. ICRC, 
‘The Use of Force in Armed Conflicts – Expert Meeting’ (2013) 12 
77 See e.g. Wolfgang Heinz, ‘Zum Umgang des VN-Sicherheitsrates mit 
Menschenrechtspflichten bewaffneter Oppositionsgruppen’ (2013) 1 HuV-I 4 et seq.; for a 
position in favour of non-state actors being bound by human rights Andrew Clapham, 
Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (OUP 2006); for the opposed position see 
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Furthermore, the uncertainty regarding the relationship between IHL and IHRL does 
not arise in a situation of non-international armed struggle, which does not surpass 
the applicability threshold of IHL, either because the armed struggle is of lesser 
intensity or because it is short-lived. The threshold for the application of Common 
article 3 is deemed to be fulfilled in cases of “…protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups 
within a State”78. Below this threshold, a conflict will be subject to national law and 
will be dealt with as an internal disturbance of public order with the exercise of public 
authority being regulated by IHRL alone.79  
If such a conflict intensifies and the threshold of Common article 3 is surpassed, the 
question of how IHL relates to IHRL does arise in principle, but not automatically 
with full force. When Common article 3 applies, it quite clearly establishes a 
minimum standard, which will not conflict with IHRL.80 The nature of Common article 
3 as a minimum guarantee is unequivocally supported by its wording: “each Party 
[…] shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions”.81 In such 
circumstances, Common article 3 establishes an explicit rule mandating the parallel 
                                            
Nigel Rodley, ‘Can armed opposition groups violate human rights standards?’ in Kathleen 
E. Mahoney and Paul Mahoney (eds), Human Rights in the 21st Century: A Global 
Challenge (Martinus Nijhoff 1993) 297-318; Marco Sassòli and Laura Olson, The 
relationship between international humanitarian and human rights law where it matters 
(2008) 90(871) Int’l Rev. Red Cross 599, 615 et seq.; cf. also ICRC, ‘The Use of Force in 
Armed Conflicts – Expert Meeting’ (2013) 10. 
78 Prosecutor v Tadic ICTY-IT-94-1-AR72 (2 October 1995) para. 70; see e.g. Claus Kreß, 
‘War Crimes Committed in Non-International Armed Conflict and the Emerging. System of 
International Criminal Justice’ (2000) 30 Isr. Yb Hum. Rts 116 et seq.; David Turns, ‘The 
Law of Armed Conflict’ (International Humanitarian Law)’ in Malcolm D. Evans (ed), 
International Law (OUP 3rd ed 2010) 814, 819; Anthony Cullen, The Concept of Non-
International Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law (CUP 2010) 117 et seq.; 
William J. Fenrick, ‘The Development of the Law of Armed Conflict through the 
Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (1998) 3 
JACL 197-232. Further indicators include “the number, duration and intensity of individual 
confrontations; the type of weapons and other military equipment used; the number and 
calibre of munitions fired; the number of persons and type of forces partaking in the fighting; 
the number of casualties; the extent of material destruction; and the number of civilians 
fleeing combat zones”, see Prosecutor v Haradinaj et al. (Trial Chamber Judgment) ICTY-
IT-04-84 (3 April 2008) para. 49 (p. 27).  
79 See article 1 para. 2 AP II; Robin Geiß, Failed States (Duncker & Humblot 2005) 229 et 
seq. with further references.  
80 Gary D. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict (CUP 2010) 237. 
81 See Anthony Cullen, The Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict in International 
Humanitarian Law (CUP 2010) 29 et seq. 
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application of its guarantees and IHRL. However, it will be argued, that this does not 
prejudice the existence of customary IHL norms or implicit rights of a state actor that 
is party to such a conflict. As an example of such a constellation, the acknowledged 
right of armed forces to target armed opposition fighters in international as well as 
non-international armed conflicts has an influence on the interpretation and 
application of the human right to life in such a situation.82  
In the same vein, the applicability of AP II to a conflict83 would have more bearing 
on the question, which norms govern a given case, since AP II does establish 
specific and tailor-made guarantees for NIACs that have an influence on the 
interpretation of IHRL.84  
Even if IHRL and IHL apply parallel to each other, the relationship between both 
regimes is sometimes specifically regulated by norms of international law. Although 
there is strictly speaking no hierarchy of norms in international law, there are 
exceptions to that rule. The solution of some conflicts can be achieved by recourse 
to the principle of lex superior.85 Examples are article 53 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT86) and article 103 UN Charter87 in combination with article 
30 para. 1 VCLT.88  
                                            
82 See below 6.3.1. 
83 This is the case, when the “dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups” 
involved in the conflict are “under responsible command” and “exercise such control over a 
part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations 
and to implement” the guarantees of AP II, see article 1 para. 1 AP II.  
84 For an analysis of the relationship of AP II to human rights law, see below especially 
regarding deprivations of liberty 6.3.2. 
85 It is a topic of dispute, if article 103 UN Charter indeed is lex superior or even reflective 
of a constitutional character of the UN Charter (in favour Bardo Fassbender, ‘The United 
Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community’ (1997) 36 Colum. J. 
Transnat'l. L. 529-619) or merely a conflict clause, see extensively Antonios 
Tzanakopolous, ‘Collective Security and Human Rights’ in Erika de Wet and Jure Vidmar 
(eds) Hierarchy in International Law (OUP 2012) 42-70; Rain Liivoja, ‘The Scope of the 
Supremacy Clause of the United Nations Charter’ (2008) 57 ICLQ 583-612. The practical 
differences of this dispute are negligible for the topic at hand. 
86 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, entry into force 27 January 1980. 
87 Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI. 
88 The rule of lex posterior, which has found an at least rudimentary expression in article 30 
of the VCLT has no bearing on the situation at hand. The application of that rule is ultimately 
bound to an interpretation of the parties‘ intent to derogate from the earlier treaty (see ILC, 
‘Fragmentation in International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission’ (13 April 2006) UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, para. 230), an intent that can be 
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Article 53 VCLT contains rules of ius cogens – peremptory norms in international 
law.89 Applicable ius cogens will not be replaced or restricted in their scope by other 
rules, more specific or not, as they are compulsory. A violation of a ius cogens norm 
is legally unjustifiable.90 Moreover, the material content of such a norm cannot be 
weakened by a harmonizing interpretation with norms of another legal regime, 
unless this is allowed by the compelling norm itself.91 A real conflict between a norm 
of IHL and a ius cogens guarantee is, however, unlikely to arise in the IHL/IHRL 
conundrum. Ius cogens norms, such as the prohibition of torture92, presuppose a 
universal acknowledgment. This factually prevents a parallel rule allowing such 
conduct in an IHL treaty.93  
A further rule with possible effect on norm conflicts is article 103 UN Charter, which 
– when read in conjunction with article 30 para. 1 VCLT – orders the primacy of UN 
Charter obligations vis a vis obligations under other international agreements in 
case of a conflict. This rule, which also grants primacy to Security Council 
resolutions94, gives the Security Council the option to “inject rules of its own making 
                                            
claimed neither for IHL nor for IHRL. Additionally, the conclusion of a later inter se 
agreement between warring state parties rendering IHL or IHRL inapplicable would run 
counter to article 41 para. 1a VCLT, since such an agreement would be “incompatible with 
the effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole”. 
89 See for an in-depth analysis Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International 
Law (OUP 2006); Jerzy Sztucki, Jus Cogens and the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (Springer 1974). 
90 See e.g. Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law (OUP 2006) 
133 et seq. 
91 See e.g. Jordan J. Paust, ‘Human Rights on the Battlefield’ (2015) 47(3) Geo. Wash. Int’l 
L. Rev. 509, 557 et seq.; while convincing on norms with ius cogens-status, Paust goes 
further and sees article 103 UN Charter as establishing “the primacy of Charter-based 
human rights duties”. This seems to go a bit far seeing that the UN Charter itself does not 
guarantee specific human rights in a material sense. The juridification of human rights was 
a development that occurred well after the UN Charter. 
92 See e.g. Erika de Wet, ‘The Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of jus cogens 
and its Implications for National and Customary Law’ (2004) 15 Eur. J. Int’l L. 97 et seq. 
93 See for a further discussion on the irrelevance of ius cogens in the discussion at hand 
Marko Milanovic, ‘Norm Conflicts, IHL and IHRL’ in Orna Ben-Naftali (ed), International 
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law (OUP 2011) 95, 103 et seq. 
94 See e.g. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention 
arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United States of 
America), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures (Order) [1992] ICJ Rep 114, 
126 (para. 42); see also Andreas Paulus and Johann Ruben Leiß, ‘Art. 103’ in Bruno 
Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte, and Andreas Paulus (eds), The Charter of the 
United Nations (OUP 3rd ed 2012) para. 38 with further reference; José Alvarez, ‘The 
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into the IHL/IHRL calculus”.95 It is still subject to debate, however, how this would 
translate to practice. By authorizing states to use “all necessary means” in a chapter 
VII resolution, the Security Council can regularly not be held to seek to depart from 
existing IHL and IHRL obligations. As such, chapter VII authorizations may well 
allow e.g. deprivations of liberty, when these are necessary means,96 by creating a 
normative basis for such actions in the realm of international law, to be 
accommodated by the existing legal regimes e.g. by way of including this case in 
the narrow catalogue of article 5 para. 1 ECHR. However, beyond establishing a 
legal basis for such a measure, a resolution will regularly not specify details, such 
as procedural guarantees of detention, prerequisites, maximum duration, etc., so 
that IHL and IHRL still apply in that regard and their relationship must be addressed 
to that extent. Indeed, the Security Council regularly includes in its resolutions 
allowing for the use of all necessary means, clauses urging the contingents “to abide 
by international humanitarian [and] human rights […] law”.97 By doing so, the 
Security Council clearly documents that it generally does not intend to alter the 
applicable norms of IHL and IHRL or set them aside.  
 
Last but not least, norm conflicts can be anticipated by the legal regimes themselves 
and dealt with by conflict clauses in the respective treaties, which establish the 
primacy of one regime over the other or that lay down basic rules concerning the 
relationship of the regime at hand with other rules.98 As stated above, it is a birth 
                                            
Security Council’s War on Terrorism: Problems and Policy Options’ in Erika de Wet and 
André Nollkaemper (eds), Review of the Security Council by Member States (Intersentia 
2003) 119, 133; critically Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘The Acts of the Security Council: 
Meaning and Standards of Review’ (2007) 11 Max Planck UNYb 143, 149-51. 
95 Marko Milanovic, ‘Norm Conflicts, IHL and IHRL’ in Orna Ben-Naftali (ed), International 
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law (OUP 2011) 95, 104. 
96 See e.g. R (on the applicant of Al-Jedda) (FC) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] 
UKHL 58. 
97 See e.g. UNSC Res 2295 (2016) UN Doc. S/RES/2295, op. para 38; see also UNSC Res 
1851 (2008) UN Doc S/RES/1851, op. para. 6: “any measures undertaken pursuant to the 
authority of this paragraph shall be undertaken consistent with applicable international 
humanitarian and human rights law”. 
98 Nele Matz-Lück, ‘Treaties, Conflict Clauses’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), MPEPIL (OUP 
online edition 2006); Marko Milanovic, ‘Norm Conflicts, IHL and IHRL’ in Orna Ben-Naftali 
(ed), International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law (OUP 2011) 95, 
104 et seq.  
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defect of IHRL and Geneva IHL that such conflict clauses, delineating IHRL and IHL 
or at least clarifying their relationship, are absent in the treaties. Some see the 
already addressed derogation clauses of human rights treaties such as article 15 
ECHR as conflict clauses.99 These derogation clauses, it is argued here, are one 
(limited) way of solving (some) conflicts, but their actual importance – theoretically 
and practically – is easily and widely overstated. Practically, derogations play no 
role whatsoever in modern extraterritorial deployments. The reason is easily 
guessed: States have simply been reluctant to actively acknowledge the 
extraterritorial applicability of human rights treaties in armed conflicts and beyond.100 
But even theoretically, the answers provided by derogation clauses are limited. 
Article 15 ECHR may serve as an example. It allows for derogations “[i]n time of war 
or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation” “to the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not 
inconsistent with its other obligations under international law”. Its para. 2 limits 
possibilities of derogations from article 2 ECHR to “deaths resulting from lawful acts 
of war” and excepts articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 from the derogable rights 
altogether. Some argue that the mere existence of this norm bars any possibility to 
consider IHL, when applying IHRL to an armed conflict, based on the fact that the 
derogation procedure was intended to be the only way to replace IHRL 
guarantees.101 However, contrary to that, it is submitted that article 15 ECHR should 
be taken at face value. It merely allows for derogations of the ECHR obligation and 
article 15 para. 2 ECHR merely defines the circle of non-derogable human rights, 
i.e. such rights which continue to apply in situations of public emergency. Article 15 
                                            
99 Marko Milanovic, ‘Norm Conflicts, IHL and IHRL’ in Orna Ben-Naftali (ed), International 
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law (OUP 2011) 95, 104 et seq.  
100 This is the most plausible explanation for the lack of derogations, while it seems highly 
unlikely that states have not gone down that road due to considerations of legal 
methodology, see however Pascal Hector, ‘Das Humanitäre Völkerrecht als lex specialis’ in 
Christian Calliess (ed), Herausforderung an Staat und Verfassung, Liber Amicorum Torsten 
Stein (NOMOS 2015) 956, 960 et seq. 
101 To that effect Silvia Borelli, ‘Jaloud v Netherlands and Hassan v United Kingdom: Time 
for a principled approach in the application of the ECHR to military action abroad’ (2015) 
2(16) QIL 25; see also Anna Gebhardt, ‘Menschenrechtsschutz oder Humanitäres 
Völkerrecht’ in Matthias Gillner and Volker Stümke (eds), Kollateralopfer (NOMOS 2015) 
57, 67; Christian Johann, Menschenrechte im internationalen bewaffneten Konflikt (Berliner 
Wissenschaftsverlag 2012) 214 et seq.; see also the dissent by Judge Spano, joined by 
Judges Nicolaou, Bianku and Kalaydjieva in Hassan v UK App no 29750/09 (ECHR Grand 
Chamber Judgment 16 September 2014) para. 16 of the dissent. 
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ECHR, however, falls significantly short of barring a priori any attempt to interpret 
human rights in accordance with the accepted methods of interpretation, including 
article 31 para. 3 lit. c of the VCLT. Likewise, it does not mandate a departure from 
other rules of legal methodology such as the concept of lex specialis derogat legi 
generalis. While an interpretation would naturally need to give effect to the IHRL 
rule and cannot water it down ad libitum,102 recourse to the interpretative process 
and other rules of legal methodology is simply not barred by the existence of a 
derogation clause. 
It has thus been established when conflicts between IHL and IHRL will not occur. It 
has furthermore been addressed when conflicts will be solved by existing rules 
establishing the primacy of one rule over another. In the following, the thesis will 
turn to cases in which both regimes do in fact conflict and it will be outlined, how 
such cases should be dealt with. 
 
5. Normative analysis of the relationship between IHL and IHRL and 
ways of conflict solution 
5.1 Key assumptions of the following analysis 
At the outset, a number of observations will be made on which the following analysis 
is based.  
It has already been stated that IHL does not set aside IHRL in armed conflicts. 
Accordingly, the analysis will be based on the following assumption: IHL is not a 
self-contained regime in the sense that it sets aside all norms of IHRL.103 While there 
is significant uncertainty surrounding the notion of self-contained regimes and the 
consequences of characterising a legal regime as self-contained, this term generally 
refers to a legal system that lays “down the rights and duties of the actors within the 
regime (primary rules)” as well as provides “for means and mechanisms to enforce 
compliance, to settle disputes […] and to react to breaches (secondary rules), with 
                                            
102 This is the fear expressed by Marko Milanovic, ‘Norm Conflicts, IHL and IHRL’ in Orna 
Ben-Naftali (ed), International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law 
(OUP 2011) 95, 97. 
103 See Dorota Marianna Banaszewska, ‘Lex Specialis’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), MPEPIL 
(OUP online edition 2015) para. 21 for the strict definition “legal regimes whose lex specialis 
system would in no case allow recourse to the general rules”. 
 
27 
 
the intention to replace and through this to exclude the application of general 
international law”.104 IHL, especially the IHL applicable to IACs, bears some 
resemblance to such a regime. It is based (and its international acceptance hinges) 
“on a subtle balance of military necessity and considerations of humanity”.105 
Furthermore, it regulates situations of very specific character and excludes as unfit 
– at least to a degree – general rules of international law, e.g. in cases of belligerent 
reprisals.106 As such, some see IHL as a self-contained regime proper and because 
of that, IHRL as well as all other general rules as excluded in armed conflicts.107 
Such a view is fundamentally misguided. Proponents of it would not only have to 
argue that the derogation clauses of IHRL treaties, especially that of article 15 
ECHR explicitly referring to “war”, are not only superfluous, but based on a flawed 
understanding of the law, it would have to characterise the Martens Clause, which 
                                            
104 Eckart Klein, ‘Self-contained regimes’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), MPEPIL (OUP online 
edition 2006) para. 1; see also Case concerning the United States Diplomatic and Consular 
Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) [1980] ICJ Rep 3, 40 (para. 86): “The rules 
of diplomatic law, in short, constitute a self-contained regime which, on the one hand, lays 
down the receiving State’s obligations regarding the facilities, privileges and immunities to 
be accorded to diplomatic missions and, on the other, foresees their possible abuse by 
members of the mission and specifies the means at the disposal of the receiving States to 
counter any such abuse.”; Article 55 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility (UN Doc. 
A/56/10, chapter V) also regulates that in case of a special regime, which supplies its own 
secondary rules, the ILC articles do not apply. 
105 Robin Geiß, ‘Land Warfare’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), MPEPIL (OUP online edition 2009) 
para. 21. 
106 See ICRC, ‘Rule 145, Reprisals’ in Customary International Humanitarian Law Database 
<https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule145> last accessed 20 
June 2017. 
107 See Wolff Heintschel v. Heinegg who allows for no role of IHRL in international armed 
conflicts, ‘Factors in war to peace transitions’ (2004) 27 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 843, 871 
and sees the progressive development of IHL by states even after the rise of human rights 
as evidence that it prevails over IHRL; the same result is reached by Michelle A Hansen, 
‘Preventing the Emasculation of Warfare’ (2007) 194 Mil. L. Rev. 1 et seq. by arguing human 
rights apply only to the citizens of the acting state for historical reasons. See also Barry A. 
Feinstein, ‘The Applicability of the Regime of Human Rights in Times of Armed Conflict and 
Particularly to Occupied Territories’ (2005) 4(2) Nw. J. Int'l Hum. Rts 238, 243: “mutually 
exclusive regimes”, which seems to go against the fact that IHL contains provisions 
applicable during peacetime, as evidenced by Common article 2 para. 1 and article 3 of 
AP I. 
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was again and again (1899108, 1907109 and 1977110) consciously included in the IHL 
treaties and which acknowledges the openness of IHL towards “the principles of 
international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity 
and from the dictates of public conscience” as irrelevant. Also, it would have to 
blatantly ignore the references to IHRL in IHL provisions such as article 72 AP I 
explicitly referring to “rules of international law relating to the protection of 
fundamental human rights during international armed conflict” and the rules in IHRL 
treaties that explicitly apply in times of armed conflict.111 While being at it, this 
position would also have to turn a blind eye to the jurisprudence of the ICJ and the 
ECtHR as well as other UN- and state practice. However, what can be (and has 
been recently) said of IHL is that it is a “special regime”, which for interpretative 
purposes “may often be considered in [its] entirety”.112 This means that an IHL rule 
will be interpreted in connection with all other rules of IHL and its underlying 
concepts as well as the “unified object and purpose” of IHL. Furthermore, while IHL 
is not a self-contained regime to the effect that it excludes IHRL from armed 
conflicts, this does not exclude the possibility that some aspects of IHL may be self-
contained regimes. This has been proposed for sets of rules relating to a specific 
subject matter such as “a treaty on the regulation of the uses of a particular 
weapon”.113  
                                            
108  Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, adopted 29 July 
1899, entry into force 4 September 1900, 187 Consol. T.S. 429. 
109 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed 18 October 
1907, entry into force 26 January 1910, 187 Consol. T.S. 227. 
110 Article 1 para. 2 of AP I and article 1 paragraph 4 of AP II. 
111 See e.g. article 38 of the CRC; Protocol 13 to the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms on the Abolition of the Death Penalty in All Circumstances, 
ETS 187, entry into force 1 July 2003; article 2 of the Second Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death 
Penalty (15 December 1989) UN Doc. A/RES/44/128, entry into force 11 July 1991. For a 
convincing discussion of IHL as a self-contained regime see Christian Johann, 
Menschenrechte im internationalen bewaffneten Konflikt (Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag 
2012) 142 et seq.; Gerd Oberleitner, Human Rights in Armed Conflict (CUP 2015) 83 et 
seq.  
112 ILC, ‘Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International 
Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’ 
(2006) 4.  
113 Ibid. with reference to the Case of the S.S. “Wimbledon”, PCIJ Rep Series A, No 1 (1923) 
23-24, in which the Permanent Court of International Justice noted that the provisions on 
the Kiel Canal in the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 “differ […] from those to which other 
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Secondly, the following analysis is based on the understanding that IHL and IHRL 
norms can conflict and do so. This has sometimes been disputed. The challenge to 
the notion of norm conflicts between IHL and IHRL is based on a very restrictive 
understanding of the term norm conflict, referring only to cases in which one norm 
compels the addressee to act in a certain way, when – at the same time – another 
norm forbids such action.114 It is submitted that while such cases would indeed be 
rare, if at all existent regarding IHL and IHRL, there is a significant area of overlap 
between IHL and IHRL in which both regimes sometimes contradict each other in 
concept. When IHL permits the taking of prisoners of war and IHRL allows the 
deprivation of liberty only in a limited number of cases, not including prisoner of war 
cases115, such a situation will for the purposes of this study be treated as a conflict 
of legal norms and concepts triggering the toolbox of means to avoid and ultimately 
solve such conflicts, i.e. the interpretation of the norms (including the interpretation 
pursuant to article 31 para. 3 lit. c VCLT), but also the concept of lex specialis 
derogat legi generalis.116 Such a solution has sometimes been attacked on the 
grounds that IHL is prohibitive in nature and does not actually allow the capture of 
persons or the use of force against combatants, just as IHRL is prohibitive in nature, 
so that there is no conflict.117 While this argument is technically coherent, it seems 
unconvincing, when one sees where IHL comes from. Of course, IHL is prohibitive 
in nature, because the state parties when negotiating IHL treaties quite clearly came 
                                            
internal navigable waterways of the [German] Empire are subjected […] The provisions of 
the Kiel Canal are therefore self-contained”. 
114 See Jean d’Aspremont and Elodie Tranchez, ‘The quest for a non-conflictual coexistence 
of international human rights and humanitarian law: which role for the lex specialis 
principle?’ in Robert Kolb and Gloria Gaggioli (eds) Research Handbook on Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Law (Edward Elgar 2013) 223, 231 et seq.; see also Christian Johann, 
Menschenrechte im internationalen bewaffneten Konflikt (Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag 
2012) 176 et seq. 
115 This conflict was the main problem of Hassan v UK App no 29750/09 (ECHR Grand 
Chamber Judgment 16 September 2014). 
116 As stated above, this rule was never intended to replace whole regimes. In the modern 
understanding applied here, lex specialis is both a concept governing interpretation (with a 
role in the process of the interpretations pursuant to article 31 para. 3 lit. c VCLT) and a 
concept solving norm- (not regime-) conflicts in favour of the more specific rule. 
117 See e.g. Christian Johann, Menschenrechte im internationalen bewaffneten Konflikt 
(Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag 2012) 183 and 196 et seq.  
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from a place where all was fair in (love and) war.118 That is not to say that IHL allows 
all behaviour it does not explicitly prohibit, but there are instances in which IHL does 
offer a legal basis for state actions.119 Furthermore, there are examples where IHL’s 
silence on certain guarantees such as procedural guarantees accompanying 
detentions of prisoners of war is deliberate, normative in nature, and an expression 
of allowing in this instance the deprivation of liberty without those procedural 
guarantees.120  
Thirdly, lex specialis is an accepted part of legal methodology. It is true that it is hard 
to pin down in content as well as legal nature. Consequently, it has been assigned 
different legal statūs over the time encompassing “principle of legal logic, positive 
rule of law, general principle of law, interpretative rule, and presumption rule to legal 
proverbs”.121 The difficulties in pinning down the legal nature of the rule should, 
however, not distract from the fact that the rule is and remains “a widely accepted 
maxim of legal interpretation and technique for the resolution of normative conflicts” 
with “a long history”.122 It dates back to Roman law and as such has been a 
“compelling technique of solving normative conflicts within [Public International 
Law]” ever since the nascence of international law.123 Consequently, the contention 
that the concept lex specialis derogat legi generali was “not part of mainstream 
thinking on the relationship between IHL and IHRL” prior to the ICJ Nuclear 
                                            
118 See also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] 
ICJ Rep 226, 240 (para. 25); Wolfrum and Matz-Lück also argue for a broader approach to 
the topic of norm conflicts, see Rüdiger Wolfrum and Nele Matz, Conflicts in International 
Environmental Law (Springer 2003) 6 et seq.  
119 See below 6. 
120 Cf. Pascal Hector, ‘Das Humanitäre Völkerrecht als lex specialis’ in Christian Calliess 
(ed), Herausforderung an Staat und Verfassung, Liber Amicorum Torsten Stein (NOMOS 
2015) 956, 966; Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(OUP 2012) 92; see below 6.2 and 6.3.2. 
121 Dorota Marianna Banaszewska, ‘Lex Specialis’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), MPEPIL (OUP 
online edition 2015) para. 7; Erich Vranes, ‘Lex Superior, Lex Specialis, Lex Posterior’ 
(2005) 65 ZaöRV 391 392 et seq. 
122 ILC, ‘Fragmentation in International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International 
Law Commission’ (13 April 2006) UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, para. 56 (and fn 57). 
123 Dorota Marianna Banaszewska, ‘Lex Specialis’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), MPEPIL (OUP 
online edition 2015) para. 2; ILC, ‘Fragmentation in International Law, Report of the Study 
Group of the International Law Commission’ (13 April 2006) UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, para. 
56-62 for an in-depth study of the concept in international jurisprudence and the writing of 
influential authors such as Pufendorf, Grotius, Vattel, etc. 
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Weapons Advisory Opinion may be true.124 This does, however, not result in a 
successful challenge to its validity or its applicability to the IHL/IHRL relationship. 
This result is backed up by the fact that reference to the rule of lex specialis has 
been quite commonplace in the verbal practice of states and in legal discourse after 
the ICJ’s jurisprudence on the relationship between IHL and IHRL. The practice and 
discourse from 1996 until today is arguably more relevant for the relationship 
between IHL and IHRL than the practice between 1949 and 1996, when the problem 
at hand was generally ignored. 
Fourthly, applying the lex specialis concept is not barred by the nature of IHRL. It 
has been argued that when human rights forbid a certain action in armed conflict, 
norm conflicts arise between IHL and IHRL that are unresolvable.125 The situation 
has been compared to a norm conflict between a duty to extradite stemming from a 
bilateral extradition treaty and the prohibition to extradite stemming from IHRL – a 
situation of a norm conflict in the restrictive sense. In such a situation, it would be 
self-defeating to argue that the obligation stemming from the extradition treaty – 
regulating more specifically the case at hand – is lex specialis and thus the 
extradition may proceed as IHRL will be set aside being the lex generalis. The 
protective nature of IHRL would clearly forbid such a solution. This logic does, 
however, not apply to the IHL/IHRL situation. While it is well established that when 
a bilateral obligation such as one to extradite from an extradition treaty conflicts with 
an obligation with a humanitarian object such as the IHRL obligation of non 
refoulement, the latter prevails regardless of the specificity of the former.126 
Regarding IHL and IHRL, however, the norms in potential conflict both serve a 
humanitarian object, so that the cases differ significantly.127 Indeed, this is the 
                                            
124 For this observation see Marko Milanovic, ‘The Lost Origins of Lex Specialis’ in Jens 
David Ohlin (ed), Theoretical Boundaries of Armed Conflict and Human Rights (CUP 2016) 
78, 101. 
125 See for this by reference to the bilateral extradition treaties Marko Milanovic, ‘Norm 
Conflicts, IHL and IHRL’ in Orna Ben-Naftali (ed), International Humanitarian Law and 
International Human Rights Law (OUP 2011) 95, 108 et seq.  
126 Cf. article 60 para. 5 VCLT; with further references Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘Article 30 
Convention of 1969’ in Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein (eds), The Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, Vol. I (OUP 2011) para. 76 (p. 793). 
127 See however Marko Milanovic, ‘Norm Conflicts, IHL and IHRL’ in Orna Ben-Naftali (ed), 
International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law (OUP 2011) 95, 108 
et seq. 
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reason why the method introduced in this thesis128 works for IHL and IHRL, but is 
not transferable to the relationship of IHRL with other legal regimes with no 
humanitarian purpose, such as international economic law.  
Fifthly, in the following, norms of IHL will generally be taken to constitute lex specialis 
in relation to norms of IHRL as long as IHL applies, i.e. as long as situations in an 
armed conflict are to be assessed. IHL is – in the vast majority of cases – the more 
specific regime vis a vis IHRL in armed conflicts. Of course, this is a generalization, 
which does not necessarily hold true in every instance. The term lex specialis refers 
to the norm that “is ‘special’ i.e. the rule with a more precisely delimited scope of 
application”129 compared to another norm, the lex generalis. IHL applies chiefly to 
armed conflicts, while IHRL applies in times of armed conflict and peace. 
Consequently, IHL is a priori narrower in its scope and contains (mostly) rules 
specific and tailored to situations of armed conflict. However, this categorization of 
IHL does not bar the possibility to create more specific IHRL in armed conflict. An 
example at hand would be children’s rights. The CRC has come close to formulating 
provisions of legal protection for children during armed conflicts, although those 
mainly reference existing IHL norms. A hypothetical IHRL norm that formulates an 
explicit legal standard how to treat children in armed conflicts and what to do to 
guarantee their safety during hostilities, which goes beyond IHL would logically be 
the lex specialis vis a vis the more general IHL norm. However, beyond this 
possibility, the proposition that existing IHRL could be more specific in situations of 
armed conflict is deeply problematic.130 Human rights have been argued to become 
lex specialis when a state exercises effective control over a territory, if the 
circumstances of the use of force allow e.g. a capture of a combatant instead of 
killing that person, if there is a law enforcement operation in an armed conflict, during 
situations of occupation, etc.131 Apart from the fact that such propositions fail to 
                                            
128 See below 5.3. 
129 ILC, ‘Fragmentation in International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International 
Law Commission’ (13 April 2006) UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, para. 57. 
130 See however OHCHR, ‘International Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict’ 
(United Nations 2011) 62 with further references; Oona A. Hathaway, Rebecca Crootof, 
Philip Levitz, Haley Nix, William Perdue, Chelsea Purvis, and Julia Spiegel, ‘Which Law 
Governs During Armed Conflict? The Relationship Between International Humanitarian Law 
and Human Rights Law’ (2011/2012) 96 Minn. Law Rev. 1883, 1907 et seq. 
131 Marco Sassòli and Laura M. Olson, ‘The relationship between international humanitarian 
and human rights law where it matters’ (September 2008) 90(871) Int’l Rev. Red Cross 599, 
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recognize that IHL does not only regulate the specific conduct of hostilities, but also 
contains general rules on upholding order and maintaining security in times of armed 
conflict at large,132 none of these proposals offer a convincing and practical way to 
distinguish between a case in which IHL would apply primarily and a case in which 
IHRL should apply. It is granted that it seems to be intuitively preferable to apply 
IHRL exclusively whenever possible. But the challenge to be addressed is the need 
for a clear and practical differentiation between the cases. Should IHRL trump IHL, 
if the actor in question is at all able to adhere to IHRL standards? Should it apply, if 
its application does not counteract deliberations of military necessity? The 
distinction between IHRL and IHL and the question, which legal standard applies in 
a specific situation must be clear in order to be translatable into practice and to 
enable compliance. None of the suggestions mentioned offer such a solution. 
Moreover, none of these proposals have a basis in the law as it stands. An IHRL 
norm does not suddenly become more specific than one of IHL, when a state 
exercises effective control or when a state occupies a territory pursuant to IHL – it 
remains the more general set of rules compared to the norms of IHL simply by virtue 
of their wider area of application.  
 
5.2 Brief overview over the current state of discussion 
With this prologue, this work will now provide a closer look to how norms of IHL and 
IHRL apply in a situation of armed conflict, whenever norms of both regimes are 
applicable and if no other of the above-mentioned rules of primacy, such as article 
53 VCLT or article 103 of the UN Charter, or of conflict-solution applies.  
This question has been at the centre of the academic discussion and the dispute is 
complex as well as ridden with differences in terminology, which further complicates 
                                            
614 et seq. in cases of effective control and the possibility to act pursuant to human rights); 
OHCHR, ‘International Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict’ (United Nations 
2011) 63 (the more effective the control exercised the more primacy should human rights 
have); Cordula Droege, ‘The Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and 
International Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict’ (2007) 40(2) Isr. L. Rev. 
310, 344 (law enforcement in armed conflicts subject to human rights). 
132 Kenneth Watkin, Fighting at the Legal Boundaries (OUP 2016) 130. 
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the situation.133 The lex specialis concept is an especially good example for that. 
While every jurist, especially one with a focus on international law, has a general 
understanding of this concept, pinning it down and explaining its exact content and 
the consequences attached to it is quite a task, as evidenced by the efforts of the 
ILC Study Group on Fragmentation.134 As such, the reference of the Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion, in which the ICJ stated that IHL is lex specialis to IHRL 
in armed conflicts, left many puzzled.135 Indeed, by saying that IHL is lex specialis 
not much is said and one might justifiably ask what that means for IHRL.136 It has 
also been questioned, if the wording of the Court was appropriate, seeing that it 
characterized the whole of IHL as lex specialis in relation to IHRL, whereas the lex 
specialis rule regulates the solution of norm conflicts not conflicts of whole 
regimes.137  
For the purposes of this thesis, reference to the Working Group on Fragmentation 
will have to suffice. The Working Group, which authored the most recent and 
exhaustive work on the topic lex specialis “suggests that whenever two or more 
[dispositive] norms deal with the same subject matter, priority should be given to the 
norm that is more specific”, as “special law, being more concrete, often takes better 
account of the particular features of the context in which it is to be applied than any 
                                            
133 See for other assessments of this topic Bernhard Schäfer, Zum Verhältnis 
Menschenrechte und humanitäres Völkerrecht (Universitätsverlag Potsdam 2006) 35 et 
seq.; Gentian Zyberi, ‘The Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice and 
International Criminal Courts and Tribunals’ in Erika de Wet and Jann Klefner (eds), 
Convergence and Conflicts (PULP 2014) 395, 400 et seq. 
134 See ILC, ‘Fragmentation in International Law, Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission’ (13 April 2006) UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682; see also OHCHR, 
‘International Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict’ (United Nations 2011) 
59 et seq.; Erich Vranes, ‘Lex Superior, Lex Specialis, Lex Posterior’ (2005) 65 ZaöRV 391 
et seq. 
135 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ 
Rep 226, 240 (para. 25); for a further discussion of the ICJ jurisprudence in that regard see 
Bernhard Schäfer, Zum Verhältnis Menschenrechte und humanitäres Völkerrecht 
(Universitätsverlag Potsdam 2006) 43 et seq. 
136 See also Francoise J. Hampson, ‘Is Human Rights Law of Any Relevance to Military 
Operations in Afghanistan?’ (2009) 85 US Naval War College ILS 485, 497. 
137 See Silvia Borelli, ‘The (Mis)-Use of General Principles of Law: Lex Specialis and the 
Relationship between International Human Rights Law and the Laws of Armed Conflict’ in 
Laura Pineschi (ed), General Principles of Law: The Role of the Judiciary (Springer 2015) 
265, 266 et seq.; Marko Milanovic, ‘The Lost Origins of Lex Specialis’ in Jens David Ohlin 
(ed), Theoretical Boundaries of Armed Conflict and Human Rights (CUP 2016) 78. 
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applicable general law.”138 As such, lex specialis “may be used to apply, clarify, 
update or modify as well as set aside general law”.139 However, general law will not 
normally be extinguished, but will remain “valid and applicable and will […] continue 
to give direction for the interpretation and application of the relevant special law” 
becoming fully applicable “in situations not provided for by the” lex specialis.140  
 
5.2.1 Conflict solution by recourse to the lex specialis concept 
There have been numerous academic positions regarding the question of how to 
translate the concept of lex specialis to the topic at hand. This has sometimes been 
taken very far. For example, it has been argued that IHRL is indeed a priori replaced 
by the IHL regime in situations of armed conflict no matter the situation at hand.141 
This represents the traditional position on the relationship between IHL and IHRL.142  
The position that in case of a conflict between an IHL norm and an IHRL norm, the 
IHRL norm would be replaced by the IHL norm is much closer to the actual content 
                                            
138 ILC, ‘Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International 
Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’ 
(2006) 1 et seq. 
139 ILC, ‘Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International 
Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’ 
(2006) 2. 
140 ILC, ‘Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International 
Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’ 
(2006) 2 et seq. 
141 With reference to these positions Hans-Joachim Heintze, ‘Theorien zum Verhältnis von 
Menschenrechten und humanitärem Völkerrecht’ (2011) 24(1) HuV-I 4, 5 et seq.; Robert 
Kolb, ‘Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), MPEPIL (OUP online 
edition 2013) para. 28; Oona A. Hathaway, Rebecca Crootof, Philip Levitz, Haley Nix, 
William Perdue, Chelsea Purvis, and Julia Spiegel, ‘Which Law Governs During Armed 
Conflict? The Relationship Between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
Law’ (2011/2012) 96 Minn. Law Rev. 1883, 1894 et seq.; Christopher Greenwood, ‘Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Law: Conflict or Convergence (2010-2011) 43 Case W. Res. J. 
Int’l L. 491, 500 et seq.; see also Kenneth W. Watkin, ‘Controlling the Use of Force: A Role 
for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict’ (2004) 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 1, 22; in 
favour Richard Ekins, Jonathan Morgan, and Tom Tugendhat, ‘Clearing the Fog of Law’ 
(Policy Exchange 2015); Michael J. Dennis, ‘Non-Application of Civil and Political Rights 
Treaties Extraterritorially During Times of International Armed Conflict’ (2007) 40 Isr. L. Rev. 
453-502. 
142 E.g. Wilfred Jenks, ‘The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties’ (1953) 30 Brit. Yb Int’l L. 401, 
446. 
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of lex specialis, since it is in place to solve conflicts of norms not of regimes.143 The 
importance of this principle has received a significant boost by the ICJ’s verdict in 
its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion. As outlined above, the ICJ clearly did not 
argue for a replacement of IHRL by IHL on the regime level. On the contrary, it 
deemed article 6 ICCPR applicable and only afterwards arrived at its famous 
conclusion that IHL is lex specialis.144 The ICJ only concluded that the examination, 
if a deprivation of life was indeed arbitrary would need to be performed on the basis 
of IHL rules.145 So mere replacement of the conflicting regime or even of the specific 
norm is not the content the ICJ prescribed for lex specialis. It saw both regimes and 
its norms as applicable, but granted one, the lex specialis, a guiding effect to a 
certain degree.  
 
5.2.2 IHL and IHRL as complementary regimes 
Other authors and institutions focus less on the specificity of IHL and the separate 
nature of IHL and IHRL by arguing for a complementary relationship between the 
individual norms of IHRL and IHL. Proponents of this position see IHRL as 
applicable in armed conflicts and not generally replaced by IHL. They continue by 
giving human rights an effect in the interpretation of IHL and vice versa.146 As such, 
IHRL guarantees surrounding the deprivation of liberty will be considered when 
                                            
143 See e.g. Jochen Abr. Frowein, ‘Probleme des allgemeinen Völkerrechts vor der 
Europäischen Kommission für Menschenrechte’ in Ingo von Münch (ed), Staatsrecht - 
Völkerrecht - Europarecht: Festschrift für Schlochauer (De Gruyter 1981) 288, 295; in a 
similar direction Ute Erberich, Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr und Europäische 
Menschenrechtskonvention (Carl Heymanns 2004) 35 et seq. 
144 Oona A. Hathaway, Rebecca Crootof, Philip Levitz, Haley Nix, William Perdue, Chelsea 
Purvis, and Julia Spiegel, ‘Which Law Governs During Armed Conflict? The Relationship 
Between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’ (2011/2012) 96 Minn. 
Law Rev. 1883, 1894 et seq., characterize this interpretation as an “aggressive reading” of 
the ICJ’s position. 
145 For a similar approach see Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Coard et al. v 
United States of America (29 September 1999), Report N. 109/99, Case 10.951, para. 42, 
in which the Commission, however, went further and saw itself bound to give effect to the 
normative standard which best safeguards the rights of the individual. 
146 See the positions referred to above of the UN institutions; see also Walter Kälin, 
‘Universal human rights bodies and international humanitarian law’ in Robert Kolb and 
Gloria Gaggioli (eds), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law 
(Edward Elgar 2013) 441, 443 et seq. 
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interpreting deprivations of liberty as allowed by IHL and IHL norms allowing 
deprivations of liberty will be read into IHRL in the process of interpreting its 
applicable guarantees. This mutual acknowledgment of the other regime is 
(explicitly or implicitly) based on the rule of article 31 para. 3 lit. c VCLT147 
(interpretation of a norm in accordance with other existing norms) and 
corresponding customary international law.148 Article 31 para. 3 lit. c VCLT and its 
mandate for a harmonizing interpretation is an expression of the principle of 
systemic integration and has its premise on the assumption (or fiction) that despite 
the fragmented nature of international law, rules come into existence in the 
knowledge of other existing rules on the matter and the applicable norms are not 
meant to collide, but to be in formal unity with each other.149 Consequently, it 
prescribes the interpretation of a treaty “by reference to its ‘normative environment’ 
which includes all sources of international law” leading to an interpretation that to 
the greatest extent possible, give rise to a single set of compatible obligations, when 
several norms apply to a case.150 The ICJ has developed its position on IHL and 
IHRL into that direction, as outlined above. 
                                            
147 See extensively Andreas Paulus and Johann Ruben Leiß, ‘Art. 103’ in Bruno Simma, 
Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte, and Andreas Paulus (eds), The Charter of the United 
Nations (OUP 3rd ed 2012) para. 17 et seq. This article and its underlying principles have 
received a considerable amount of scholarly attention. A recent example is Panos 
Merkouris, Article 31(3)(c) VCLT and the Principle of Systemic Integration (Brill 2015); for 
the purposes of this thesis, it suffices to see in article 31 para. 3 lit. c VCLT a rule allowing 
for the harmonization of two or more norms that apply to the same situation; for an example 
of such an interpretation see Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of 
America) [2003] ICJ Rep 161, 182 (paras 41 et seq), see below fn 230 for a discussion of 
the criticism this decision received. 
148 For the customary international law status of article 31 para. 3 lit. c VCLT see with further 
reference Jean d’Aspremont, ‘The Systemic Integration of International Law by Domestic 
Courts’, in Ole Kristian Fauchald and André Nollkaemper (eds), The Practice of International 
and National Courts and the (De-)Fragmentation of International Law (Bloomsbury 2014) 
141, 151. 
149 See e.g. Jean d’Aspremont, ‘The Systemic Integration of International Law by Domestic 
Courts’, in Ole Kristian Fauchald and André Nollkaemper (eds), The Practice of International 
and National Courts and the (De-)Fragmentation of International Law (Bloomsbury 2014) 
141, 148; further on the rule and the underlying principle Oliver Dörr, ‘Article 31’, in Oliver 
Dörr and Kerstin Schmalenbach (eds), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 
Commentary (Springer 2012) 521, 560-8 (paras 89-104). 
150 Jean d’Aspremont, ‘The Systemic Integration of International Law by Domestic Courts’, 
in Ole Kristian Fauchald and André Nollkaemper (eds), The Practice of International and 
National Courts and the (De-)Fragmentation of International Law (Bloomsbury 2014) 141, 
148; see also the analysis of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence 
Hélène Tigroudja, ‘The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and international 
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Such reciprocal effects of IHL and IHRL on the interpretation of norms of the other 
regime are sometimes denied with the argument that both regimes stand for 
themselves and e.g. the use of force against an enemy combatant may be deemed 
legal under IHL, but – absent a declaration of derogation – at the same time illegal 
under IHRL.151 This result is then justified by the argument that the right to life and 
the right to use force against enemy combatants are in an unresolvable norm conflict 
leaving the state to decide on the basis of policy considerations and value judgments 
if it violates the IHRL obligation.152 This situation was again likened to the situation 
of bilateral extradition treaties regulating a duty to extradite and the human rights 
guarantee of non refoulement – a comparison, which – as explained above – falls 
flat due to the fact that unlike extradition treaty obligations, IHL has a humanitarian 
object and thus does not fall under article 60 para. 5 VCLT.153 The proposition that 
IHRL and IHL stand side by side and have to be viewed independently from one 
another, albeit theoretically coherent, ignores the fact that despite the problems in 
applying it, lex specialis is a generally accepted concept in international law, as is 
the rule included in article 31 para. 3 lit. c VCLT. As such, interactions between 
different legal regimes are the rule rather than the exception. Furthermore, it is 
submitted that the translation of legal guarantees into practice, especially in 
situations most likely not foreseen by state parties at the time of conclusion of a 
treaty, sometimes calls for an eye for the actual circumstances, the aim to arrive at 
a conclusion, which gives effect to all applicable rules and a solution, which is 
translatable into the real world and palatable to the bearers of the obligations. The 
object and purpose of IHRL and IHL is not maximum-theoretical protection of 
individuals on paper, but the maximum-practical protection in the real world under 
                                            
humanitarian law’ in Robert Kolb and Gloria Gaggioli (eds), Research Handbook on Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Law (Edward Elgar 2013) 466-479. 
151 See e.g. Marko Milanovic, ‘Norm Conflicts, IHL and IHRL’ in Orna Ben-Naftali (ed), 
International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law (OUP 2011) 95. 
152 Marko Milanovic, ‘Norm Conflicts, IHL and IHRL’ in Orna Ben-Naftali (ed), International 
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law (OUP 2011) 95, 118-121 and 123 
et seq. 
153 See e.g. Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘Article 30 Convention of 1969’ in Olivier Corten and 
Pierre Klein (eds), The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vol. I (OUP 2011) para. 
76. 
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the given circumstances.154 As such, leaving IHRL guarantees fully applicable 
during armed conflicts and not even acknowledging the more specific norms of IHL 
in the process of interpreting human rights would essentially do away with the 
regime of IHL, a result never intended by the international community and entirely 
lacking of its backing. Thus, such a view would result in little other than a growing 
disregard for legal standards by the international community at large with potentially 
dramatic consequences for the protection of the individual in armed conflicts. 
Consequently, this thesis supports the view that reciprocal effects of IHL and IHRL 
in the interpretative process of norms of both regimes are indeed possible. 
 
5.2.3 Derogations as tools of norm conflict solution  
A rising number of scholars focus on the derogation process in order to solve 
conflicts between IHL and IHRL. They argue that the only way to prevent a 
replacement of IHL by IHRL would be a declaration of derogation under the 
derogation procedure of the human rights treaties.155 This overstates the importance 
and normative content of the derogation procedure greatly, as outlined above. After 
the Hassan-judgment of the ECtHR, which will be discussed below, this position 
does not even have the backing of the ECtHR anymore.156 It has been argued 
already that the fact that IHRL treaties allow for a process of derogation does not 
bar the interpretation of human rights. The articles allowing for derogations from 
human rights define the circle of non-derogable and derogable human rights and 
outline the procedure for state parties to derogate from human rights guarantees. 
This exhausts their normative content. They were never intended to make IHRL 
uninterpretable. The acknowledged methods of interpretation include article 31 
para. 3 lit. c of the VCLT, which enables a harmonization of IHRL with IHL. 
Furthermore, the position arguing that the derogation procedure means IHL has no 
effect at all on IHRL, unless a state derogates from IHRL, regularly tends to 
                                            
154 See also Stefan Oeter, ‘Fortschrittsnarrative im Humanitären Völkerrecht’ in Christian 
Calliess (ed), Herausforderung an Staat und Verfassung, Liber Amicorum Torsten Stein 
(NOMOS 2015) 1025, 1043 on the “colonialization of IHL by IHRL” and with the warning 
that IHL is meant to work, not look good on paper. 
155 See above fn 101. 
156 Hassan v UK App no 29750/09 (ECHR Grand Chamber Judgment 16 September 2014) 
para. 101; for a further analysis see below 6.2.  
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overstate the legal consequences of a derogation and thus its fitness as a conflict-
solution-mechanism. Indeed, a derogation from the ECHR would have limited effect 
on the problems caused by uncertain legal standards in extraterritorial deployments. 
This also exposes the announcements by the UK government threatening a 
derogation from the ECHR for deployments to come as mere populism.157 Indeed, 
the UK – to stay with the example – could derogate from article 2 para. 1 ECHR for 
lawful acts of war, but what would it stand to win apart from the cheap political signal. 
The ECtHR has already proven to be willing to accommodate IHL in international 
armed conflicts into the ECHR even without a derogation declaration. This 
effectively renders a derogation from article 2 para. 1 ECHR useless in international 
armed conflict settings.158 Moreover, such a derogation declaration159 would fall well 
short of its aim, to silence the ECtHR and curtail its practical influence. Even if a 
derogation would fulfil the formal requirements, the Court would maintain a vital role 
in adjudicating on the acts of armed forces. It would not be side-lined, but would still 
be able to assess e.g. if a use of force was a “lawful act of war” and thus falls under 
the derogable content of article 2 para. 1 ECHR.160 If the state is found to have 
violated IHL with its lethal use of force, the court could assess the act as usual 
                                            
157 See the references in the introduction. Even Marko Milanovic, who very much supports 
the idea of derogating from the ECHR alludes to the exaggerated rhetoric and expectations, 
see ‘UK to Derogate from the ECHR in Armed Conflict’ (EJIL:Talk 5 October 2016). 
158 Hassan v UK App no 29750/09 (ECHR Grand Chamber Judgment 16 September 2014) 
para. 101. 
159 The formalities as foreseen by article 15 para. 3 ECHR tend to be treated as binding, so 
that there is no implied derogation. Cf. Cyprus v Turkey App nos 6780/74 and 6950/75 
(EComHR 10 July 1976) para. 66-8, where the Commission stated that “it could not, in the 
absence of some formal and public act of derogation by Turkey, apply Art 15 of the 
Convention…” (para. 67); see Jens Meyer-Ladewig and Christiane Schmaltz, ‘Art. 15’ in 
Jens Meyer-Ladewig, Martin Nettesheim and Stefan von Raumer (eds) Europäische 
Menschenrechtskonvention (4th ed, NOMOS 2017) para. 11; Karin Oellers-Frahm, ‘A 
regional perspective on the convergence and conflicts of human rights and international 
humanitarian law in military operations: The European Court of Human Rights’ in Erika de 
Wet and Jann Klefner (eds), Convergence and Conflicts (PULP 2014) 333, 340; Ashauer 
argues that the notification is a mere formal obligation, whose violation does not bar the 
member state from relying on the derogation, as long as a state of emergency exists, see 
Christoph Ashauer, ‘Die Menschenrechte im Notstand’ (2007) 45 ArchVR 400, 410. 
160 See also Heike Krieger, ‘After Al-Jedda: Detention, Derogation, and an Enduring 
Dilemma’ (2011) 50 Mil. L. & L. War Rev. 419, 438-9. 
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without the derogation having any legal effect, since a derogation from the right to 
life is only possible for lawful acts of war pursuant to article 15 para. 2 ECHR.161  
Moreover, a derogation is seen by the Court as an “exceptional” right, only possible 
under strict conditions, which are to be interpreted narrowly162 and for which the 
member state relying on the derogation has the burden of proof.163 There is 
significant doubt, if these requirements are fulfilled in those modern-day deployment 
of troops abroad that have sparked the alarmist political statements referred to 
above.  
For a derogation to be successful pursuant to article 15 ECHR there has to be an 
actual or imminent exceptional situation of crisis or emergency of which “war” is an 
example. This emergency has to “affect the whole nation to the extent that the 
continuance of the organised life of the community was threatened.”164 Furthermore, 
                                            
161 The exact function of a derogation is still unclear, so that it cannot be said with certainty 
whether article 2 would not apply at all for the lawful use of force, or if there is no interference 
with the right or if such an interference would be justified by the derogation, see Heike 
Krieger, ‘Die Verantwortlichkeit Deutschlands nach der EMRK für seine Streitkräfte im 
Auslandseinsatz’ (2002) 62 ZaöRV 669, 694 who seems to be in favour of a justification, 
while Grabenwarther and Pabel argue for a partial inapplicability of the convention to the 
situation, Christoph Grabenwarther/ Katharina Pabel, Europäische 
Menschenrechtskonvention (C.H. Beck 6th ed 2016) 10; in the same direction Christoph 
Ashauer, ‘Die Menschenrechte im Notstand’ (2007) 45 ArchVR 400, 411. 
162 Lawless v Ireland App no 332/57 (ECHR 1 July 1961) para. 22 et seq. 
163 EComHR, Greek Case, Report of the Sub-Commission, Vol. I, Part 1, p. 70, para. 114; 
see in general Christoph Ashauer, ‘Die Menschenrechte im Notstand‘ (2007) 45 ArchVR 
400, 416 et seq. 
164 Lawless v Ireland App no 332/57 (ECHR 1 July 1961) para. 28; for the requirements of 
a derogation from the ICCPR see UN Commission on Human Rights, ‘The Siracusa 
Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights’ (28 September 1984) UN Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4; Johann argues that 
“threatening the life of the nation” may only refer to “other public emergency” and not to 
“time of war” with the result that the ECtHR may have lower material standards for a 
derogation in times of war, Christian Johann, Menschenrechte im internationalen 
bewaffneten Konflikt (Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag 2012) 242 et seq. He, however, also 
concedes that apart from the ambiguous wording of the authoritative texts, this position 
cannot really be backed up. Indeed, the wording goes against that proposition, since “other 
public emergency” (emphasis added) suggests that “time of war” is indeed seen only as an 
example of a public emergency. Moreover, seeing that article 15 ECHR is an exception, it 
is to be interpreted narrowly, as done by the ECtHR. Furthermore, the object and purpose 
of the Convention also point in the direction of a narrow interpretation and high standards 
for a derogation; see also Christoph Grabenwarther and Katharina Pabel, Europäische 
Menschenrechtskonvention (C.H. Beck 6th ed 2016) 11; Heike Krieger, ‘Notstand’ in Oliver 
Dörr, Rainer Grote, and Thilo Marauhn (eds), EMRK/GG Konkordanzkommentar Vol. I 
(Mohr Siebeck 2nd ed. 2013) 417, 427. 
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the crisis or danger has to be “exceptional, in that the normal measures or 
restrictions, permitted by the Convention for the maintenance of public safety, 
health, and order, were plainly inadequate.”165 Derogations may also only be 
declared “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”166, 
resulting in the possibility of the ECtHR to review the acts regarding their 
necessity.167 Lastly, derogations and the measures taken thereafter have to be 
consistent with other obligations under international law. If one of these 
circumstances is not met, a derogation would fail to exert legal effect.  
It seems doubtful, whether the ECtHR will see the criterion of a threat to the “life of 
the nation” as being met in the reality of the current extraterritorial deployments of 
armed forces. The state parties negotiating article 15 ECHR likely did not envision 
a situation in an extraterritorial deployment of the military, but a war or emergency 
on the territory of the ECHR member state. The current reality of deployments of the 
armed forces of European nations is very distant from such a situation not 
concerning the intensity of warfare, but the proximity of the conflict to the territory of 
the member state and thus the immediacy of the threat to the population and the 
nation at large.168 So far, the ECtHR had to decide on the prerequisites of a 
                                            
165 EComHR, Greek Case, Report of the Sub-Commission, Vol. I, Part 1, p. 70, para. 113: 
“The crisis or danger must be exceptional, in that the normal measures or restrictions 
permitted by the Convention for the maintenance of public safety, health and order are 
plainly inadequate.” 
166 Aksoy v Turkey App no 21987/93 (ECHR 18 December 1996) para. 68; Brannigan and 
McBride v United Kingdom App nos 14553/89 and 14554/89 (ECHR 26 May 1993) para. 
43; the Court adopts a three-pronged test aptly described by Bernadette Rainey, Elizabeth 
Wilcks, and Clare Ovey, ‘Reservations & Derogations’ in Jacobs, White & Ovey, The 
European Convention of Human Rights (OUP 6th ed 2014) 118: “First, are the derogations 
necessary to cope with the threat to the life of the nation? Secondly, are the measures taken 
no greater than those required to deal with the emergency? This is a test of proportionality. 
Finally, how long have the derogations been applied”. It is a subject of academic dispute, if 
every act undertaken after a derogation has to be “strictly required”, establishing a strict 
proportionality standard for each act (see Hartmut Henninger, Menschenrechte und Frieden 
als Rechtsprinzipien des Völkerrechts (Mohr Siebeck 2013) 344-5). This result would 
devalue derogations even further as instruments to regulate the relationship between IHL 
and IHRL. The alternative would be that the derogation lifts the human rights obligations, to 
which it applies from the state and gives the state a legal ground to interfere with those 
human rights, Christoph Ashauer, ‘Die Menschenrechte im Notstand’ (2007) 45 ArchVR 
400, 410 et seq. 
167 See Aksoy v Turkey App no 21987/93 (ECHR 18 December 1996) para. 87; see for the 
ongoing judicial control excercised by the ECtHR Heike Krieger, ‘After Al-Jedda: Detention, 
Derogation, and an Enduring Dilemma’ (2011) 50 Mil. L. & L. War Rev. 419, 438-9. 
168 See also Heike Krieger, ‘Die Verantwortlichkeit Deutschlands nach der EMRK für seine 
Streitkräfte im Auslandseinsatz’ (2002) 62 ZaöRV 669, 690; see however Bart van der 
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derogation only concerning internal threats or conflicts such as the fight against 
terrorism in Northern Ireland169, activities of the PKK in the southeast of Turkey170 
as well as post 9/11 England171. A possible future case, which is just as domestic in 
nature, is the French derogation from the ECHR in the wake of the Paris attacks of 
the 13th of November 2015, which (problematically) continues to be in effect until 
today. The ECtHR has accepted the derogations it had to decide on as being in 
accordance with article 15 ECHR.172 These cases, however, all came closer to the 
notion of a member state being immediately threatened than is the case in 
extraterritorial deployments. This is not to say that extraterritorial deployments may 
never justify a derogation. An extraterritorial deployment of troops in the ongoing 
fight against international terrorism after the so-called Islamic State has attacked 
European nations may be said to fulfil the prerequisites, as a member state can be 
seen to be under a direct and immediate threat. In other cases, however, western 
nations are involved in foreign countries to counter first and foremost regional 
threats, which have the potential to destabilize a region or may even have global 
effects.173 Of course, one could argue, that it would suffice for a derogation, when 
the Security Council sees a situation as a threat to world peace and acts pursuant 
to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. However, such a view would be very distant from 
the criteria established by the ECtHR mandating that the continuance of the 
organised life of the community (in the member state!) has to be threatened in order 
for a derogation to be justified. It would also, arguably, not be in keeping with the 
object and purpose of the ECHR and its article 15. For the (almost) parallel criteria 
of a derogation under the ICCPR, member of the Human Rights Committee of the 
United Nations Walter Kälin has indeed rejected that the requirement “threat to the 
                                            
Sloot, ‘Is All Fair in Love and War? An Analysis of the Case Law on Article 15 ECHR’, (2014) 
53 Mil. L. & L. War Rev. 319, 346, who sees the fact that the ECtHR addressed the fact that 
the government did not „purport to derogate under Article 15“, Al Jedda v UK App No 
27021/08 (ECHR Grand Chamber Judgment 7 July 2011) para. 100. 
169 Ireland v UK App no 5310/71 (ECHR 18 January 1978). 
170 Aksoy v Turkey App no 21987/93 (ECHR 18 December 1996).  
171 A. and others v UK App no 3455/05 (ECHR 19 February 2009). 
172 With an analysis of the case-law Bart van der Sloot, ‘Is All Fair in Love and War? An 
Analysis of the Case Law on Article 15 ECHR’, (2014) 53 Mil. L. & L. War Rev. 319, 348-9 
who observes a widening of the prerequisites in the court’s jurisprudence 
173 See also Heike Krieger, ‘Notstand‘ in Oliver Dörr, Rainer Grote, and Thilo Marauhn (eds), 
EMRK/GG Konkordanzkommentar Vol. I (Mohr Siebeck 2nd ed. 2013) 417, 429. 
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life of a nation” is fulfilled “if a State is conducting military operations in foreign lands, 
be it as an aggressor and occupier or as a participant in a peace-enforcing or peace-
keeping mission.”174 It might be said that this view would result in the derogation 
process not keeping pace with the ever extending spacial application of IHRL, 
however, the counterargument to that may well be that a derogation process is not 
needed for deployments to foreign countries, since IHRL does not foresee a 
possibility to derogate, when the member state can in fact fulfil its IHRL obligations. 
In the case of an extraterritorial deployment one could – although this would be 
isolationist and potentially cynical in nature – always argue that the member state 
has the option to stay at home and by that fulfil its human rights obligations (although 
potentially fail a responsibility to protect).  
While the Court acknowledges that ECHR member states have a wide discretion or 
margin of appreciation175 concerning the question, if the prerequisites of a 
derogation are met, it also emphasises that there are limits and ultimately, the Court 
is the arbiter and decides if a member state’s derogation goes beyond of what is 
“strictly required” in the specific situation.176 This criterion also clearly shows that 
member states do not have the option to issue a general derogation and thus simply 
make the dispositive human rights standards disappear, which exposes every 
political statement suggesting the contrary as a dramatic misrepresentation of the 
law.177  
                                            
174 See the presentation of Walter Kälin, The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its 
relationship with international humanitarian law, in the Expert Meeting on the Supervision 
of the Lawfulness of Detention during Armed Conflict, pp. 25 et seq. (27); see also Heike 
Krieger, ‘Die Verantwortlichkeit Deutschlands nach der EMRK für seine Streitkräfte im 
Auslandseinsatz’ (2002) 62 ZaöRV 669, 690. 
175 Aksoy v Turkey App no 21987/93 (ECHR 18 December 1996) para. 68; EComHR, Greek 
Case, Report of the Sub-Commission, Vol. I, Part 1, p. 70, para. 114; cf regarding the 
concept of margin of appreciation in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR with further references 
Meinhard Hilf and Tim R. Salomon, ‘Margin of Appreciation Revisited: The Balancing Pole 
of Multilevel Governance’ in Marise Cremona, Peter Hilpold, Nikos Lavranos, Stefan Staiger 
Schneider, and Andreas R. Ziegler (eds), Reflections on the Constitutionalisation of 
International Economic Law, Liber Amicorum for Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (Brill 2014) 37, 
43 et seq. 
176 Cf. EComHR, Greek Case, Report of the Sub-Commission, Vol. I, Part 1, p. 87 et seq., 
para. 145 et seq.; Lawless v Ireland App no 332/57 (ECHR 1 July 1961) paras 31 et seq. 
177 This is, however, the result proponents for derogations at times attempt to reach see 
Richard Ekins, Jonathan Morgan, and Tom Tugendhat, ‘Clearing the Fog of Law’ (Policy 
Exchange 2015). 
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Consequently, due to the lacking jurisprudence of the ECtHR concerning 
derogations pursuant to article 15 ECHR in the case of current extraterritorial 
deployments it is far from certain that it will accept derogations in such cases.178 
Even if it would, this would have a limited effect. As outlined, derogations are in 
place for emergency situations, in which the IHRL guarantees cannot be complied 
with or a state needs to suspend those guarantees to counteract an immediate 
threat against itself and its people. They are not at all suited to regulate or indeed 
solve the complex relationship between IHL and IHRL. For this, the methods of 
interpretation and the lex specialis concept are much better qualified, because they 
enable a fine-tuning in each specific case. This is not to say that derogations will 
play no part at all in solving singular cases, e.g. in NIACs,179 but their role most likely 
will remain in the background.  
 
5.3 Two-step-approach: First harmonize then apply lex specialis 
5.3.1 Fundamentals of the suggested approach 
The interpretation of a norm, including by recourse to article 31 para. 3 lit. c VCLT 
is a logical first step when applying an IHRL guarantee in an armed conflict scenario, 
where a parallel IHL norm applies. This step logically precedes the application of 
the lex-specialis-concept in the traditional sense i.e. setting aside a more general 
                                            
178 See Karin Oellers-Frahm, ‘A regional perspective on the convergence and conflicts of 
human rights and international humanitarian law in military operations: The European Court 
of Human Rights’ in Erika de Wet and Jann Klefner (eds), Convergence and Conflicts (PULP 
2014) 333, 339 et seq.; the Al-Jedda decision of the ECtHR has been seen as indicative of 
a readiness of the court to do so, Heike Krieger, ‘After Al-Jedda: Detention, Derogation, and 
an Enduring Dilemma’ (2011) 50 Mil. L. & L. War Rev. 419, 436. In Al Jedda v UK App No 
27021/08 (ECHR Grand Chamber Judgment 7 July 2011) para. 99 the court has referenced 
article 15 ECHR stating that “[n]o deprivation of liberty will be compatible with Article 5 § 1 
unless it falls within one of those grounds or unless it is provided for by a lawful derogation 
under Article 15 of the Convention, which allows for a State ‘in time of war or other public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation’ to take measures derogating from its 
obligations under Article 5 ‘to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’”. 
While this statement might be a hint towards member states to consider derogations, this 
has likely been rendered outdated by Hassan v UK App no 29750/09 (ECHR Grand 
Chamber Judgment 16 September 2014) para. 101, in which the court observed that “no 
State has ever made a derogation pursuant to Article 15 of the Convention in respect of” 
“military missions involving Contracting States acting extra‑territorially“ and effectively side-
lined derogations as a tool for considering IHL integration. 
179 See below 6.3.2. 
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norm. Article 31 para. 3 lit. c VCLT is based on the presumption that two or more 
norms of international law applicable to one situation are in accordance with each 
other.180 Consequently, the rule provides for an interpretation method that avoids a 
possible norm conflict by harmonizing the applicable norms.181 Lex specialis proper, 
i.e. the process of replacing the general norm with a more specific would – in case 
of a successful harmonizing interpretation – be superfluous as the interpretation 
result would be the compatibility of both norms with each other and a single set of 
compatible obligations originating from both IHL and IHRL in the case at hand.  
However, what if the interpretative process fails to produce such a set of compatible 
obligations and instead results in the incompatibility of two norms? It is submitted 
that if this is the case, then lex specialis proper would apply, solving the conflict 
between the two incompatible norms by giving primacy to the more specific one.182  
This two-step-approach to the IHL/IHRL situation exposes that the two main 
competing academic opinions on the relationship between IHL and IHRL are likely 
not really competing theories, but merely two separate steps of the process of 
transferring the legal standard stemming from two distinct legal regimes to a 
situation in the real world: First, the process of interpretation with the aim to arrive 
at the result that two norms are compatible and complement each other and second, 
in case this fails, the application of the lex specialis concept. The ICJ’s 
jurisprudence, albeit not very helpful in many regards, actually supports such a 
solution. The ICJ in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion did not apply the lex 
                                            
180 Andreas Paulus and Johann Ruben Leiß, ‘Art. 103’ in Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus 
Khan, Georg Nolte, and Andreas Paulus (eds), The Charter of the United Nations (OUP 3rd 
ed 2012) para. 17. 
181 See the principle of harmonization as referred to in the Fragmentation report “It is a 
generally accepted principle that when several norms bear on a single issue they should, 
to the extent possible, be interpreted so as to give rise to a single set of compatible 
obligations.” (ILC, ‘Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International 
Law’ (2006) 1 <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/1_9_2006.pdf> 
last accessed 20 June 2017). 
182 See also Andreas Paulus and Johann Ruben Leiß, ‘Art. 103’ in Bruno Simma, Daniel-
Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte, and Andreas Paulus (eds), The Charter of the United Nations 
(OUP 3rd ed 2012) para. 12 et seq. 
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specialis rule (although it said it did),183 but interpreted the norms of IHL and article 
6 ICCPR in a successful harmonizing interpretation pursuant to article 31 para. 3 lit. 
c VCLT. In doing so, it arrived at the result that both article 6 ICCPR and the legal 
standards on lawful use of force in armed conflict are pertinent to the case at hand. 
They were held to be compatible insofar the standard for arbitrariness in the IHRL 
guarantee is interpreted by reference to the IHL standards on the use of force.184 As 
such, in that case there was no room for applying the concept of lex specialis – 
although the court said this is what it did apply. Would the ICJ have concluded that 
the applicable norms of IHL and IHRL are incompatible and in conflict, the lex 
specialis, in this case the IHL norm would have prevailed?185  
Moreover, as evidenced in the Fragmentation Report, the concept of lex specialis 
does not only have the dimension of setting aside the more general norm. Indeed, 
it “may be used to apply, clarify, update or modify as well as set aside general 
law”186. Consequently, it does have a place not only after the harmonizing 
interpretation but within the interpretation process as well. That the lex specialis 
concept may indeed influence the interpretation is generally acknowledged today.187 
It is submitted that in the interpretative process, especially when harmonizing the 
applicable norms, the more specific norm carries more weight, since it would replace 
the norm it conflicts with, in case the harmonization should fail. An applicable IHL 
                                            
183 See William A. Schabas, ‘Lex Specialis? Belt and Suspenders? The Parallel Operation 
of Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of Jus ad Bellum’ 
(2007) 40 Isr. L. Rev. 595, 597-8. 
184 See Jordan J. Paust, ‘Human Rights on the Battlefield’ (2015) 47(3) Geo. Wash. Int’l L. 
Rev. 509, 532 et seq. 
185 Consequently, the criticism of Hathaway et al., that seeing IHL and IHRL in a relationship 
of complementarity presupposes that conflicts can always be solved by recourse to article 
31 para. 3 lit. c VCLT seems unfounded, see Oona A. Hathaway, Rebecca Crootof, Philip 
Levitz, Haley Nix, William Perdue, Chelsea Purvis, and Julia Spiegel, ‘Which Law Governs 
During Armed Conflict? The Relationship Between International Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights Law’ (2011/2012) 96 Minn. Law Rev. 1883, 1901 et seq.; it is indeed a 
possible result of the interpretative process that the interpretation cannot solve a conflict. 
Then the primacy of lex specialis would follow.  
186 ILC, ‘Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International 
Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’ 
(2006) 2. 
187 See e.g. Dorota Marianna Banaszewska, ‘Lex Specialis’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), 
MPEPIL (OUP online edition 2015) para. 21; ILC, ‘Conclusions of the work of the Study 
Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification 
and Expansion of International Law’ (2006) 1 et seq. 
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norm would thus be given a greater weight when interpreting and attempting to 
harmonize the IHRL guarantee applicable to the same situation in case of an armed 
conflict. This results in a dominant role of IHL, when interpreting the legal standard 
of state action in armed conflicts. It does, however, not mean that the interpretative 
process is a mere one-way street.188 In fact, IHRL also influences the interpretation 
of IHL norms. The effect it has is, however, mainly limited to cases of non-derogable 
IHRL (which will be addressed in the following) and notions which IHL does not 
regulate or define. A case in point is the interpretation of the prohibition of torture, a 
notion not defined by IHL. The prohibition of torture in IHL will be interpreted in 
accordance with the definition of torture as explicated by IHRL and the Convention 
against Torture.189 IHRL will, however, not fill conscious omissions left in the IHL 
legal framework. When IHL e.g. allows the taking of prisoners of war and outlines a 
detailed procedure for doing so as well as an exhaustive standard on how to treat 
them, its silence on other guarantees is in many instances normative in nature and 
a conscious decision to not have these guarantees apply to the case at hand.190 
While these IHL norms also may refer to IHRL standards191 and IHL may influence 
instances not deliberated by IHL,192 when conscious omissions are concerned, IHRL 
cannot be used to fill gaps, because there are no normative gaps. 
  
                                            
188 See the criticism expressed by Matthias Lippold, ‘Between Humanization and 
Humanitarization? Detention in Armed Conflicts and the European Convention on Human 
Rights’ (2016) 76 ZaöRV 53 et seq. 
189 See Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts (OUP 2012) 
88-89. 
190 Cf. Pascal Hector, ‘Das Humanitäre Völkerrecht als lex specialis’ in Christian Calliess 
(ed), Herausforderung an Staat und Verfassung, Liber Amicorum Torsten Stein (NOMOS 
2015) 956, 966; Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(OUP 2012) 92. 
191 See e.g. article 84 Geneva Convention III referring to the prohibition to try a prisoner of 
war „by a court of any kind which does not offer the essential guarantees of independence 
and impartiality as generally recognized“, Theodor Meron, ‘The Humanization of 
Humanitarian Law’ (2000) 94 Am. J. Int’l L. 239, 266. 
192 See Theodor Meron, ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’ (2000) 94 Am. J. Int’l L. 
239, 253-6 for a role of IHRL in cases of repatriation of POWs, who genuinely and without 
pressure refuse to be repatriated, particularly because they fear persecution in their country. 
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5.3.2 Applying the approach to non-derogable IHRL guarantees 
When discussing the weight of each norm in the process of a harmonizing 
interpretation, the issue of non-derogable rights needs to be addressed. The 
traditional human rights instruments exclude some guarantees from the possibility 
of derogation (article 15 para. 2 ECHR or article 4 para. 2 ICCPR).193 Technically, 
the normative content of those rules is exhausted in the fact that the derogation 
process under both treaties does not apply for the guarantees excluded from it. It is 
argued in the following, that the fact that a human right is non-derogable does not – 
in principle – exclude that human right from being interpreted. Indeed, the position 
that non-derogable human rights stand alone and will not be influenced by other 
norms of international law, including IHL at all cannot be sustained, as evidenced 
by how the ICJ handled the interpretation of the non-derogable article 6 ICCPR, 
which it interpreted in accordance with the applicable humanitarian law norms.194 
However, the idea behind non-derogable rights is quite clearly that they will be 
materially guaranteed in times of emergency no matter what. In the following, a 
position on the interpretation of non-derogable human rights in armed conflict is 
proposed, first concerning the ECHR and second addressing the ICCPR. 
Article 15 ECHR explicitly mentions the derogation procedure as being in place for 
“time[s] of war”. Thus, it seems in keeping with the object and purpose of the 
derogation rules to grant the non-derogable ECHR guarantees a higher standing 
than usual in relation to the more specific IHL. This already follows from the fact that 
the lex specialis characteristic of IHL is devalued, if not fully negated, when the 
                                            
193 Article 15 para. 2 ECHR: right to life pursuant to article 2, unless caused by legitimate 
use of force; prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment 
pursuant to article 3; prohibition of slavery pursuant to article 4 para. 1; nulla crimen sine 
lege pursuant to article 7. 
Article 4 para. 2 ICCPR: right to life in article 6; prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment or punishment in article 7; prohibition of slavery and servitude in article 
8 paras 1 and 2; prohibition of detention for debt in article 11; nulla crimen sine lege, 
especially the prohibition of retroactive criminal laws in article 15; recognition of legal 
personality in article 16 and the freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief in article 
18. 
194 Paust argues that this is only due to the fact that article 6 has a “limiting criterion” with 
its notion of arbitrariness, Jordan J. Paust, ‘Human Rights on the Battlefield’ (2015) 47(3) 
Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 509, 522. Surely, the arbitrariness provides the open door for IHL, 
but it can nevertheless be stated that by its interpretation the ICJ modified the usual 
standard of arbitrariness and as such modified the regulatory content of a non-derogable 
rule. 
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wording of the treaty itself describes that certain human rights norms are meant to 
specifically apply unadulterated in armed conflicts. An exception to this rule is article 
2 ECHR which article 15 para. 2 ECHR explicitly deems derogable in cases of 
“lawful acts of war”. In doing so, the ECHR foresees potential conflicts with IHL and 
solves them by enabling a member state to derogate from the right to life, as long, 
as its actions are in keeping with IHL. However, the ECHR guarantees under articles 
3, 4 para. 1 and 7 ECHR will carry a higher weight in the process of interpretation. 
Article 7 ECHR (null crime sine legi) is unlikely to cause any friction in practice, 
because its content finds itself in IHL and IHRL alike.195 Article 4 para. 1 ECHR 
(prohibition of slavery and servitude) may, at first sight, run counter to articles 49 
and 50 of the Third Geneva Convention allowing for the utilization of the labour of 
prisoners of war for non-military work. However, only article 4 para. 1 ECHR is non-
derogable and while the utilization of labour of prisoners of war may be deemed to 
be compulsory or forced labour, this falls under the (derogable) article 4 para. 2 
ECHR.196 Consequently, article 4 para. 1 ECHR will in practice not conflict with IHL 
since IHL does not come close to allowing slavery or servitude. The guarantees and 
prohibitions contained in article 3 ECHR also have a counterpart in IHL.197 However, 
it must be noted that there may be instances – e.g. when taking prisoners of war – 
in which the very specific guarantees read into the prohibition of inhuman treatment 
by the ECtHR, such as the minimum size of prison cells etc.198, are not transferable 
                                            
195 See article 99 para. 1 Geneva Convention III; article 67 Geneva Convention IV; article 
75 para. 4 lit. c AP I; article 6 para. 2 lit. c AP II; with further references ICRC, ‘Rule 101, 
The Principle of Legality’ in Customary International Humanitarian Law Database 
<https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule101> last accessed 20 
June 2017. 
196 The Court has addressed article 4 as non-derogable in a singular case, see Rantsev v 
Cyprus and Russia App no 25965/04 (ECHR 7 January 2010) para. 283. Since this is 
contrary to the clear wording of article 15 para. 2 ECHR, it is not clear whether this was a 
simple mistake or reflective of a progressive reading of article 15 para. 2 ECHR by the 
Court, see also Jens Meyer-Ladewig and Christiane Schmaltz, ‘Art. 15’ in Jens Meyer-
Ladewig, Martin Nettesheim, and Stefan von Raumer (eds) Europäische 
Menschenrechtskonvention (4th ed, NOMOS 2017) para. 1. 
197 See Common article 3; article 12 para. 2 Geneva Convention I; article 12 para. 2 Geneva 
Convention II, articles 17 para. 4, 87 para. 3, 89 (end) Geneva Convention III; article 32 
Geneva Convention IV with further references ICRC, ‘Rule 90, Torture and Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment’ in Customary International Humanitarian Law Database 
<https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule90 > last accessed 20 
June 2017. 
198 See e.g. Mursic v Croatia App no 7334/13 (ECHR Grand Chamber Judgment 20 October 
2016). 
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to situations of armed conflicts. Cases of deprivation of liberty in armed conflicts are 
distinguishable on a factual and legal basis from deprivation of liberty in the penal 
system. Consequently, when the prohibition of inhuman treatment is applied in the 
context of an armed conflict, much of the ECtHR jurisprudence may not be 
transferred to the new situation, but a separate standard will have to be formulated 
for these cases. This standard will have to take into account the IHL rules, e.g. on 
prisoners of war and the legal standards for prisoner of war camps pursuant to IHL, 
and the circumstances of each singular case.  
The ICCPR includes a much longer list of non-derogable rights. Adding to that, while 
article 15 para. 2 ECHR explicitly addresses times of war and indeed gives 
guidance, how to deal with lawful acts of war, article 4 para. 2 ICCPR is silent in that 
regard. An explicit reference to war was struck during the treaty negotiations to avoid 
the “impression that the United Nations accepted war”.199 Nevertheless, the ICCPR 
derogation possibility applies, when armed conflicts “constitute a threat to the life of 
the nation”.200 In practice, the non-derogable guarantees of articles 11 (prohibition 
of detention for debt) and 16 (recognition of legal personality) regularly will not 
conflict with IHL. For the guarantees of articles 7 (prohibition of torture and cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment), 8 paras 1 and 2 (prohibition of 
slavery and servitude), and 15 (nullum crimen sine lege) the same applies that has 
been outlined for the parallel ECHR provisions. The freedom of thought, conscience, 
religion and belief in article 18 ICCPR is part of IHL as well and e.g. the Third 
Geneva Convention even offers clear guidance on how to realize this right.201 The 
most practical conflict seems to be the non-derogable character of the right to life in 
article 6 ICCPR. Since article 4 para. 2 ICCPR features no exclusion to the non-
derogability for lawful acts of war, as article 15 para. 2 ECHR does, one might argue 
that this means the death of civilians as part of collateral damage or even the killing 
                                            
199 See above fn 34. 
200 Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 29’ (2001) UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, para. 3: “The Covenant requires that even during an armed 
conflict measures derogating from the Covenant are allowed only if and to the extent that 
the situation constitutes a threat to the life of the nation”. 
201 See also articles 34 et seq. of Geneva Convention III; see also with further references 
ICRC, ‘Rule 104, Respect for Convictions and Religious Practices’ in Customary 
International Humanitarian Law Database <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule104> last accessed 20 June 2017. 
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of a combatant always violates the guarantee of article 6 ICCPR. However, article 
6 ICCPR, while acknowledging the right to life of every human being, prohibits only 
the arbitrary deprivation of life. Here, the ICJ has, as outlined above, taken IHL and 
its standards for lawfulness of acts in armed conflicts and read those into the 
standard of arbitrariness of article 6 ICCPR to the effect that a deprivation of life is 
not arbitrary, if it is lawful pursuant to IHL. Indeed, the fact that article 6 para. 1 
ICCPR with its standard of arbitrariness is open for such interpretative measures 
provides a methodologically sound way of reading IHL into article 6 ICCPR.202 
 
5.3.3 Remaining effect of IHRL in case of a recourse to the lex specialis 
concept 
In the rare event of a failed attempt of harmonization, when an IHL norm actually 
set aside a norm of IHRL, IHRL may nevertheless retain an effect on IHL. According 
to the Fragmentation Report,  
“the application of the special law does not normally extinguish the relevant 
general law. That general law will remain valid and applicable and will, in 
accordance with the principle of harmonization […], continue to give direction 
for the interpretation and application of the relevant special law and will 
become fully applicable in situations not provided for by the latter.”203  
For the topic at hand this means a replaced IHRL norm retains an effect on the 
interpretation of the IHL norm and may in certain situations guide its application.204 
This will most likely be reserved to rare cases, since its humanitarian object and 
purpose often guides the application of IHL in the direction of more protection 
anyways. 
  
                                            
202 For a further discussion see below 6.1. 
203 ILC, ‘Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International 
Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’ 
(2006) 1-2. [references deleted]; see also Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘The Interaction 
between Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Fragmentation, Conflict, Parallelism, or 
Convergence?’ (2008) 19(1) Eur. J. Int’l L. 161-182. 
204 See below 6.3.1. 
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5.3.4 Acknowledgment of criticism 
It is acknowledged that many have and will continue to take issue with the view that 
IHL needs to be the decisive yardstick in armed conflicts, although IHRL continues 
to apply. The radiance of human rights and the dark and generally unwanted 
situations IHL governs all too easily lead to the humane reaction that applying IHRL 
is thought to be the answer. However, factually replacing IHL with IHRL when this 
runs counter to the will of state actors will lead not to more protection in armed 
conflicts, it will lead to less and, which is worse, it may lead to a decrease in human 
rights compliance beyond the area of armed conflicts, as the acceptance for IHRL 
could erode. There are real problems with applying IHRL standards to armed 
conflicts without giving effect to IHL. Arguing that IHRL should apply fully 
necessitates showing the actors a way how to do it, which is far from easy in 
situations in which even the tailor-made IHL norms sometimes fail to encourage 
compliance. The articles of the modern IHL treaties contain clear rules of what to do 
and what not to do in specific situations. The Geneva provisions on prisoners of war 
basically enable legal laymen and -women to set up a prisoner camp in accordance 
with IHL and still enable the respective commanders to carry out their mission, which 
is exactly what is needed in armed conflict. In doing so, those IHL rules protect the 
dignity, life and wellbeing of potential prisoners of war. Human rights are not as easy 
to handle. Peacetime administrations often fail to implement IHRL standards 
properly, as the treaties do not spell out the exact content of their guarantees. The 
characteristic weighing of legal goods in the abstract and in concrete before 
deciding, if a legitimate state interest is sufficiently important to rectify an 
interference in the human rights of an individual is something peacetime public 
administration and bureaucracy are able to handle, but it is a time-intensive process. 
In armed conflict, clarity of legal standards is needed more than elsewhere to enable 
compliant behaviour.205 IHL enables a swift translation of legal norms to operation 
plans, rules of engagement or, quite simply, orders. This is what characterizes the 
specificity of IHL. It is tailor-made to situations of armed conflict not only in its 
                                            
205 On the importance of clarity Silvia Borelli, ‘Jaloud v Netherlands and Hassan v United 
Kingdom: Time for a principled approach in the application of the ECHR to military action 
abroad’ (2015) 2(16) QIL 25, 26; John Tobin, ‘Seeking Clarity in Relation to the Principle of 
Complementarity’ (2007) 8 Melb. J. Int’l L. 356-372; Michael J. Kelly, ‘Critical Analysis of 
the International Court of Justice Ruling on Israel's Security Barrier’ (2005) 29 Fordham Int’l 
L. J. 181, 188. 
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content, but in its clarity of norms and in its easy-to-understand systematics. Its 
norms prohibiting excessive collateral damage206 are the practical translation of the 
peacetime-standard of proportionality into armed conflict.207 Introducing the much 
more complex IHRL proportionality standard into armed conflict will lead to grave 
practical problems. It would also shut out any deliberations of military necessity, an 
aspect central to IHL. One may understandably shudder at the thought of military 
necessity trumping individual rights, especially of civilians, but such aspects are 
essential to IHL and of key importance to retain the acceptance of state actors for 
legal standards in armed conflicts, which ultimately safeguards the protection of the 
individual. 
 
 
6. Translating theory to practice: How to apply specific IHRL 
guarantees in armed conflicts 
The measure for a solution on the relationship between IHL and IHRL is not only its 
theoretical coherence, but also the possibility to translate it into practice as well as 
the need for results which give effect to the applicable legal standards and which 
are acceptable to the international community during armed conflicts. In the 
following, the approach suggested above will be measured by these standards 
addressing first the human right to life in IACs, secondly the human right to liberty 
in IACs and thirdly NIAC scenarios featuring both rights.  
 
6.1 The human right to life in IACs  
The right to life is an obvious starting point and a well-suited litmus test for a theory 
on how to apply IHRL norms in armed conflicts. It is also a fairly straight forward – 
                                            
206 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, ‘Rule 14’ in Customary International 
Humanitarian Law Vol. I (CUP 2005) 46; see also article 51 para. 5 lit. b AP I. A (qualified) 
violation of the prohibition of excessive damage is a war crime pursuant to article 8 para. 2 
lit. b, iv of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
207 See Yoram Dinstein, ‘The Principle of Proportionality’ in Kjetil Mujezinović Larsen, 
Camilla Guldahl Cooper, and Gro Nystuen (eds), Searching for a ‚Principle of Humanity‘ in 
International Humanitarian Law (CUP 2013) 72, 74 et seq.; cf. Thomas Winkler, ‘The 
Copenhagen Process on Detainees: A Necessity’ (2010) 78 Nord. J. Int’l L. 489, 495-6. 
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and commonly discussed – example since the ICJ has already sketched it out in 
part. Using force against legitimate targets is a key feature of IHL. IHL grants 
combatants the right to use lethal force against a legitimate military objective, i.e. an 
enemy combatant.208 It also “allows, or at least tolerates, the killing and wounding 
of innocent human beings not participating in an armed conflict, such as civilian 
victims of lawful collateral damage.”209 
Applying the human right to life without modification would be in stark contrast to the 
content of IHL and would – in fact practically set aside IHL.210 The use of lethal force 
against an enemy combatant, even though conducted with the necessary 
precautions and without the expectance of excessive incidental loss of civilian life, 
would be rendered unlawful.211 Here IHRL arguably clashes most violently with IHL, 
since pursuant to the conception of IHRL “killing a person can only be an exceptional 
means to save life, but never a lawful end in itself, and has furthermore to meet a 
strict proportionality test in each individual case”212. To apply this rule to armed 
conflicts would lead to the methodologically and practically unsound result that the 
                                            
208 See article 43 para. 2 AP I, “Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other 
than medical personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are 
combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities”; see also 
article 52 para. 2 AP I; for further reference Peter Rowe, ‘Is There a Right to Detain Civilians 
by Foreign Armed Forces During a Non-International Armed Conflict?’ (2012) 61 ICLQ 697, 
701 et seq. 
209 Theodor Meron, ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’ (2000) 94 Am. J. Int’l L. 239; 
see also Article 51 para. 5 lit. b and 85 para. 3 lit. b AP I. 
210 Insofar the report of Richard Ekins, Jonathan Morgan, and Tom Tugendhat, ‘Clearing 
the Fog of Law’ (Policy Exchange 2015) 26 rightly raises an issue. 
211 As such, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights deserves criticism for Coard, 
et al. v the United States (29 September 1999) Case 10.951, Report No. 109/99, para. 42 
in which it acknowledged the role IHL needs to play in interpreting the regional human rights 
guarantees, but still argued that it is “bound by its Charter-based mandate to give effect to 
the normative standard which best safeguards the rights of the individual.”; see with further 
references Oona A. Hathaway, Rebecca Crootof, Philip Levitz, Haley Nix, William Perdue, 
Chelsea Purvis, and Julia Spiegel, ‘Which Law Governs During Armed Conflict? The 
Relationship Between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’ (2011/2012) 
96 Minn. Law Rev. 1883, 1909 et seq. 
212 Matthias Lippold, ‘Between Humanization and Humanitarization? Detention in Armed 
Conflicts and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2016) 76 ZaöRV 53, 64; see 
McCann and Others v UK App no 18984/91 (ECHR Grand Chamber Judgment 27 
September 1995) paras 146-150, 156 and 194. 
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norms of the more specific legal regime of international law would be replaced in 
full, at least in practice, by the more general.213  
There are two options to give effect to IHL: The first, derogations, has been 
addressed. As argued above, this seems to be an overly crude tool for such a 
complex task and one, which is unlikely to succeed. The second is the one submitted 
here: to interpret the human rights guarantee in accordance with the rule in article 31 
para. 3 lit. c VCLT. A use of force depriving a human being of his or her life, which 
is lawful pursuant to IHL, would fall within the scope of protection of article 2 ECHR 
and would interfere with the right to life. However, due to the fact that the interfering 
act is a “lawful act of war” and as such falls outside of article 2’s non-derogable 
content, the rule of IHL that allows this use of force would prevail in the harmonizing 
interpretation and article 2 ECHR would be modified to allow the deprivation of life 
when lawful pursuant to IHL. This constellation would be read into the otherwise 
exhaustive catalogue of cases in article 2 para. 2 ECHR, in which the deprivation of 
life can be justified. A further deviation from the regular position of the ECtHR has 
to be made concerning the proportionality test. The Court has established in 
McCann et al. v United Kingdom that the wording of under article 2 para. 2 ECHR 
(“absolutely necessary”) calls for a stricter proportionality standard for deprivations 
of life, resulting in a measure having to be “strictly proportionate to the achievement 
of the aims”214. This test would need to be amended in situations of IACs so that 
interfering with the human right to life by using force in an IAC would be a priori 
proportionate, if the use of force is lawful pursuant to IHL, rendering lethal force 
against military objectives and use of force not excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct military advantage legal pursuant to IHRL.215 Concerning article 6 of the 
ICCPR, the approach adopted by the ICJ would be taken. Because article 6 ICCPR 
outlaws the arbitrary deprivation of life only, and the test of arbitrariness will – at 
                                            
213 See Christopher Greenwood, ‘Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Conflict or 
Convergence (2010-2011) 43 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 491, 501 et seq.; Louise Doswald-
Beck, ‘The Right to Life in Armed Conflict’ (December 2006) 88(864) Int’l Rev. Red Cross 
881, 903 et seq. 
214 See McCann et al. v United Kingdom App no 18984/91 (ECHR Grand Chamber 
Judgment 27 September 1995) para. 149. 
215 ICRC, ‘Rule 14, Proportionality in Attack’ in Customary International Humanitarian Law 
Database <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter4_ 
rule14> last accessed 20 June 2017. 
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least in the context of an international armed conflict – be conducted pursuant to the 
applicable IHL, a lawful deprivation of life pursuant to IHL would not be an arbitrary 
deprivation of life pursuant to IHRL.216 Article 6 ICCPR also is a case in point of IHL 
possibly establishing a higher degree of protection. What constitutes arbitrary 
behaviour pursuant to article 6 ICCPR has been a topic of significant controversy.217 
The arbitrariness standard is said to include elements of unlawfulness, injustice, 
capriciousness and unreasonableness, but it has also been described as not 
understandable in the abstract.218 At the core of the prohibition of an arbitrary 
deprivation of life is the deprivation of life without an objective reason. Indeed, this 
is rather general and circumstances are easily envisioned, where a deprivation of 
life would happen with an objective reason – and thus not arbitrary. IHL adds 
significant contours to the arbitrariness standard e.g. with its clear duties of 
precaution before using force.219  
 
This leads to a follow-up problem that needs to be addressed. If it is said that article 
2 ECHR and article 6 ICCPR are violated as soon as the deprivation of life is 
unlawful pursuant to IHL, this begs the question of how narrow conformity with IHL 
is to be understood. Take the case of the duty to cancel or suspend an attack 
pursuant to article 57 para. 2 lit. b AP I, “if it becomes apparent that the objective is 
not a military one…”. In a case, in which it becomes apparent during an attack that 
the attack targets civilians instead of combatants, IHL would mandate an immediate 
suspension of the attack. What happens in such a situation when it is nevertheless 
decided – for whatever reasons – to continue the attack and in the end, it turns out 
that – unlike expected during the attack – the persons targeted were indeed 
combatants and not civilians. The attacking party would have violated article 57 
para. 2 lit. b AP I by not suspending the attack, when it thought that the objective 
                                            
216 See Christopher Greenwood, ‘Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Conflict or 
Convergence (2010-2011) 43 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 491, 505; see also Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, 240 (para. 25). 
217 See Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Commentary (Engel 
1993), article 6, para. 12 et seq. 
218 Manfred Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Commentary (Engel 1993), 
article 6, para. 14. 
219 Jordan J. Paust, ‘Human Rights on the Battlefield’ (2015) 47(3) Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 
509, 533 et seq. 
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was not a military one. However, the result achieved by the attack would be lawful 
pursuant to IHL, because the attack targeted combatants in the end, although IHL 
was violated on the way. The question then becomes: was the deprivation of the life 
of a combatant during the attack arbitrary pursuant to article 6 para. 1 ICCPR. The 
same question arises in case of a breach of the duty to take precautions to minimize 
injuries to civilians, to give effective warning of an attack, which may affect the 
civilian population, etc., which then turns out not to have practical consequences, 
since only hostile combatants, i.e. legitimate targets, and no civilians were harmed 
as a result of the attack. It is proposed that not every violation of IHL renders a 
deprivation of life arbitrary or illegal pursuant to IHRL. The purpose of the IHL norm 
to suspend the attack, when the objective turns out to be civilian in nature, is to 
protect the civilian objective. The duties of precaution referred to have the same 
purpose. In the given example, this protective purpose is not interfered with in the 
end, since combatants fall outside of its scope. As such, it seems sensible to look 
at the protective purpose of the IHL norm that was violated and analyse, if this 
protective purpose is interfered with. Adopting this method, the killing of a combatant 
with unlawful methods, e.g. by way of a perfidious attack would be an arbitrary 
deprivation of life, since the combatant falls within the protective purpose of the 
norm, which forbids perfidy.220  
 
6.2 The human right to liberty in IACs 
Deprivations of liberty have been the most practical examples of measures 
undertaken in armed conflicts, which have come before the courts in recent years. 
It suffices to say for the purposes of this thesis that the IHL of IACs allows for the 
taking of prisoners of war and internment of civilians in specific circumstances.221 
                                            
220 This paragraph follows an approach suggested for the application of German criminal 
law to acts by German soldiers in armed conflicts, see Stefan Sohm and Tim R. Salomon, 
‘Völkerrechtsakzessorietät des StGB beim Einsatz deutscher Streitkräfte’ (2014) NZWehrr 
133-153. 
221 See e.g. article 43 para. 2 AP I read in conjunction with article 4 Geneva Convention III, 
as well as articles 42 para. 1, article 68 para. 1, 78 para. 1 Geneva Convention IV, see Chris 
Jenks, ‘Detention under the law of armed conflict’ in Rain Liivoja and Tim McCormack (eds), 
Routledge Handbook of the Law of Armed Conflict (Routledge 2016) 301-316; Alex Conte, 
‘The legality of detention in armed conflict’ in Annyssa Bellal (ed), The War Report: Armed 
Conflict in 2014 (OUP 2015) 476, 489 et seq.; Peter Rowe, ‘Is There a Right to Detain 
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The ICCPR again offers an easy way to accommodate IHL, since article 9 ICCPR 
prohibits only arbitrary deprivations of liberty, as does IHL.222 Consequently, as is 
the case for article 6 ICCPR, a deprivation of liberty in accordance with IHL, will not 
be arbitrary pursuant to article 9 ICCPR and is allowed as such.223  
Article 5 ECHR poses more problems.224 On its face, article 5 para. 1 ECHR 
contains an exhaustive catalogue of cases in which a deprivation of liberty may be 
conducted lawfully. These cases do not include cases of internment225 or 
detention226, which are lawful pursuant to IHL. However, this does not mean that 
deprivations of liberty pursuant to IHL are automatically unjustifiable violations of the 
right to liberty under the ECHR. If a deprivation of liberty in an (international) armed 
conflict setting is conducted lawfully pursuant to IHL, then the IHL norm allowing 
that conduct and article 5 ECHR seemingly disallowing it, since it does not fall under 
the article 5 para. 1 ECHR catalogue, conflict in concept and result. Consequently, 
in the interpretative process – as outlined above – attempts will need to be made to 
reconcile both norms by interpretation as article 31 para. 3 lit. c VCLT proposes. 
This thesis takes the position that such harmonization is indeed achievable in the 
case mentioned by reading into the catalogue of article 5 para. 1 lit. a-f ECHR the 
case of deprivations of liberty pursuant to IHL. It is accepted that this is subject to 
                                            
Civilians by Foreign Armed Forces During a Non-International Armed Conflict?’ (2012) 61 
ICLQ 697, 701 et seq.; Ashley S. Deeks, ‘Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict’ (2009) 
40 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 403, 406 et seq. 
222 See ICRC, ‘Rule 99, Deprivation of Liberty’ in Customary International Humanitarian Law 
Database <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule99 > last 
accessed 20 June 2017. 
223 See Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 35’ (16 December 2014) UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/GC/35, para. 64 “Security detention authorized and regulated by and complying 
with international humanitarian law in principle is not arbitrary.”; see also Alex Conte, ‘The 
legality of detention in armed conflict’ in Annyssa Bellal (ed), The War Report: Armed 
Conflict in 2014 (OUP 2015) 476, 487; Christopher Greenwood, ‘Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law: Conflict or Convergence (2010-2011) 43 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 491, 
506. 
224 See e.g. Christopher Greenwood, ‘Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Conflict or 
Convergence (2010-2011) 43 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 491, 506; Bernhard Schäfer, Zum 
Verhältnis Menschenrechte und humanitäres Völkerrecht (Universitätsverlag Potsdam 
2006) 46. 
225 See article 42 and 78 Geneva Convention IV (internment for reasons of security). 
226 See articles 28, 30, and 32 Geneva Convention I (retention and detention of medical and 
religious personnel); articles 36 and 37 Geneva convention II (retention and detention of 
medical and religious personnel on hospital ships); articles 21 and 118 Geneva Convention 
III (prisoners of war); article 44 AP I (prisoners of war). 
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challenge, since such an interpretation would depart from the wording of article 5 
para. 1 ECHR in a way, which may be criticized as contra legem. As argued above, 
IHL does have a significant weight in the harmonizing interpretation, as the 
applicable lex specialis in such a case. Since article 5 ECHR is derogable, it is open 
to accommodate the rules of IHL. The alternative to a solution by interpretation 
would be the result that article 5 ECHR and the IHL norm allowing the deprivation 
of liberty are indeed in unresolvable conflict. Consequently, article 5 ECHR would 
be set aside by the lex specialis, at least insofar as it would disallow actions that are 
allowed pursuant to IHL. It could be argued that article 5 ECHR having been 
replaced does not apply to the situation any longer, meaning that the ECtHR would 
not be able to exercise judicial oversight over such a measure. It would thus seem 
to be in keeping with the object and purpose of article 5 ECHR to generally uphold 
the human right to liberty modified to the extent that a deprivation of liberty lawful 
pursuant to IHL is justifiable and not to replace it. 
The ECtHR had to address this issue in the case of Hassan v UK. The case dealt 
with the security detention of an Iraqi national in Camp Bucca, who was arrested 
during an operation, which had the aim to arrest his brother, a General of the Quds 
Force. During this operation, Tarek Hassan was found armed with an AK-47 rifle on 
the roof of the home of his brother and was subsequently detained as posing a threat 
to security.227  
The ECtHR did not exactly have a clean slate when this case came before it. On the 
contrary, it has had a chequered history with the topic IHL. The European 
Commission on Human Rights had acknowledged IHL as lex specialis in the 
traditional sense in Cyprus v Turkey228, a case dealing with the occupation of parts 
of Cyprus by Turkey in 1974, in which it decided that the taking of prisoners of war 
was subject to the Third Geneva Convention to which both parties of the conflict 
were bound and as such, the Commission “has not found it necessary to examine 
the question of a breach of article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
with regard to persons accorded the status of prisoners of war.”229 The ECtHR did 
                                            
227 Hassan v UK App no 29750/09 (ECHR Grand Chamber Judgment 16 September 2014) 
para. 104. 
228 Cyprus v Turkey App nos 6780/74 and 6950/75 (EComHR 10 July 1976). 
229 Cyprus v Turkey App nos 6780/74 and 6950/75 (EComHR 10 July 1976) para. 313. 
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not adopt such a clear cut approach. At times, the ECtHR seems to have ignored 
IHL because of article 32 ECHR, which extends the jurisdiction of the Court to “all 
matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention”.230 While, 
of course, addressing IHL would have been part of the “interpretation of the 
Convention”231, in some cases the Court flat out dodged the issue, while in other 
cases, in which IHL was not even applicable, it did address it.232 In the case Al Jedda 
v UK (security internment in Basrah from 2004 to 2007), the Court – simply put – 
decided to ignore IHL and the applicable UN Security Council resolutions in the 
process of interpretation and indeed rejected both as a legal ground to detain a 
person posing a threat, arguing that they only gave a right to detain and did not 
include an obligation to do so.233 Hassan v UK now represents a significant 
improvement over this stance. In this case, the ECtHR decided to read into the 
catalogue of article 5 para. 1 ECHR the unwritten case of a detention lawful pursuant 
to IHL. It argued:  
                                            
230 Karin Oellers-Frahm, ‘A regional perspective on the convergence and conflicts of human 
rights and international humanitarian law in military operations: The European Court of 
Human Rights’ in Erika de Wet and Jann Klefner (eds), Convergence and Conflicts (PULP 
2014) 333, 348. 
231 Article 32 ECHR; it is granted that there are some grey areas concerning the application 
of article 31 para. 3 lit. c VCLT in circumstances of limited jurisdiction. The ICJ has faced 
criticism sparked by its decision in Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of 
America) [2003] ICJ Rep 161, in which it applied general rules of international law, 
especially norms regulating the use of force, to analyze, if certain measures were justified 
pursuant to a friendship treaty between the USA and Iran, allowing for measures necessary 
for the protection of a state’s essential security interests (paras 41 et seq.). The decision 
has been met with unease, since the ICJ was deemed to have expanded its jurisdiction by 
applying this interpretation method, see Jean d’Aspremont, ‘The Systemic Integration of 
International Law by Domestic Courts’, in Ole Kristian Fauchald and André Nollkaemper 
(eds), The Practice of International and National Courts and the (De-)Fragmentation of 
International Law (Bloomsbury 2014) 141, 149 with further reference. However, while it is 
accepted that recourse to article 31 para. 3 lit. c VCLT may not “go as far as displacing the 
applicable law” (ibid 149), it is argued that when a court has jurisdiction to interpret a norm, 
it has jurisdiction to do so with reference to all interpretation methods, including the principle 
of systemic integration. Otherwise it runs the risk to come to a false result, simply because 
it was by way of its limited jurisdiction prevented to take into account other pertinent rules.  
232 See Gerd Oberleitner, Human Rights in Armed Conflict (CUP 2015) 309 with reference 
to Kononov v Latvia App no 36376/04 (ECHR Grand Chamber Judgment 17 May 2010); 
Engel et al. v Netherlands App nos 5100/71, 5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/72, 5370/72 (ECHR 
8 June 1976). 
233 Al Jedda v UK App no 27021/08 (ECHR Grand Chamber Judgment 7 July 2011) 
para. 107; see with a justifiably critical assessment Jelena Pejic, ‘The European Court of 
Human Rights’ Al-Jedda judgment: the oversight of international humanitarian law’ 
(September 2011) 93(883) Int’l Rev. Red Cross 837, 842 et seq. 
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“By reason of the co-existence of the safeguards provided by international 
humanitarian law and by the Convention in time of armed conflict, the 
grounds of permitted deprivation of liberty set out in subparagraphs (a) to (f) 
of that provision should be accommodated, as far as possible, with the taking 
of prisoners of war and the detention of civilians who pose a risk to security 
under the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions. […] As with the grounds of 
permitted detention already set out in those subparagraphs, deprivation of 
liberty pursuant to powers under international humanitarian law must be 
“lawful” to preclude a violation of Article 5 § 1. This means that the detention 
must comply with the rules of international humanitarian law and, most 
importantly, that it should be in keeping with the fundamental purpose of 
Article 5 § 1, which is to protect the individual from arbitrariness.”234 
 
The ECtHR justified this fresh start concerning human rights in armed conflicts with 
the argument that in Hassan v UK a state party had for the first time “requested the 
Court to disapply its obligations under Article 5 or in some other way to interpret 
them in the light of powers of detention available to it under international 
humanitarian law”235, which the UK failed to do in Al-Jedda v UK. It continued in the 
same direction, when it decided that its approach would hinge on the applicability of 
IHL being “specifically pleaded by the respondent State”.236 With this the Court 
seemingly tried to save its face and blame its incoherent jurisprudence on IHL 
incorporation on the member states’ failure to raise the issue. This passage is a 
weakness of the judgment. Contrary to the court’s decision, which explains that it is 
“not for the Court to assume that a State intends to modify the commitments which 
it has undertaken by ratifying the Convention in the absence of a clear indication to 
that effect”, it indeed is the court’s solemn responsibility to interpret, apply and give 
effect to the law and make use of the universally accepted methods of interpretation, 
including article 31 para. 3 lit. c VCLT, independent of a member state’s will or 
consent.237  
                                            
234 Hassan v UK App no 29750/09 (ECHR Grand Chamber Judgment 16 September 2014) 
para. 104-5 (References omitted). 
235 Hassan v UK App no 29750/09 (ECHR Grand Chamber Judgment 16 September 2014) 
para. 99. 
236 Hassan v UK App no 29750/09 (ECHR Grand Chamber Judgment 16 September 2014) 
para. 107. 
237 Cf. Stefan Oeter, ‘Fortschrittsnarrative im Humanitären Völkerrecht’ in Christian Calliess 
(ed), Herausforderung an Staat und Verfassung, Liber Amicorum Torsten Stein (NOMOS 
2015) 1025, 1041, who ties this attitude of the ECtHR (although pre-Hassan) back to a 
tendency of every monitoring body or court to base its assessment on its own material 
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However, in general the Court deserves praise for Hassan v UK. It freed itself from 
the chains of needing a derogation to address IHL, although its justification for doing 
so seems a bit odd.238 The court can be seen as being on track to build a foundation 
for a workable approach to the topic human rights in armed conflicts. With Hassan 
v UK it has also deferred to IHL, when it comes to the duration of imprisonment, 
which is regularly for an uncertain amount of time, since IHL allows the 
imprisonment of a prisoner of war until the cessation of hostilities, where after a 
prisoner will be entitled to repatriation.239 Indeed, the Court acknowledges the 
significant role of IHL in interpreting human rights in armed conflict scenarios by 
deciding IHL should be “accommodated as far as possible.” It does so by also 
modifying article 5 para. 4 ECHR, which guarantees the habeas corpus right, to the 
degree that it deems a “competent body”240 performing the review procedure – as 
IHL foresees in articles 43 and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention – as 
sufficient.241  
An additional tool in the toolbox needed to apply human rights to armed conflict 
scenarios was hinted at by the Court in Jaloud v Netherlands, where the Court 
accepted that armed conflicts regularly mean that state actors act in “relatively 
difficult conditions”. It stressed that it is prepared to make reasonable allowances 
                                            
sources of law, e.g. the ECHR. He also rightly points to the obliqueness of the interpretative 
result so achieved.  
238 The simple justification would have been that article 15 ECHR never intended to bar the 
interpretation of human rights guarantees, whereas the Court referred to the ongoing state 
practice of not derogating in extraterritorial military operations (Hassan v UK App no 
29750/09 (ECHR Grand Chamber Judgment 16 September 2014) para. 101). It used this 
practice as relevant pursuant to article 31 para. 3 lit. b VCLT to decide that drawing on IHL 
would be possible even without a formal derogation, see the criticism of this approach in 
the separate opinion of Judges Spano, Nicolaou, Bianku and Kalaydjieva (para. 12); see 
with further criticism Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, ‘The Grand Chamber Judgment in Hassan 
v UK’ (EJIL:Talk 16 September 2014). 
239 Article 118 Geneva Convention III, see Peter Rowe, The Impact of Human Rights on 
Armed Forces (OUP 2006) 149, who mentions this feature of IHL as being “difficult to fit 
within the regime of human rights”. 
240 See articles 43, 78 Geneva Convention IV; see Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, ‘The Grand 
Chamber Judgment in Hassan v UK’ (EJIL:Talk 16 September 2014). 
241 Hassan v UK App no 29750/09 (ECHR Grand Chamber Judgment 16 September 2014) 
para. 106; cf. Peter Rowe, The Impact of Human Rights on Armed Forces (OUP 2006) 150 
et seq. 
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for this factor.242 It remains to be seen, if the Court merely sought to soften the force 
of the judgment in the specific case, which found for a violation of the ECHR, or if it 
follows up on this idea in future cases.  
 
6.3 The case of NIACs 
While the IHL applicable in IAC scenarios is rather detailed, NIACs currently pose 
the most practical and legal questions, resulting from the much less regulated legal 
framework. This has consequences for the relationship of the IHL of NIACs and 
IHRL. A less detailed IHL clearly means that in NIACs, human rights have a more 
influential role, since “general law will remain valid and applicable”, even when there 
is a regime containing lex specialis norms and will “become fully applicable in 
situations not provided for by the latter.”243 At the same time, the situation is 
complicated by the fact that one must differentiate between gaps of IHL, which are 
left intentionally and those which may be filled by the lex generalis. Moreover, the 
IHL of NIACs takes on a different terminology due to the larger role of domestic 
law.244  
 
6.3.1 The human right to life in NIACs 
It is a basic rule of IHL that a state actor, when using force has to distinguish 
between combatants and civilians.245 This principle of distinction applies in non-
                                            
242 Jaloud v Netherlands App no 47708/08 (ECHR 20 November 2014) para. 226; see also 
Al Skeini et al. v UK App no 55721/07 (ECHR Grand Chamber Judgment 7 July 2011) para. 
168. 
243 ILC, ‘Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International 
Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’ (2006) 
1 et seq. [references deleted]; see also Knut Dörmann, Detention in Non-International 
Armed Conflicts (2012) 88 US Naval War College ILS 347, 348-9. 
244 Peter Rowe, ‘Is There a Right to Detain Civilians by Foreign Armed Forces During a 
Non-International Armed Conflict?’ (2012) 61 ICLQ 697, 702 et seq. 
245 See e.g. ICRC, ‘Rule 1, The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and Combatants’ 
in Customary International Humanitarian Law Database <https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule1> last accessed 20 June 2017 with 
further references. The principle of distinction is one of the most basic and fundamental 
pillars of modern IHL. 
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international settings as well.246 In NIACs the opponent of a state actor is a non-
state actor, whose members do not possess the status of a combatant in the sense 
of having the right to use force.247 Yet, a hostile fighter in a NIAC may still be 
targeted. This is suggested by the principle of distinction as well as Common article 
3 of the Geneva Conventions, which excludes persons participating directly in 
hostilities from its protection, and article 13 para. 3 of the AP II, clarifying the 
immunity of civilians from direct attacks “unless and for such time as they take a 
direct part in hostilities”. It is a subject of dispute whether a right to use force against 
civilians engaging in hostilities follows from these provisions. Regulating an act (e.g. 
the use of force against civilians) may be said to be different from authorizing such 
an act.248 Indeed, if everything IHL regulates is deemed to be authorized by it, it 
would have to be argued that IHL authorizes compulsory work vis a vis detained 
civilians in NIACs with its article 5 para. 1 lit. e AP II, a position that would rightly be 
subject to challenge. Consequently, the opinion that IHL does not actually authorize 
the use of force in NIACs by regulating it is strongly represented in literature.249 
There are some strong aspects of this view. One might well argue that in NIACs 
legal authorizations for the actions of the state party are not based on international 
law – a NIAC is after all by its nature more domestic than international – but must 
                                            
246 See e.g. ICRC, ‘Rule 1, The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and Combatants’ 
in Customary International Humanitarian Law Database <https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule1> last accessed 20 June 2017. 
247 See e.g. Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts (OUP 
2012) 71. 
248 See regarding detentions extensively Ryan Goodman, ‘Authorization versus Regulation 
of Detentions in Non-International Armed Conflicts’ (2015) 91 US Naval War College ILS 
155. 
249 See Marco Sassòli and Laura M. Olson, ‘The relationship between international 
humanitarian and human rights law where it matters’ (September 2008) 90(871) Int’l Rev. 
Red Cross 599, 610 et seq.; see also J. Cerone, ‘Jurisdiction and Power: The Intersection 
of Human Rights Law & the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict in an Extraterritorial 
Context’ (2007) 40 Isr. L. Rev. 396, 411; Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (OUP 2012) 71 “the law of non-international armed conflict 
does not provide the parties to the conflict with a right to undertake certain actions. Rather, 
it prohibits certain actions and regulates other conduct should the parties choose to engage 
in particular endeavours”; see also the discussion between Aurel Sari, Lawrence Hill-
Cawthorne and Dapo Akande on EJIL:Talk Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne and Dapo Akande, 
‘Does IHL Provide a Legal Basis for Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts?’ 
(EJIL:Talk 7 May 2014); Aurel Sari, ‘Sorry Sir, We’re All Non-State Actors Now: A Reply to 
Hill-Cawthorne and Akande on the Authority to Kill and Detain in NIAC’ (EJIL:Talk 9 May 
2014); Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne/Dapo Akande, Locating the Legal Basis for Detention in 
Non-International Armed Conflicts: A Rejoinder to Aurel Sari (EJIL:Talk 2 June 2014). 
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be sought in domestic law, or, in Security Council resolutions pursuant to Chapter 
VII.250 In addition, the wording of the Geneva Conventions and of AP II does not 
explicitly specify a legal basis to target hostile fighters in NIACs. Furthermore, it can 
be argued that Common article 3 and the IHL of NIACs in general are norms, whose 
object and purpose is the protection of individual rights. In the case of Common 
article 3 they fulfil this purpose by partially protecting civilians, i.e. as long as they 
do not participate in hostilities. To read from this partial protection a legal basis to 
use force against individuals not falling under the protection has drawn criticism.251 
Indeed, if one would perceive this as a gap of IHL, insofar it does not regulate the 
protection of persons involved in hostilities, one might argue that this gap needs to 
be filled by recourse to IHRL. One would then have to argue that hostile fighters are 
protected by human rights, pursuant to which killing a person can only be an 
exceptional means to save life and has to be strictly proportional in each case.252 
This would undercut the conception of Common article 3, which awards protection 
first and foremost to persons not involved in hostilities. 
However, it is submitted that there is sufficient evidence for an actual authorization 
of the use of force against hostile fighters in NIACs. Mačák has rightly alluded to the 
fact that a “legal basis authorizing specific conduct may be implied from the relevant 
treaty text or found in customary international law.”253 While it could be argued that 
the legal basis for the use of force is implied in AP II and Common article 3, such a 
position would have to overcome their vague wording and their overall protective 
object and purpose. A way to still arrive at this conclusion would be to interpret 
                                            
250 Peter Rowe, ‘Is There a Right to Detain Civilians by Foreign Armed Forces During a 
Non-International Armed Conflict?’ (2012) 61 ICLQ 697, 706 et seq. 
251 Els Debuf argues on the basis of the humanitarian purpose of IHL, Captured in War: 
Lawful Internment in Armed Conflict (Hart Publ 2013) 469; see however Kubo Mačák, ‘A 
Needle in a Haystack? Locating the Legal Basis for Detention in Non-International Armed 
Conflict’ (2015) 45 Isr. Yb Hum. Rts 87, 97, who convincingly argues for a broader object 
and purpose of IHL as “a dialectical compromise between (…) two opposing forces: 
humanity and military necessity” with reference to Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Military Necessity 
and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law’ (2010) 50 Va. J. Int’l L. 795, 798. 
252 See Matthias Lippold, ‘Between Humanization and Humanitarization? Detention in 
Armed Conflicts and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2016) 76 ZaöRV 53, 64; 
McCann and Others v UK App no 18984/91 (ECHR Grand Chamber Judgment 27 
September 1995) paras 146-150, 156 and 194. 
253 Kubo Mačák, ‘A Needle in a Haystack? Locating the Legal Basis for Detention in Non-
International Armed Conflict’ (2015) 45 Isr. Yb Hum. Rts 87, 90.  
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Common article 3 and article 13 para. 3 AP II in accordance with article 31 para. 3 
lit. b VCLT, since the subsequent practice of the state parties strongly suggests for 
a legal basis of the right to use force in IHL.254 A similar way would be to argue for 
a customary authorization of state parties to use force in NIACs. It is submitted that 
the requirements for the emergence of a norm of customary law255, consuetudo 
(congruent state practice) and opinio juris sive necessitatis are met concerning a 
legal norm that authorizes the use of force against civilians participating directly in 
hostilities in NIACs.256 There is widespread state practice to the point that civilians 
taking part in hostilities not only lose their protection, but “become legitimate 
targets”, which “may be attacked”257. This can be drawn from an assessment of the 
military manuals, relying on the well-established fact that state practice can be 
drawn from verbal practice.258 There is no practice to the contrary, since those states 
                                            
254 See Tim R. Salomon, ‘Die Anwendung von Menschenrechten im bewaffneten Konflikt’ 
(2015) 53(3) ArchVR 322, 351.  
255 See Article 38 para. 1 lit. b of the ICJ Statute: “evidence of a general practice accepted 
as law”; see further North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v 
Denmark/Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep 3, 42 et seq (paras 
70 et seq.). 
256 Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Targeting in Operational Law’ in Terry D. Gill and Dieter Fleck (eds), 
The Handbook of International Military Operations (OUP 2010) 245 et seq. (para. 16.02: 
“those who directly participate in hostilities may be attacked for such times as they do so. 
Codified in Article 51(3) of API and Article 13(3) of AP II, this principle reflects customary 
international humanitarian law in both international and non-international armed conflict”). 
257 See Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, ‘Distinction between Civilians 
and Combatants’ in Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. II Part 1 (CUP 2005) 
108 et seq. (paras 762 et seq.), see especially the Military Manuals of Belgium (para. 821); 
Canada (para. 764: “They lose their protection and become legitimate targets for such time 
as they take direct part in hostilities”); Colombia (para. 840: “They thus become 
combatants”); Croatia (para. 766: “civilians may not be attacked, unless they participate 
directly in hostilities”); the Dominican Republic (para. 767: “all persons who participate in 
military operations or activities are considered combatants”); Ecuador (para. 768: “civilians 
who participate directly in hostilities […] lose their immunity and may be attacked”); France 
(para, 769); India (para. 771; 824: “may be treated as combatants”); Indonesia (para. 772 
“unlawful combatant and is considered a military objective”); Lebanon (para. 847: “lose their 
civilian status and become military objectives liable to attack”); Madagascar (para. 775); 
Philippines (para. 849: “can be the object of a direct attack”) Spain (para. 782); Togo (para. 
784); USA (para. 788 “lose their immunity and may be attacked”; 829: “liable to attack”); 
Yugoslavia (para. 789 “permitted to directly attack”); see also para. 805 for reference to a 
US memorandum of law stating that “there is general agreement among law-of-war experts 
that civilians who participate in hostilities may be regarded as combatants”).  
258 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, ‘Introduction’ in Customary 
International Humanitarian Law Vol. I (CUP 2005) xxxviii; see the practice of the ICJ in Case 
concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United 
States) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 100 (para. 190); Case concerning the Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, 39-46 (paras 49–58); for the 
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that do not explicitly outline in their military manuals a right to use force, do not 
negate this right, but merely focus on the fact that civilians, who engage in hostilities, 
lose their protection.  
Much suggests that there is also sufficient opinio juris. Opinio juris is notoriously 
hard to ascertain. Opinio juris on the “existence of a rule that allows a certain 
conduct […] can be found in acts that recognise the right to behave in such a way 
without actually requiring such behaviour. This will typically take the form of States 
undertaking such action, together with the absence of protests by other States.”259 
In practice, it is hardly separable from state practice. The verbal acts alluded to 
above are not only evidence for state practice but also reflective of “the legal 
conviction of the State[s].”260 This is especially clear in those examples, where the 
states explicitly use legal terminology, such as civilians becoming “legitimate 
targets” or “military objectives”, when they participate in hostilities. This terminology 
matters greatly. There are different legal bases for the use of force against hostile 
fighters in NIACs that states could rely on. Aside from IHL, there is the right to self-
defence as established pursuant to domestic law, domestic laws establishing the 
right of police and possibly military to use force in domestic contexts, and quite 
possibly UN resolutions pursuant to chapter VII allowing for “all necessary means”. 
Which legal basis a state relies on is often difficult to analyse. However, when a 
state uses IHL terminology such as “legitimate target”, “military objectives” or “may 
be attacked like combatants”, it shows that it has the legal conviction that its right to 
use force is based on IHL. An additional case, which makes for a very clear example 
of opinio juris, is the Argentinian La Tablada-case. The Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights had to assess the use of force of the military against civilians 
attacking a military base. The Commission made explicit that civilians, who take 
direct part in hostilities become “legitimate military targets” and are “subject to direct 
                                            
explicit acceptance of military manuals as state practice see Prosecutor v Tadic ICTY-IT-
94-1-AR72 (2 October 1995) para. 99; while the ICRC Customary International 
Humanitarian Law study has been attacked for its definition of “verbal practice” being too 
wide (see e.g. Leah M. Nicholls, ‘The Humanitarian Monarchy legislates’ (2006-07) 17 Duke 
J. Comp. & Int’l L. 223, 238), the use of military manuals has not been challenged (ibid., 
238 set seq.) 
259 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, ‘Introduction’ in Customary 
International Humanitarian Law Vol. I (CUP 2005) xlvi. 
260 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, ‘Introduction’ in Customary 
International Humanitarian Law Vol. I (CUP 2005) xlvi. 
 
69 
 
individualized attack to the same extent as combatants.”261 Therefore, deaths and 
wounds inflicted on them by state actors “did not constitute violations of the 
American Convention or of the applicable provisions of humanitarian law rules.”262 
This statement by a regional human rights body read together with the verbal state 
practice referred to above is persuasive evidence for the fact that there is sufficient 
opinio juris to establish the use of force in NIACs as a customary rule of IHL. 
As such, the (customary) IHL applicable in NIACs also contains a right to target 
hostile fighters. This right is by virtue of its comparably smaller scope of application 
(situations of NIACs) lex specialis to the human right to life and as such influences 
its interpretation in the way outlined above.  
Regarding article 2 ECHR there is the potential additional problem that article 15 
para. 2 ECHR gives article 2 ECHR the status of a non-derogable norm, “except in 
respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war”. One might argue that the 
targeting of hostile fighters in NIACs is not a “lawful act of war”, because a NIAC is 
not a war. The legal importance of the term “war” has diminished drastically after 
the end of World War II, but “war” in the narrow sense, albeit subject to diverging 
interpretations and contestations263, refers to a declared international armed 
conflict.264 If that would be the case, then pursuant to the method suggested here, 
the lex specialis character of IHL would be devalued and the human right to life 
would most likely prevail in interpretation and application. However, by accepting 
deprivations of the right to life by “lawful acts of war” as derogable, the Convention’s 
aim was to accommodate the more specific rules of IHL on the use of force against 
                                            
261 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Juan Carlos Abella v Argentinia Case 
11.137, Report No. 55/97 (18 November 1997) para. 178; see also Peter Rowe, The Impact 
of Human Rights on Armed Forces (OUP 2006) 174 et seq. 
262 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Juan Carlos Abella v Argentinia Case 
11.137, Report No. 55/97 (18 November 1997) para. 188; the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights hints into the same direction in its ‘General Comment No. 3 On 
The African Charter On Human And Peoples’ Rights: The Right To Life (Article 4)’ (2015) 
paras 32-35. 
263 See Matthias Lippold, ‘Between Humanization and Humanitarization? Detention in 
Armed Conflicts and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2016) 76 ZaöRV 53, 58 
with reference to Jean S. Pictet (ed), Commentary on the First Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (ICRC 
1952) 32. 
264 See Common article 2 " the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war 
or of any other armed conflict“. 
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hostile combatants.265 The purpose of the phrase “lawful acts of war” is to avoid 
collisions between IHL and IHRL.266 Where the IHL of NIACs contains the right to 
use force, there is the potential of such a collision. It thus seems to be in keeping 
with the telos of article 15 para. 2 ECHR to include uses of force in NIACs that are 
lawful pursuant to IHL in the phrase “lawful acts of war”.  
This leads to the result that the right to target hostile fighters influences the 
guarantee of article 2 ECHR, which accommodates IHL by giving way to the IHL 
norm insofar the use of force is legal pursuant to IHL.  
The ECtHR has so far not acknowledged the influence of the IHL applicable to 
NIACs on the interpretation of human rights guarantees. It tends to analyse these 
situations only by reference to human rights and turns a blind eye to the more 
specific IHL.267 In doing so, it applies the standards outlined above, that a lethal use 
of force must be “absolutely necessary” and adhere to a strict proportionality 
standard. By the same token, further duties accepted under article 2 ECHR are also 
deemed applicable. Consequently, IHRL would also govern the phase of the 
planning of a military operation.268 Furthermore, it would not fall short of regulating 
the weapons used in an operation.269 However, the same dismissive stance of the 
                                            
265 See Heike Krieger, ‘Notstand‘ in Oliver Dörr, Rainer Grote, and Thilo Marauhn (eds), 
EMRK/GG Konkordanzkommentar Vol. I (Mohr Siebeck 2nd ed. 2013) 417, 439; Jochen 
Abr. Frowein, ‘Probleme des allgemeinen Völkerrechts vor der Europäischen Kommission 
für Menschenrechte’ in Ingo von Münch (ed), Staatsrecht - Völkerrecht - Europarecht: 
Festschrift für Schlochauer (De Gruyter 1981) 288, 295, who argues that article 5 ECHR is 
not applicable when the law of war provides for the right to detain. He continues stating – in 
coherence with the opinion expressed in this thesis – that the protection of civilians and 
detained persons is more detailed, and insofar sharper and more effective in the Geneva 
Conventions, since those rules have a focus on the specific problems in military operations. 
266 Cf. Heinz-Eberhard Kitz, Die Notstandsklausel des Art. 15 der europäischen 
Menschenrechtskonvention (Duncker & Humblot 1982) 59 et seq. 
267 See with further references Lindsay Moir, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and 
international humanitarian law’ in Robert Kolb and Gloria Gaggioli (eds), Research 
Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Edward Elgar 2013) 480, 481 et seq.; 
this is rightly criticized by Robert Kolb, ‘Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’ in Rüdiger 
Wolfrum (ed), MPEPIL (OUP online edition 2013) para. 44.  
268 See e.g. Ergi v Turkey, 66/1997/850/1057 (ECHR 28 July 1998) para. 79-81 (79: „…the 
responsibility of the State […] may also be engaged where they fail to take all feasible 
precautions in the choice of means and methods of a security operation mounted against 
an opposing group with a view to avoiding and, in any event, to minimising, incidental loss 
of civilian life.“). 
269 See for all of these effects Peter Rowe, The Impact of Human Rights on Armed Forces 
(OUP 2006) 185 et seq.; for the use of weapons being an issue before the ECtHR see e.g. 
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ECtHR regarding IHL has been traditionally true for international armed conflicts as 
well up until the Hassan-decision opened the gates for an appropriate role of IHL in 
such cases.270 Consequently, it remains to be seen, if the ECtHR will grant IHL a 
stronger role in NIAC scenarios in the cases that will undoubtedly come.  
A separate problem of the right to target hostile fighters in NIACs has been how long 
the right to use force lasts, i.e., if the use of force is only allowed during the actual 
participation in the hostilities or if an ongoing membership in an armed opposition 
group and ongoing functions are sufficient to establish a continued right of the state 
actor to use force and thus an exception from the protection of Common article 3 
and article 13 para. 2 AP II. While the wording “direct participation in hostilities” 
suggests that participation is qualified and once the immediate participation seizes 
the use of force is disallowed, the ICRC and state practice have adopted a broader 
approach.271 It could be contended that the wording of Common article 3 (“Persons 
taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have 
laid down their arms and those placed ' hors de combat ' by sickness, wounds, 
detention, or any other cause…”) means that seizing participation in hostilities has 
to have a similar quality and intensity as laying down arms or being placed ‘hors de 
combat’, especially if a person directly participates in hostilities on a regular basis. 
Indeed, any other result would be problematic since it would encourage guerrilla 
tactics with pinprick attacks and swift retreats.272 The ICRC has published an 
interpretative aid for “direct participation in hostilities” in 2009, which – although 
being highly controversial – offers some insights.273 It advances the thesis that 
participation in hostilities is made up from three criteria:  
                                            
Tagayeva et al. v Russia App nos 26562/07, 14755/08, 49339/08, 49380/08, 51313/08, 
21294/11 and 37096/11 (ECHR 13 April 2017). 
270 See above 6.2. 
271 See e.g. Sylvie-S. Junod, ‘Article 13 AP II’ in Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, and 
Bruno Zimmermann (eds) Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 (ICRC 
1987) 1453 (para. 4789: “Those belonging to armed forces or armed groups may be 
attacked at any time.”) 
272 See however the criticism of Marco Sassòli and Laura M. Olson, ‘The relationship 
between international humanitarian and human rights law where it matters’ (September 
2008) 90(871) Int’l Rev. Red Cross 599, 607 et seq.  
273 Nils Melzer, Interpretative guidance on the notion of direct participation in hostilities 
(ICRC 2009). 
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“1. the act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military 
capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, 
or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack (threshold 
of harm), and 2. there must be a direct causal link between the act and the 
harm likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military 
operation of which that act constitutes an integral part (direct causation), and 
3. the act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required 
threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of 
another (belligerent nexus).”274  
Acts of preparation (e.g. loading bombs in an airplane) and acts subsequent to a 
hostile act (e.g. tactical retreat) are included, if these are integral parts of the hostile 
act.275 It suggests that a distinction be drawn between civilians, who take part in 
hostilities and who lose the protection of Common article 3 and article 13 para. 2 AP 
II only for the duration of their participation and members of organized armed 
groups, who lose their protection for the duration of their membership “by virtue of 
their continuous combat function”.276  
When accepting this interpretation and the reading of article 15 para. 2 ECHR 
proposed above, the human right to life under article 2 ECHR would not prevent the 
use of force lawful pursuant to IHL of NIACs i.e. the use of force against members 
of organized armed groups with a continuous combat function and the use of force 
against other civilians directly participating in a hostile act. The same overall result 
would hold true for the ICCPR, in which the lawful use of force pursuant to IHL would 
not be an arbitrary deprivation of the right to life and as such not outlawed by article 
6 ICCPR.  
Three additions warrant brief attention:  
First, it must be added that, when involved in extraterritorial NIAC operations, 
member states of the ECHR regularly fight side by side with the territorial state. In 
                                            
274 Nils Melzer, Interpretative guidance on the notion of direct participation in hostilities 
(ICRC 2009) 46; for an extensive discussion see Nina Kapaun, Völkerrechtliche Bewertung 
gezielter Tötungen nicht-staatlicher Akteure (Norderstedt BoD 2014) 231 et seq. 
275 Nils Melzer, Interpretative guidance on the notion of direct participation in hostilities 
(ICRC 2009) 65 et seq. 
276 Nils Melzer, Interpretative guidance on the notion of direct participation in hostilities 
(ICRC 2009) 69 et seq.; with a critical assessment of the interpretative guidance see Daniel 
von Devivere, ‘Unmittelbare Teilnahme an Feindseligkeiten: Kniefall des humanitären 
Völkerrechts vor der Wirklichkeit?’ (2008) 41(1) Krit. J. 24, 32 et seq.; for a consideration of 
riots during a NIAC see ICRC, ‘The Use of Force in Armed Conflicts – Expert Meeting’ 
(2013) 24-5. 
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this case, the territorial state and a foreign nation fighting alongside the territorial 
state may make lawful use of the right to use force, to the extent described above.  
Secondly, at least in case of an attack against the armed forces of an ECHR member 
state, the right to use force of that state’s armed forces will regularly not only follow 
from IHL and possibly article 2 para. 2 lit. c ECHR, allowing measures taken to quell 
a riot or an insurrection, but also from the right of private self-defence, which is 
explicitly acknowledged by article 2 para. 2 lit. a ECHR. In most cases of armed 
attacks in NIAC scenarios, armed and even lethal self-defence will be “absolutely 
necessary” even by the strict standard of the ECHR, which explains why self-
defence plays a very important role in the legal education of soldiers and in their 
preparatory training leading up to a deployment.  
Thirdly, some argue that human rights establish further duties not necessarily part 
of IHL, such as duties to investigate the use of lethal force277, the duty to investigate, 
if there is an actual case of direct participation before using force278, and the duty to 
use armed force as a measure of absolute last resort. A duty to investigate after 
having used lethal force, if possible in the circumstances, may be an instance in 
which the lex generalis retains an effect on the lex specialis, either because of a gap 
in the IHL applicable to NIACs or because it guides the interpretation of IHL. In 
contrast thereto, the duty to investigate, if there is an actual case of direct 
participation before using force, does not follow from human rights, but from IHL and 
its fundamental principle of distinction referred to above. The proposition that IHRL 
influences IHL in the sense that the use of armed force is limited to a measure of 
absolute last resort, e.g. if the capture is impossible, etc., and as such transferring 
the oft-referred-to rules of police operations to armed conflicts has to be rejected. In 
the view advanced here, there simply is no legal ground to alter the existing 
standards of the lex specialis to accommodate IHRL. This suggestion follows an 
understandable sentiment; however, transferring the human right standards to such 
a situation will mean to introduce inadequate legal standards to armed conflict 
                                            
277 Marco Sassòli and Laura M. Olson, ‘The relationship between international humanitarian 
and human rights law where it matters’ (September 2008) 90(871) Int’l Rev. Red Cross 599, 
615 with further references. 
278 See Louise Doswald-Beck, ‘The Right to Life in Armed Conflict’ (December 2006) 
88(864) Int’l Rev. Red Cross 881, 887 et seq. 
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scenarios. The soft law for police operations279 that is sometimes mentioned in this 
context, is inadequate for armed conflict settings, in that it is written for situations 
that are simply not comparable to the armed conflicts, in which having to repel 
attacks by armed groups with armed force is a real possibility and becoming a 
regular reality of troops abroad. 
 
In conclusion, it is argued that NIAC scenarios are to be treated according to the 
general method proposed in this thesis: When the IHL applicable to NIACs contains 
norms applicable to the situation at hand, in the process of harmonizing 
interpretation of the applicable human right, significant weight needs to be given to 
the more specific norms of IHL. Where the IHL of NIACs contains no rules for a 
situation, human rights apply. That being said, attention has to be given to the 
regulatory framework of IHL, which regularly, while being “prohibitive in nature”280, 
presupposes rights of state parties to NIACs.  
 
The approach suggested in this thesis is further supported by the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), which in its General 
Comment No. 3281 on the right to life issued in November 2015,282 argues that 
human rights remain applicable during armed conflicts and may influence the 
interpretation of IHL,283 however, during armed conflicts – of international or non-
international character284 – deprivations of the right of life are “determined by 
                                            
279 Cf. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials 
(1990). 
280 Christian Johann, Menschenrechte im internationalen bewaffneten Konflikt (Berliner 
Wissenschaftsverlag 2012) 183 et seq. 
281 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘General Comment No. 3 On The 
African Charter On Human And Peoples’ Rights: The Right To Life (Article 4)’ (2015). 
282 See Vito Todeschini, ‘The Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights Law in the African Commission’s General Comment on the Right to Life’ 
(EJIL:Talk 7 June 2016). 
283 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘General Comment No. 3 On The 
African Charter On Human And Peoples’ Rights: The Right To Life (Article 4)’ (2015) paras 
32-35. 
284 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘General Comment No. 3 On The 
African Charter On Human And Peoples’ Rights: The Right To Life (Article 4)’ (2015) para. 
33, emphasis added. 
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reference to international humanitarian law.”285 Where military actions cause 
deprivations of life, the human right to life will not be held to have been violated, if 
the military action was in accordance with IHL. On the other hand, if such action 
goes along with a violation of IHL, it will be seen as a violation of the human right to 
life as well as a breach of the law of armed conflict. Yet, the Commission goes further 
and deliberates the duty to capture instead of kill a hostile fighter or combatant, if 
military necessity does not require the use of lethal force.286 Such a rule has 
regularly been rejected. Indeed, it has been alluded to the fact that the enemy fighter 
“has the means to achieve the same result [as a capture before kill rule] by 
surrendering, since those who surrender are hors de combat and cannot be 
attacked […]”.287 This works in IAC as well as NIAC scenarios. A rule prohibiting an 
attack, when a capture is possible “would shift the burden from the fighter to the 
attacker in a way that warfighting states would have been, and remain, unlikely to 
countenance.”288 It may be added that while it is not inconceivable that a capture-
first-rule could be established, such a rule would have to grant a wide margin of 
appreciation for the state party regarding aspects of military necessity and viability 
of capture. It seems unlikely that such a rule would in reality add anything to the 
protection of individual rights in armed conflict. Moreover, a small blemish on the 
General Comment is the clear de lege ferenda notion that new weapon technologies 
shall only be developed when they strengthen the protection of the right to life. This 
seems to be a bit out of place and unfounded in law.289 
                                            
285 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘General Comment No. 3 On The 
African Charter On Human And Peoples’ Rights: The Right To Life (Article 4)’ (2015) para. 
32. 
286 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘General Comment No. 3 On The 
African Charter On Human And Peoples’ Rights: The Right To Life (Article 4)’ (2015) para. 
34. 
287 Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Wound, Capture, or Kill’ (2013) 24(3) Eur. J. Int’l L. 855, 858; see 
however Ryan Goodman, ‘The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants’ (2013) 24(3) 
Eur. J. Int’l L. 819 et seq., who advances in a thought-provoking way inter alia the thesis 
that the decision to kill instead of capture (combatants in IAC) needs to be backed up by 
military necessity. 
288 Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Wound, Capture, or Kill’ (2013) 24(3) Eur. J. Int’l L. 855, 858. 
289 This statement by the Commission is likely meant to strengthen the understandable 
proposition that meaningful human control should be exercisable and exercised over 
machine autonomy in the selection of human targets African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, ‘General Comment No. 3 On The African Charter On Human And Peoples’ 
Rights: The Right To Life (Article 4)’ (2015) para. 35. 
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6.3.2 The human right to liberty in NIACs 
The human right to liberty in NIACs has been especially surrounded by problems 
and controversial discussions. The ECtHR has explicitly decided in Hassan v UK 
that the approach it adopted there would not apply in cases of NIACs. This warrants 
criticism. The ECtHR assumes that “[i]t can only be in cases of international armed 
conflict, where the taking of prisoners of war and the detention of civilians who pose 
a threat to security are accepted features of international humanitarian law, that 
Article 5 could be interpreted as permitting the exercise of such broad powers.”290 
The statement is clearly obiter dictum and the “accepted feature”-phrase seems to 
be misleading at best and false at worst. Such a conclusion presupposes an 
analysis, if detention or rather internment measures indeed are “accepted features” 
of the IHL of NIACs. While it is uncertain what is needed to fulfil that standard, the 
fact that AP II to the Geneva Conventions291 explicitly mentions cases of internment 
and detention of civilians and that the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in 
NATO military operations echo this seems to suggest that the deprivation of liberty 
is at least a well-known feature that states regularly resort to in NIACs.292  
 
Is there a legal basis for deprivations of liberty in IHL? 
There has been a lively debate on the question, if there are legal bases to be found 
in IHL for deprivations of liberty in NIACs. This has been sparked mainly by the UK 
case of Serdar Mohammed, a case concerning the detention of a person suspected 
of being a Taliban commander in Afghanistan for the duration of 110 days without 
                                            
290 Hassan v UK App no 29750/09 (ECHR Grand Chamber Judgment 16 September 2014) 
para. 104 (emphasis added). 
291 For the area of application, see Article 1 para. 1 AP II. 
292 See Articles 4, 5, and 6 AP II. Internment refers to the deprivation of liberty for security 
reasons, while detention regularly refers to the deprivation of liberty before or during a 
criminal proceeding, see ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: Convention 
(I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field (ICRC 2nd ed. 2016), Common article 3, para. 717 et seq.; see also ICRC, Internment 
in Armed Conflict: Basic Rules and Challenges, Opinion Paper (ICRC November 2014) 6 
et seq. for a discussion of internment in NIACs; see also the discussion in Lawrence Hill-
Cawthorne, Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts (OUP 2016) 68 et seq.; for the 
SOP see NATO/ISAF Standard Operating Procedures Detention of Non-ISAF Personnel 
SOP 362, 31 August 2006, para. 4; see Jacques Hartmann, ‘Detention in International 
Military Operations: Problems and Process’ (2013) 52 Mil. L. & L. War Rev. 303, 305. 
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charge and without access to a lawyer.293 The majority opinion in academic writing 
denies a legal basis for detentions or internments in NIACs pursuant to IHL.294 This 
might seem to be surprising at first, since it is generally acknowledged that such 
measures are constant features of NIAC scenarios. Would one conclude that there 
is no legal basis in IHL then, in order for the measure to be legal, a valid legal basis 
would have to be found in domestic law or possibly in UN Security Council 
resolutions pursuant to Chapter VII.295 Detaining people without a legal basis would 
lead to the measure being arbitrary and thus illegal under IHRL as well as IHL296 
and, in addition, the domestic criminal law of many countries.297  
As outlined above, the (customary) IHL of NIACs does indeed contain legal bases 
for state action, as has been explicated concerning the right to use force against 
civilians directly participating in hostilities. Consequently, it is not unthinkable that 
IHL offers a basis for deprivations of liberty as well. To go even further, as a matter 
of policy it could be said that it would be highly problematic, if there was a customary 
right to use force against a civilian, while a right to detain such an individual would 
                                            
293 Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB); [2015] EWCA Civ 
843; [2017] UKSC 1 and 2. 
294 For the majority view Alex Conte, ‘The legality of detention in armed conflict’ in Annyssa 
Bellal (ed), The War Report: Armed Conflict in 2014 (OUP 2015) 476, 493 et seq.; Peter 
Rowe, ‘Is There a Right to Detain Civilians by Foreign Armed Forces During a Non-
International Armed Conflict?’ (2012) 61 ICLQ 697, 702 et seq.; Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, 
Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts (OUP 2016) 66 et seq.; Sandesh 
Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts (OUP 2012) 71; see however 
in favour of a legal basis in IHL Jann Kleffner, ‘Operational Detention and the Treatment of 
Detainees’ in Terry D. Gill and Dieter Fleck (eds), The Handbook of the International Law 
of Military Operations (OUP 2010) 465, 471; Jelena Pejic, ‘Procedural Principles and 
Safeguards for Internment/administrative Detention in Armed Conflicts and Other Situations 
of Violence’ (2005) 87(858) Int’l Rev. Red Cross 375, 377; Knut Dörmann, ‘Detention in 
Non-International Armed Conflicts’ (2012) 88 US Naval War College ILS 347, 349: 
“Deprivation of liberty is an inevitable and lawful occurrence in armed conflict, including in 
NIAC.”; Kubo Mačák, ‘A Needle in a Haystack? Locating the Legal Basis for Detention in 
Non-International Armed Conflict’ (2015) 45 Isr. Yb Hum. Rts 87; David Tuck, ‘Detention by 
Armed Groups’ (2011) 93(883) Int’l Rev. Red Cross 759, 765. 
295 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to address the issue, if a Security Council resolution 
would suffice in the different domestic law regimes or if an additional legal basis would be 
needed.  
296 ICRC, ‘Rule 99, Deprivation of Liberty’ in Customary International Humanitarian Law 
Database <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule99 > last 
accessed 20 June 2017.  
297 Kubo Mačák, ‘A Needle in a Haystack? Locating the Legal Basis for Detention in Non-
International Armed Conflict’ (2015) 45 Isr. Yb Hum. Rts 87, 95-6. 
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be lacking. This is especially so, since quarter must be given in IHL and a lacking 
legal basis for detention or internment would disincentivize using non-lethal force 
against individuals that are known threats.298 However, wishful thinking is not a 
method of norm interpretation and a policy argument or the fact that it would be nice 
to have a norm with a certain content cannot compensate for the lack of said norm. 
Instead, it may well be said that states may regularly have legal bases for 
deprivations of liberty, however these are found in their domestic law or conferred 
to them by Chapter VII resolutions.299  
The arguments in favour of a treaty-based implied authorization of deprivations of 
liberty in the IHL applicable to NIACs are thin and ultimately unconvincing. The UK 
Supreme Court has rightly alluded to the fact that the IHL of NIACs originally was 
not supposed to grant rights to state parties involved in NIACs. The IHL of NIACs 
first and foremost – and to a much greater extent than the IHL applicable to IACs – 
is supposed to limit state action. The references to internments and detentions in 
AP II and Common article 3 are easily explained as being reflective of a widespread 
practice of states to deprive people of their liberty in NIACs. For this situation, IHL 
sought to establish minimum guarantees. In doing so, it acknowledged deprivations 
of liberty as ongoing, but can hardly be interpreted to authorize them.300 Indeed, 
when comparing AP II and Common article 3 to the provisions actually authorizing 
deprivations of liberty in the IHL applicable in IACs, the latter are much more express 
in conferring legal bases and more detailed concerning the prerequisites of and the 
                                            
298 The longstanding rule that ordering no quarter is prohibited is explicitly part of the IHL of 
NIACs as well, see Article 4 of AP II. The UK government has tried to argued with an a 
fortiori argument in Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence that a power to kill “logically 
encompassed operational detention” ([2015] EWCA Civ 843, para. 207). In a very technical 
approach, one could argue that such a right would end in the second in which the person 
would be detained, since that person would then be hors de combat and not involved directly 
in hostilities anymore thus ending the right to use force and with it any other rights that it 
may encompass ([2015] EWCA Civ 843, paras 211 with further references). The court 
rejected the argument on other grounds [2015] EWCA Civ 843, paras 214 et seq. First and 
foremost, it found the nonexistence of procedural guarantees problematic. The UK Supreme 
Court seems to deny that IHL in NIACs contains legal bases for any state actions, as such 
it rejected the argument of the UK government flat out, see Serdar Mohammed v Ministry 
of Defence [2017] UKSC 2, para. 265.  
299 Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 2, para. 265, on the topic see 
also Gabor Rona, ‘Is there a Way Out of the Non-International Armed Conflict Dilemma?’ 
(2015) 91 US Naval War College ILS 32, 37 et seq. 
300 Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 2, para. 264. 
 
79 
 
procedure governing such measures.301 The IHL for NIACs is lacking not so much 
regarding the guarantees applicable in cases of deprivations of liberty, which AP II 
does address302, but regarding the prerequisites that have to be met for a 
deprivation of liberty to be lawful and regarding the maximum duration of such a 
measure.303 While this shortfall is not conclusive to sustain the finding that there is 
no legal basis in IHL. A more detailed regulation may be preferable, but – as stated 
above – matters of policy do not make or break norms of international law. However, 
the lack of details and express wording are suggestive towards the position that the 
IHL of NIACs confers no legal basis for deprivations of liberty on the state actors. 
Moreover, the solution that is sometimes proposed, to apply the norms applicable 
in IACs by way of an analogy to NIACs has to be rejected as well. Such a proposition 
has been made expressly for deprivations of liberty.304 There are two ways to arrive 
at that conclusion and both ultimately fail:  
                                            
301 See article 21 sentences 1 and 2 Geneva Convention III: “The Detaining Power may 
subject prisoners of war to internment. It may impose on them the obligation of not leaving, 
beyond certain limits, the camp where they are interned, or if the said camp is fenced in, of 
not going outside its perimeter.”; Article 42 sentence 1 Geneva Convention IV: “The 
internment or placing in assigned residence of protected persons may be ordered only if 
the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary.”; Article 68 sentence 1 
Geneva Convention IV: “Protected persons who commit an offence which is solely intended 
to harm the Occupying Power, but which does not constitute an attempt on the life or limb 
of members of the occupying forces or administration, nor a grave collective danger, nor 
seriously damage the property of the occupying forces or administration or the installations 
used by them, shall be liable to internment or simple imprisonment, provided the duration 
of such internment or imprisonment is proportionate to the offence committed.”; article 78 
sentence 1 Geneva Convention IV: “If the Occupying Power considers it necessary, for 
imperative reasons of security, to take safety measures concerning protected persons, it 
may, at the most, subject them to assigned residence or to internment.”; see also Serdar 
Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 2, para. 260. 
302 See below 6.3.2. 
303 See the criticism in Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB) 
para. 246 “I do not see how CA3 or AP2 could possibly have been intended to provide a 
power to detain, nor how they could reasonably be interpreted as doing so, unless it was 
possible to identify the scope of the power. However, neither CA3 nor AP2 specifies who 
may be detained, on what grounds, in accordance with what procedures, or for how long.”; 
for a discussion of the duration of detention measures see Yuval Shany, ‘A Human Rights 
Perspective to Global Battlefield Detention: Time to Reconsider Indefinite Detention’ (2017) 
93 US Naval War College ILS 102.  
304 Marco Sassòli and Laura M. Olson, ‘The relationship between international humanitarian 
and human rights law where it matters’ (September 2008) 90(871) Int’l Rev. Red Cross 599, 
623 et seq. 
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The first would be to argue that the prerequisites for an analogy are met. The use 
of analogies in international law is disputed.305 Some argue that the existence of a 
gap simply means a non-regulation of the issue under international law, leading to 
the general freedom to act accepted by the Permanent Court of International Justice 
in the Case of the SS Lotus.306 Others maintain that an area of non-regulation means 
neither a permission nor a prohibition.307 Proponents for the use of analogies argue 
on the basis of “considerations of justice” that similar cases have to be treated 
similarly.308 If one were to accept analogies in international law, one would 
nevertheless have to prove a similarity between two cases and an unintended 
lacuna in the regulation of one of these.309 It is submitted that NIACs are not similar 
to IACs, but rather distinctly different in that the latter is a traditional topic of 
international law, regulating the relationship between states, while the prior 
regulates first and foremost the relationship between a state and a non-state actor 
regularly made up of the state’s citizens. Also, one can hardly argue that the topic 
of detentions was an unintended lacuna in the IHL applicable to NIACs, as states 
expressly regulated and established a legal basis for detentions in IACs, while only 
regulating, but stopping short of establishing an explicit legal basis for such 
measures in NIACs. Moreover, IHRL applies in NIACs. Even if the rules regarding 
deprivations of liberty in IACs could be transferred by way of an analogy to NIACs, 
they would hardly influence the interpretation of IHRL, since a rule transferred by 
                                            
305 See with an overview Albert Bleckmann, ‘Analogie im Völkerrecht‘ (1977/78) 17 ArchVR 
161. 
306 S.S. “Lotus” (France v Turkey) (1927) PCIJ Rep Series A No 10; Silja Vönecky, ‘Analogy 
in International Law’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), MPEPIL, Vol. I (OUP 2012) 374, 376 with 
further references; Alfred Verdross and Bruno Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht (Duncker & 
Humblot 3rd ed 1984) 387-8. 
307 Silja Vönecky, ‘Analogy in International Law’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), MPEPIL, Vol. I 
(OUP 2012) 374, 376 with further references. 
308 Silja Vönecky, ‘Analogy in International Law’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), MPEPIL, Vol. I 
(OUP 2012) 374, 376-7) with further references; Georg Dahm, Jost Delbrück and Rüdiger 
Wolfrum, Völkerrecht Die Grundlagen, Die Völkerrechtssubjekte I/1 (De Gruyter 2nd ed. 
1989) 80-83. 
309 Silja Vönecky, ‘Analogy in International Law’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), MPEPIL, Vol. I 
(OUP 2012) 374, 377. 
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way of analogy cannot claim a lex specialis status in relation to the directly 
applicable IHRL.310  
A second way to render the rules of IACs applicable to NIAC scenarios would be if 
their application would be backed by consuetudo and opinio juris, i.e. the regime of 
IACs would apply to NIACs by virtue of a customary norm to that effect. However, 
there is quite plainly insufficient state practice and opinio juris to allow such a 
conclusion as most states pronounce the differences of law between both regimes. 
Consequently, the only way to construe a legal basis for deprivations of liberty under 
the IHL of NIACs is to establish sufficient state practice and opinio juris to justify a 
customary legal basis for such measures, as has been done for the use of force.  
There is some state practice to that extent. Even critics of the customary status of 
such a norm do not deny that deprivations of liberty are a regular feature of 
NIACs.311 However, it has been argued convincingly that the finding that such 
detentions are based on IHL is unsustainable, seeing that alternative legal bases 
are available to states in most cases, be it in their domestic law, the domestic law 
of the territorial state or in applicable Chapter VII resolutions.312 Take the example 
of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), where much of the recent 
state practice concerning detentions originates, the Security Council Resolution 
regime offers a legal basis for detention measures.313 For state practice and opinio 
juris to be substantiated, it has to be proven that states rely on IHL as a legal basis 
for detentions. There is only limited verbal practice suggestive towards a customary 
                                            
310 See also Heike Krieger, ‘After Al-Jedda: Detention, Derogation, and an Enduring 
Dilemma’ (2011) 50 Mil. L. & L. War Rev. 419, 426-32; see however Chris Jenks, ‘Detention 
under the law of armed conflict’ in Rain Liivoja and Tim McCormack (eds), Routledge 
Handbook of the Law of Armed Conflict (Routledge 2016) 301-16, who argues for a transfer 
of the rules of IACs as a matter of policy. Of course, such an approach would not provide a 
legal basis for detention. 
311 Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 2, para. 272. 
312 See Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne and Dapo Akande, Locating the Legal Basis for Detention 
in Non-International Armed Conflicts: A Rejoinder to Aurel Sari (EJIL:Talk 2 June 2014). 
313 This is reflected in the NATO/ISAF Standard Operating Procedures Detention of Non-
ISAF Personnel SOP 362, 31 August 2006, para. 4: “The only grounds upon which a person 
may be detained under current ISAF Rules of Engagement (ROE) are: if the detention is 
necessary for ISAF force protection; for the self-defence of ISAF or its personnel; for 
accomplishment of the ISAF mission”. 
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norm offering a legal basis for detentions in IHL.314 The United Kingdom has stated 
that the power to intern in NIACs can be “derived from a UNSCR, from the Law of 
Armed Conflict or from host nation law”.315 It has repeated this position in the case 
of Serdar Mohammed, although the UK courts ultimately rejected it.316 Similar 
statements have been issued by the Netherlands317 and the United States of 
America.318 The Copenhagen Principles and Guidelines319 could be a document of 
                                            
314 The Human Rights Committee has acknowledged that security detention in NIACs may 
be resorted to “under the most exceptional circumstances”, when a number of prerequisites 
are met, ‘General Comment No. 35’ (16 December 2014) UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35, para. 
15. The Committee does not mention a legal basis for such a measure, but merely accepts 
that there may be a possibility to detain in extreme situations. This opinion seems to be 
more an acknowledgment of the need for security detentions than an expression of opinio 
juris that IHL allows deprivations of liberty, see Alex Conte, ‘The legality of detention in 
armed conflict’ in Annyssa Bellal (ed), The War Report: Armed Conflict in 2014 (OUP 
2015) 476, 497 et seq. 
315 United Kingdom, Joint Doctrine Publication 1-10, Captured Persons (CPERS) (3rd ed. 
2015) para. 148 (emphasis added); see Kubo Mačák, ‘A Needle in a Haystack? Locating 
the Legal Basis for Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict’ (2015) 45 Isr. Yb Hum. 
Rts 87, 98. 
316 Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2014] EWHC 1369 (QB); [2015] EWCA Civ 
843; [2017] UKSC 1 and 2. 
317 Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 2, para. 272 refers to a “letter 
dated 21 July 2006, headed ‚Combating international terrorism‘, sent by the Foreign 
Minister, the Minister of Defence and the Minister for Development Cooperation to the 
President of the House of Representatives (KST 99753, 27 225 Nr 221)” with said content. 
318 United States of America, ‘Second Periodic Report to the Committee against Torture’ 
(13 January 2006) UN Doc. CAT/C/48/Add.3/Rev.1, Annex 1, at 48: “under the law of armed 
conflict, the United States has the authority to detain persons who have engaged in unlawful 
belligerence until the cessation of hostilities”; This position has been upheld under the 
Obama administration, see United States Department of State, ‘Speech by the Legal 
Adviser, The Obama Administration and International Law, Annual Meeting of the American 
Society of International Law, Washington D.C.’ (25 March 2010): “As a nation at war, we 
must comply with the laws of war, but detention of enemy belligerents to prevent them from 
returning to hostilities is a well-recognized feature of the conduct of armed conflict, as the 
drafters of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II recognized and as our own Supreme 
Court recognized in Hamdi v Rumsfeld.” see with these examples also Kubo Mačák, ‘A 
Needle in a Haystack? Locating the Legal Basis for Detention in Non-International Armed 
Conflict’ (2015) 45 Isr. Yb Hum. Rts 87, 102, who also lays out that the UK position used to 
be that IHL offers no such legal basis. Kubo Mačák, ‘A Needle in a Haystack? Locating the 
Legal Basis for Detention in Non-International Armed Conflict’ (2015) 45 Isr. Yb Hum. Rts 
87, 102 furthermore refers to the US Supreme Court in Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 
(2004). That case, however, does not contain the acknowledgment of a right to detain under 
IHL in NIACs. While the Court decided “the authority to detain for the duration of the relevant 
conflict” was indeed in line with “longstanding law-of-war principles”, it also clearly stated 
that the authorization to detain came from Congress‘ Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(115 Stat. 224) and not from IHL. 
319 (2012) 51 ILM 1368-80. 
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consequence in that regard. These principles were formulated by the Copenhagen 
Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations, a 
multinational initiative in which states, international and regional organizations were 
involved.320 The initiative intended to set standards for deprivations of liberty in 
NIACs and other military operations not conducted in an IAC setting321 and 
recognized that “detention is a necessary, lawful and legitimate means of achieving 
the objectives of international military operations”322. While the wording a first sight 
seems to suggest opinio juris in favour of a legal basis for detentions in IHL, it likely 
cannot be construed as such.323 First, the principles are silent on where they locate 
the legal basis for detentions. While it is one reading of the text to see the cited 
phrase as a reference to IHL, it is by far not the only one, especially since the 
principles deal with “international military operations in the context of non-
international armed conflict situations and peace operations”324. As such they are 
consciously not limited in scope to military operations in which the IHL of NIACs 
applies, due to the fact that the categorization of the conflict may be subject to 
change or a situation may escape certain legal classification.325 Secondly, the 
commentary by the chairman, acknowledging that the principles lack “a legally 
                                            
320 “Representatives from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Russia, South 
Africa, Sweden, Tanzania, the Netherlands, Turkey, Uganda, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States of America participated in The Copenhagen Process meetings. 
Representatives of the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO), the United Nations (UN), and the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) also attended The Copenhagen Process meetings as observers. 
Representatives of civil society were also consulted…”, (2012) 51 ILM 1368. However, the 
stakeholder participation process has drawn criticism since it apparently consisted of a “brief 
meeting” less than 48 hours before the final meeting of the states involved was to begin, 
see Amnesty International, Copenhagen ‘Principles’ on military detainees undermine 
human rights, 22 October 2012; for a justification see Bruce “Ossie” Oswald and Thomas 
Winkler, ‘Copenhagen Process Principles and Guidelines on the Handling of Detainees in 
International Military Operations’ (2012) 16(39) ASIL Insights. 
321 See para. VII of the preamble (2012) 51 ILM 1368. 
322 Para. III of the preamble (2012) 51 ILM 1368, emphasis added. 
323 With the same conclusion Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 2, 
para. 272. 
324 (2012) 51 ILM 1368. 
325 Thomas Winkler, ‘The Copenhagen Process on Detainees: A Necessity’ (2010) 78 Nord. 
J. Int’l L. 489, 493. 
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binding nature”326 outlines that the principles “cannot constitute a legal basis”327 for 
detentions and states that “the mere inclusion of a practice in the Copenhagen 
Process Principles and Guidelines should not be taken as evidence that States 
regard the practice as required out of a sense of legal obligation”328. Strictly 
speaking, this does not preclude reading into the principles opinio juris for a legal 
basis in IHL, since the chairman only precludes the reading of opinio juris for legal 
obligations and the legal basis would be an authorization rather than an obligation. 
However, it has rightly been observed that such a reading looks a bit like the 
participants would try to have their cake and eat it too by stating opinio juris for a 
legal basis for detentions in IHL, while not accepting the obligations that potentially 
go along with the document.329 A legal basis for deprivations of liberty in IHL has 
furthermore been explicitly acknowledged by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross:  
“One view is that a legal basis for internment would have to be explicit, as it 
is in the Fourth Geneva Convention; in the absence of such a rule, IHL cannot 
provide it implicitly. Another view, shared by the ICRC, is that both customary 
and treaty IHL contain an inherent power to intern and may in this respect be 
said to provide a legal basis for internment in NIAC. This position is based on 
the fact that internment is a form of deprivation of liberty which is a common 
occurrence in armed conflict, not prohibited by Common Article 3, and that 
Additional Protocol II – which has been ratified by 167 States – refers 
explicitly to internment.”330 
                                            
326 Para. 16.2 (2012) 51 ILM 1368, 1379. 
327 Para. 16.2 (2012) 51 ILM 1368, 1379. 
328 Para. 16.2 (2012) 51 ILM 1368, 1379-80. 
329 Jacques Hartmann, ‘The Copenhagen Process: Principles and Guidelines’ (EJIL:Talk 3 
November 2012). 
330 ICRC, Internment in Armed Conflict: Basic Rules and Challenges, Opinion Paper (ICRC 
November 2014), emphasis added. With a similar approach Jelena Pejic/Cordula Droege, 
‘The Legal Regime Governing Treatment and Procedural Guarantees for Persons Detained 
in the Fight against Terrorism’ in Larissa van den Herik and Nico Schrijver (eds), Counter-
Terrorism Strategies in a Fragmented International Legal Order Meeting the Challenges 
(CUP 2013) 527, 548: “there is no doubt that internment is a lawful incidence of armed 
conflict, as reflected in the considerable number of rules devoted to this form of deprivation 
of liberty”. The ICRC is a bit unclear concerning the scope of its view, because it 
distinguishes between traditional NIACs and extraterritorial NIACs, in which other states or 
organizations fight alongside the territorial state. The wording of the opinion paper has 
caused some confusion, see Kevin Jon Heller, What Exactly Is the ICRC’s Position on 
Detention in NIAC? (Opinio Juris 6 February 2015). 
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As already submitted, the fact that detention is a common occurrence in NIACs is 
insufficient evidence for a customary norm, since such practice could easily be 
based on alternative legal bases. Practice supported by opinio juris for detentions 
based on IHL in NIACs seems, however, to be limited to the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands and the United States of America. This seems insufficient to 
substantiate a customary norm. 
Such practice also does not follow from the verbal practice supportive of a 
customary norm to use force, as outlined above. One might argue that the verbal 
practice on how to deal with civilians engaged in hostilities suggests that the 
customary norm allowing the use of force also covers the deprivation of liberty. 
Indeed, states describe civilians taking up arms as “military objectives” and 
“legitimate targets”, who “may be treated as combatants”, suggesting that it is not 
only allowed to use force in these cases, but also to detain them, as this would be 
allowed by IHL against people who are “combatants” or “legitimate targets”.331 
However, the right to detain and the right to use force are inherently different actions 
and it is striking that the verbal practice of states alluded to above refers only to the 
use of force and not to the right to detain.332  
All of these reasons are likely the explanation, why the ICRC has not referred to the 
customary norm allowing for deprivations of liberty – which it now claims exists in 
the publication mentioned above – in its extensive analysis of Customary 
International Humanitarian Law.333  
While a customary legal basis for detentions in situations of NIACs can be seen to 
be developing in IHL – especially if the Copenhagen Principles are elaborated 
further and clarified in the sense that they are to be understood in that regard – an 
analysis of present state practice and opinio juris fails to support the finding that 
such a customary norm is already in existence. Consequently, the IHL applicable to 
NIACs does not provide a legal basis for deprivations of liberty.  
                                            
331 Kubo Mačák, ‘A Needle in a Haystack? Locating the Legal Basis for Detention in Non-
International Armed Conflict’ (2015) 45 Isr. Yb Hum. Rts 87, 101 goes further and argues 
that it has been accepted by the drafters, as evidenced by the travaux préparatoires, that a 
right to detain was accepted for both parties to a NIAC.  
332 See however Sean Aughey and Aurel Sari, ‘Targeting and Detention in Non-International 
Armed Conflict: Serdar Mohammed and the Limits of Human Rights Convergence’ (2015) 
91 US Naval War College ILS 60. 
333 See also Serdar Mohammed v Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 2, para. 271. 
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Alternative legal bases for deprivations of liberty in NIACs 
The lacking legal basis in IHL means in principle that IHRL, especially article 5 
ECHR, does not need to accommodate detentions in NIACs in the catalogue of 
article 5 para. 1 ECHR by way of a harmonizing interpretation with IHL. However, 
IHRL cannot turn a blind eye to other legal bases. If a deprivation of liberty would 
be based on a Chapter VII resolution, IHRL would have to accommodate for the 
possibility to detain pursuant to the lex superior as established by article 103 UN 
Charter, since authorizations by the Security Council fall under article 103 UN 
Charter.334 As UN resolutions rarely specify detailed guarantees, the maximum 
duration of detentions that are “necessary means” will have to be guided by 
deliberations of objective necessity. Regarding procedural and material guarantees, 
a resolution will most likely reference IHRL and IHL, making clear that while it 
provides a legal basis for the measure itself, IHL and IHRL instruments remain 
applicable concerning the procedural and material guarantees. The ECtHR could 
accommodate such a detention pursuant to a Chapter VII resolution by applying its 
Hassan-solution and thus expanding the catalogue of article 5 para. 1 ECHR to 
include cases of deprivations of liberty authorized by the Security Council.  
In contrast to this, a deprivation of liberty in a NIAC based on domestic law would 
have to fall under the catalogue of article 5 para. 1 ECHR in order to be lawful. 
Article 5 para. 1 lit. c ECHR offers room for such cases in that it allows deprivations 
of liberty in cases of “the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the 
purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable 
suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered 
necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so”.  
Since civilians participating in hostilities do not fall under the combatant privilege335, 
they will regularly commit crimes by participating in hostilities. Any person that is 
                                            
334 See above 4.; Robert Kolb, ‘Does Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations Apply 
only to Decisions or also to Authorizations adopted by the Security Council?’ (2004) 64 
ZaöRV 21-35; see also R (on the applicant of Al-Jedda) (FC) v Secretary of State for 
Defence [2007] UKHL 58, para. 33 with further references; however, the ECtHR did – as 
already described – take a contrary view, Al Jedda v UK App no 27021/08 (ECHR Grand 
Chamber Judgment 7 July 2011) para. 107. See extensively Alex Conte, ‘The legality of 
detention in armed conflict’ in Annyssa Bellal (ed), The War Report: Armed Conflict in 2014 
(OUP 2015) 476, 499 et seq.; Gabor Rona, ‘Is there a Way Out of the Non-International 
Armed Conflict Dilemma?’ (2015) 91 US Naval War College ILS 32, 57. 
335 Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts (OUP 2012) 71. 
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detained after having committed an attack or even after having joined a criminal 
group can be deprived of their liberty to effect their prosecution, if their action is 
deemed to be a crime pursuant to domestic criminal law and if domestic law contains 
a legal basis e.g. for pre-trial detention, which it will regularly do. In these cases, 
article 5 ECHR as well as Common article 3, articles 4, 5 and 6 AP II apply side by 
side, mutually protecting the detainee. This legally sound way to handle detentions 
in NIACs will, however, be subject to practical issues. When applied to the kind of 
extraterritorial NIACs in which European states are currently involved – take the 
example of Afghanistan – transferring detainees for purposes of criminal 
prosecutions to the territorial states will often be limited by article 3 ECHR and the 
domestic law of the European state as far as applicable.336 While criminal 
prosecutions by the European state that detained an attacker will likely be lawful 
pursuant to international law, at least, when the armed forces of that state were the 
subject of the attack,337 this will surely be an option the state in question will regularly 
have no interest to pursue. Such scenarios will have to be considered by European 
states before they enter into NIACs or other military operations short of IACs338, 
which may well reduce their intention to do so. 
 
Interpretation of guarantees regarding deprivations of liberty 
Although the IHL applicable to NIACs does not yet offer with sufficient certainty a 
customary basis concerning the “if” of detentions, with regard to the interpretation 
of applicable IHRL governing the “how” of detentions, especially the procedural and 
material guarantees, e.g. the right to be brought promptly before a judge pursuant 
                                            
336 See for a review of the situation in the context of the fight against piracy Tim R. Salomon, 
Die internationale Strafverfolgungsstrategie gegenüber somalischen Piraten (Springer 
2016) 258 et seq.; see also more generally Peter Rowe, ‘Is There a Right to Detain Civilians 
by Foreign Armed Forces During a Non-International Armed Conflict?’ (2012) 61 ICLQ 697, 
709 et seq. 
337 While the passive personality principle, applicable to cases, in which the state whose 
citizens have been the victim of an act wished to exercise jurisdiction, is disputed in 
international law (see Florian Jeßberger, Der transnationale Geltungsbereich des 
deutschen Strafrechts (Mohr 2011) 253 et seq. with further references; see also Michael 
Akehurst, ‘Jurisdiction in International Law’ (1972-73 Brit. Yb Int’l L. 145, 164), the state 
actor chiefly involved in the conflict, whose citizens have taken up arms against him will 
regularly not object to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by his allied state actors. 
338 Peter Rowe, ‘Is There a Right to Detain Civilians by Foreign Armed Forces During a 
Non-International Armed Conflict?’ (2012) 61 ICLQ 697, 709 et seq. 
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to article 5 para. 3 ECHR and article 9 para 3 ICCPR or the habeas corpus rights 
pursuant to article 5 para. 4 ECHR and article 9 para. 4 ICCPR, IHL maintains a 
decisive role.  
First, in the singular cases, in which the prerequisites may be deemed to be fulfilled, 
derogations may play a limited role in NIACs, since the pertinent articles 5 ECHR 
just as articles 9 and 10 ICCPR are derogable guarantees, although the above-
mentioned drawbacks of derogations limit the practicality of this approach.  
Secondly, it is submitted that IHL does maintain a weighty role in the interpretation 
of IHRL in the case of detentions and internment in NIACs. Articles 4 and 5 (and 
possibly article 6 concerning criminal prosecutions) AP II strike an important balance 
between a high legal standard of protection of interned or detained persons, while 
still offering the possibility of compliance to the state conducting these measures 
and prioritizing those guarantees safeguarding the wellbeing of the detainee in a 
NIAC situation. It is submitted that these norms maintain their status as lex specialis 
in relation to IHRL and thus their significant interpretative influence in cases of 
deprivations of liberty, although IHL does not offer a legal basis for deprivations of 
liberty. Consequently, while the legal basis for detention or internment has to be 
found elsewhere, IHL still represents the most specific standard for deprivations of 
liberty in NIAC scenarios and will influence the interpretation of applicable IHRL 
guarantees and potentially vice versa. This will be elaborated in the following. 
While Common article 3 is explicitly open to any other legal regime providing 
guarantees by stating that parties “to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a 
minimum, the following provisions”, articles 4 and 5 AP II may be said to be a special 
regime for deprivations of liberty in NIACs, which for interpretative purposes may 
“be considered in [its] entirety”339. Naturally, this does not preclude the applicability 
of IHRL, but it does give IHL norms significant weight in the interpretative process.  
The regulatory systematic of AP II concerning internments is as follows340:  
                                            
339 See above fn 112.  
340 Article 6 AP II, which regulates detentions leading to criminal procedures is relevant to 
deprivations of liberty in NIACs as well, but will be left out in the following in order to 
concentrate on one regime and illustrate the regulatory systematics of IHL to that effect in 
greater detail.  
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Article 4 AP II contains fundamental guarantees applicable to “[a]ll persons who do 
not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities, whether or not 
their liberty has been restricted”341. It provides they are “entitled to respect for their 
person, honour and convictions and religious practices” and shall “in all 
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction.” It further 
prohibits “at any time and in any place whatsoever”  
“(a) violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, 
in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or 
any form of corporal punishment; (b) collective punishments; (c) taking of 
hostages; (d) acts of terrorism; (e) outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution 
and any form of indecent assault; (f) slavery and the slave trade in all their 
forms; (g) pillage; (h) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.”  
Article 4 AP II furthermore contains specific protections for children surpassing in 
specificity and arguably in its standard of treatment IHRL instruments such as the 
ECHR by giving children the right to “an education, including religious and moral 
education, in keeping with the wishes of their parents, or in the absence of parents, 
of those responsible for their care”, obliges the state to take “all appropriate steps 
[…] to facilitate the reunion of families temporarily separated”, prohibits the 
recruitment of children “who have not attained the age of fifteen years”, and obliges 
a state “to remove children temporarily from the area in which hostilities are taking 
place to a safer area within the country and ensure that they are accompanied by 
persons responsible for their safety and well-being.”342 
Article 5 AP II contains specific guarantees for persons detained or interned. In its 
paragraph 1 it contains minimum guarantees (“the following provisions shall be 
respected as a minimum”). However, this wording does not open the guarantees of 
AP II towards any other regimes containing guarantees, in the same way the 
wording of Common article 3 does.343 The “minimum” set by para. 1 is a minimum 
in relation to article 5 para. 2 AP II, which contains a higher standard of treatment to 
be guaranteed by the state parties “within the limits of their capabilities”, and not vis 
a vis other regimes of international law. The minimum standard set by para. 1 
                                            
341 Article 4 para. 1 AP II.  
342 Article 4 para. 3 AP II. 
343 See above 4. 
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regarding persons deprived of their liberty includes the treatment of the wounded 
and the sick, the provision of food and drinking water “to the same extent as the 
local civilian population”, “safeguards as regards health and hygiene and protection 
against the rigours of the climate and the dangers of the armed conflict”, the 
guarantee to be able to receive individual or collective relief344, a guarantee that they 
are allowed to “practise their religion and, if requested and appropriate, to receive 
spiritual assistance from persons, such as chaplains, performing religious functions” 
and the obligation of the party depriving them of their liberty to give them, “if made 
to work” “the benefit of working conditions and safeguards similar to those enjoyed 
by the local civilian population.” This catalogue guarantees those rights that have to 
be adhered to even in the most dire and dangerous NIAC settings.  
Art. 5 para. 2 AP II further obliges “[t]hose responsible for the internment or 
detention” “within the limits of their capabilities” to adhere to further guarantees 
including the separate detention of men and women except in cases of families 
accommodated together, enabling the detained persons “to send and receive letters 
and cards”, the duty to locate “places of internment and detention […] not […] close 
to the combat zone” and to evacuate the persons deprived of their liberty, when the 
places are “particularly exposed to danger arising out of the armed conflict”, if the 
safety of the persons allows for such measure. Furthermore, the persons deprived 
of their liberty “shall have the benefit of medical examinations” and “their physical or 
mental health and integrity shall not be endangered by any unjustified act or 
omission”, especially prohibiting “any medical procedure which is not indicated by 
the state of health of the person concerned, and which is not consistent with the 
generally accepted medical standards applied to free persons under similar medical 
circumstances.” 
In addition, article 5 para. 4 AP II obliges the conflict party to take necessary 
measures to ensure the safety of persons being released from the place of 
internment or detention.  
                                            
344 This right guarantees that detained and interned persons may receive either individual 
relief, i.e. “parcels sent by a donor” or collective relief sent to detainees in general “either in 
standard anonymous parcels, or in the form of bulk shipments”. Moreover, “detainees must 
be allowed to benefit from relief actions for the civilian population.”, see Sylvie-S. Junod, 
‘Article 5 AP II’ in Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, and Bruno Zimmermann (eds) 
Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 (ICRC 1987) 1388 (para. 4577). 
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With this regulatory system, AP II prioritizes those rights most important in situations 
of armed conflict in articles 4 and 5 para. 1 AP II to ensure that persons deprived of 
their liberty in NIACs stay alive and maintain a dignified existence. In fact, the 
material content of those articles may well be said to succeed that of IHRL in many 
aspects, e.g. with its rules regarding children in armed conflict, the right to receive 
“individual or collective relief”, and the guarantee to the “benefit of working 
conditions and safeguards similar to those enjoyed by the local civilian population”. 
Those guarantees have the highest standard of obligation and apply independently 
from “limits of capabilities”. Consequently, if these cannot be fulfilled by the conflict 
party, then that party is disallowed to detain or intern persons. AP II is, however, not 
satisfied with these minimum obligations. Thus, as soon as the situation allows, 
conflict parties are obliged to adhere to the guarantees outlined in article 5 para. 2 
AP II. These guarantees again surpass IHRL norms in material content, e.g. 
regarding the obligation to separate women and men and have women be 
supervised by women.345 With its system of obligations, articles 4 and 5 AP II contain 
a tailor-made solution for guarantees of deprivations of liberty in NIACs.  
It is argued, that this prioritization benefits the person detained or interned in a NIAC 
scenario by safeguarding their most important rights to dignity and life when it 
obliges the conflict party to first and foremost adhere to obligations serving that 
purpose. Insofar IHL influences IHRL guarantees that apply in these circumstances. 
The right to “be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law 
to exercise judicial power”, to “trial within a reasonable time or to release pending 
trial” (art. 5 para. 3 ECHR) as well as the right “to take proceedings by which the 
lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release 
ordered if the detention is not lawful” (art. 5 para. 4 ECHR) are not referred to in 
article 5 AP II. There are two explanations for this: First, a conflict party is not 
necessarily a state actor and thus will not (necessarily) have judicial systems in 
place. Secondly, these rights are foreseeably problematic to realize in armed conflict 
situations and AP II acknowledges that by omission. State parties regularly do not 
have judges that tag along in military deployments. As such, AP II’s silence in that 
regard is likely deliberate.346 It seems to be in keeping with the object and purpose 
                                            
345 Article 5 para. 2 lit. a AP II. 
346 Cf. Pascal Hector, ‘Das Humanitäre Völkerrecht als lex specialis’ in Christian Calliess 
(ed), Herausforderung an Staat und Verfassung, Liber Amicorum Torsten Stein (NOMOS 
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of IHL, but also of IHRL, to see the IHL obligations as prioritized obligations. How 
IHRL will be able to accommodate this normative content of the IHL of NIACs is up 
for debate. One may interpret the human rights guarantees as obligations to be 
fulfilled within the limits of the capabilities of a state party to a NIAC and modified to 
a degree that has yet to be ascertained. The Copenhagen Principles may offer some 
guidance. They depart from the IHRL standard guaranteeing a prompt review by a 
“judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power”347 and speedy 
court proceeding to decide on the lawfulness of the detention348, by laying down in 
principle 12 that a “detainee whose liberty has been deprived for security reasons 
is to, in addition to a prompt initial review, have the decision to detain reconsidered 
periodically by an impartial and objective authority that is authorised to determine 
the lawfulness and appropriateness of continued detention.”349 This seems to be a 
standard that balances well the rights of the persons deprived of their liberty with 
aspects of military necessity. The ECtHR has gone into a similar direction with 
Hassan, albeit in cases of IACs. It has stated obiter dictum:  
“Articles 43 and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provide that internment 
‚shall be subject to periodical review, if possible every six months, by a 
competent body‘. Whilst it might not be practicable, in the course of an 
international armed conflict, for the legality of detention to be determined by 
an independent ‚court‘ in the sense generally required by Article 5 § 4, 
nonetheless, if the Contracting State is to comply with its obligations under 
Article 5 § 4 in this context, the ‚competent body‘ should provide sufficient 
guarantees of impartiality and fair procedure to protect against arbitrariness. 
Moreover, the first review should take place shortly after the person is taken 
into detention, with subsequent reviews at frequent intervals, to ensure that 
any person who does not fall into one of the categories subject to internment 
under international humanitarian law is released without undue delay.”350 
Although the ECtHR has shown reluctance in Hassan to apply these principles in 
NIAC scenarios, it is submitted that there are no methodological differences 
                                            
2015) 956, 966; Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(OUP 2012) 92 with further references. 
347 Art. 5 para. 3 ECHR. 
348 Art. 5 para. 4 ECHR. 
349 Copenhagen Principles, Principle 12, 51 ILM 1368, 1369-70. 
350 Hassan v UK App no 29750/09 (ECHR Grand Chamber Judgment 16 September 2014) 
para. 106. 
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between the IHL rules regulating detentions in IACs and articles 4 and 5 AP II that 
would mandate such a different treatment.351  
The ECtHR has acknowledged the fact that member states acting in armed conflicts 
are in difficult situations, which make compliance with ECHR guarantees extremely 
burdensome. In addition to the position taken above, the statement of the Court may 
be seen as opening a possibility for member states to invoke the difficult situation 
that lead to a possible noncompliant behaviour. The ECtHR has hinted into the 
direction that it would possibly make “reasonable allowances”352 for the specific 
circumstances in an armed conflict and would apply ECHR provisions such as the 
procedural duty under Article 2 “realistically, to take account of specific problems”.353 
Consequently, in cases of detentions in NIAC scenarios, the member state will be 
well-advised to not only to argue for the interpretative influence of AP II on its IHRL 
                                            
351 See however the ‘United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on remedies and 
procedures on the right of anyone deprived of their liberty to bring proceedings before a 
court’ that apply the human rights standard without even acknowledging the more specific 
IHL norms, (4 May 2015) UN Doc. WGAD/CRP.1/2015, para. 115. The Basic Principles 
offer an exception, if the “government of the State affected by the non-international armed 
conflict claimed for itself belligerent rights”. Then captured combatants should be treated as 
prisoners of war and civilians should be granted the same treatment as afforded to civilians 
in IACs pursuant to Geneva Convention IV. This seems to hint in the direction, that the IHL 
of IAC would completely set aside IHRL, a rather peculiar position coming from that 
direction.  
352 Jaloud v Netherlands App no 47708/08 (ECHR 20 November 2014) para. 226. This has 
to be seen in light of the controversial (and not yet final) decision in Tagayeva et al. v Russia 
App nos 26562/07, 14755/08, 49339/08, 49380/08, 51313/08, 21294/11 and 37096/11 
(ECHR 13 April 2017). The case concerned failings of the Russian security forces 
concerning the terrorist attack by Chechen militants directed against a school in Beslan in 
September 2004. The court found that Russia had violated article 2 ECHR (1) by failure to 
protect the life of the hostages (paras 481 et seq. the first time that court actually found for 
a violation of the duty to protect life), (2) by violating the duty to investigate (paras 496 et 
seq.), (3) by failing to minimise risk for the hostages in the operation of the security forces 
(paras 562 et seq.), and (4) by using lethal force, contributing to casualties among hostages 
(paras 584 et seq.). While IHL was not applicable to the case - although the applicants 
alluded to IHL to strengthen their case, arguing that the Russian actions would have failed 
to meet legal standards even under IHL (para. 577) - the main topic of controversy following 
from that judgment will likely be that the ECtHR may have failed to take into account the 
extraordinary difficulties of security forces in such situations, especially when adjudicating 
on the obligation to plan and control the operation involving the use of lethal force so as to 
minimise the risk to life, see the dissent of Judges Hajiyev and Dedov, paras 3 et seq. 
However, the inapplicability of IHL in this case may well mean that the Jaloud-promise of 
the Court still stands in cases of armed conflicts. 
353 Al Skeini et al. v UK App no 55721/07 (ECHR Grand Chamber Judgment 7 July 2011) 
para. 168. 
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obligations, but also to allude to the specific situation accompanying the deprivation 
of liberty and how its ability to comply with the ECHR was adversely affected by it.  
 
6.3.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is submitted that IHL retains an interpretative influence on IHRL 
guarantees in NIAC scenarios insofar both apply side by side. This does not depend 
on the question whether the IHL applicable in NIACs offers a legal basis for a state 
action or not. Even if it does not, IHL may still regulate such actions and will impact 
the interpretation of IHRL guarantees. The ECtHR has yet to acknowledge this 
influence. In cases of NIACs it has underlined that absent a declaration of 
derogation the “normal legal background” (meaning IHRL) will be the only yardstick, 
with which it will measure the acts of member states.354 While this has been subject 
to criticism, e.g. by its own Judge Malinverdi, who found fault in the fact that the 
court did not even mention the more specific standards in Common article 3 and AP 
II,355 the court at large has until now remained unconvinced.356 
 
 
7. Conclusion and outlook 
The days are long gone that one could confidently be of the opinion of the forefathers 
of international law, such as Hugo Grotius, and state that in war, the law of war 
applies exclusively and in peace merely the law of peace applies or, in more learned 
                                            
354 Isayeva v Russia App no 57950/00 (ECHR 24 February 2005) para. 191; also Gerd 
Oberleitner, Human Rights in Armed Conflict (CUP 2015) 304; see however William A. 
Schabas, ‘Lex Specialis? Belt and Suspenders? The Parallel Operation of Human Rights 
Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of Jus ad Bellum’ (2007) 40 Isr. L. 
Rev. 595, 605, who highlights that the ECtHR may actually have moved into the direction 
of IHL with the Isayeva decision, when it stated that lethal force may have been permissible, 
if government planes would be attacked by illegal armed groups. 
355 Abuyeva et al. v Russia App no 27065/05 (ECHR 2 December 2010), Concurring opinion 
of Judge Malinverni, para. 3. 
356 See also Gerd Oberleitner, Human Rights in Armed Conflict (CUP 2015) 304 et seq. with 
further references. 
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words, “inter pacem et bellum nihil est medium”357 – effectively imagining peacetime 
and wartime as mutually exclusive blocks, separated by a watershed.358 Today, 
where once was a watershed, one has to wade in knee-deep bog and the distinction 
between peace and war has recently been muddied even further – with full intention 
to gain operative advantages.359  
The issues posed by the uncertain relationship between IHL and IHRL are pressing. 
Finding solutions has been difficult over the years. This thesis can at most strive to 
give an impulse to the discussion by suggesting a methodology that could produce 
workable results. Beyond this, significant stumbling blocks have to be overcome to 
find a solution. This is currently impeded by many factors. 
One such factor that has continuously made sure that a solution will not be found is 
the failure of IHL and IHRL scholars and practitioners to be at the same table. This 
has been the root cause of the problem, since modern IHL and IHRL were 
negotiated at around the same time in close proximity, yet by different people at 
different tables. This continues to hinder progress until today. Assessing the 
literature on the topic, one cannot help to get the impression that when someone 
accentuates the importance of IHL, IHRL scholars feel threatened and vice versa. 
This culture of distrust between the opposing interpretative communities is certainly 
counterproductive. It may, however, be easily explained as it comes down to 
different mind-sets. Human rights proponents continue to share the vision that the 
United Nations had in its founding years. After years of dreadful armed conflict and 
the endless human suffering it brought, the international community came together 
and set an end to it, the pinnacle of this development being the rise of IHRL – the 
new ius contra bellum. Consequently, every argument in favour of IHL vis a vis IHRL 
                                            
357 The phrase coined by Cicero was used by Grotius in his foundational work De Iure Belli 
ac Pacis Libri Tres (original 1625, Liberty Fund 2005) cap. XXI, para. 1 to explain the legal 
regime of truce in armed conflicts. That international law indeed saw peacetime law and 
wartime law as two mutually exclusive blocks is clearly evidenced e.g. by the title of Grotius‘ 
work. See Robert Kolb, ‘Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), 
MPEPIL (OUP online edition 2013) para. 12. 
358 Robert Kolb, ‘Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), MPEPIL 
(OUP online edition 2013) para. 12. 
359 See the observation by General Waleri Wassiljewitsch Gerassimow, Chief of the General 
Staff of the Russian Federation in “The Value of Science is in the Foresight”, translated in 
(2016) 1 Military Review 23: “In the twenty-first century we have seen a tendency toward 
blurring the lines between the states of war and peace. Wars are no longer declared and, 
having begun, proceed according to an unfamiliar template.”, for a discussion see Charles 
K. Bartles, ‘Getting Gerasimov Right’ (2016) 1 Military Review 30-38. 
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and every invocation of military necessity is perceived as a potential threat to the 
IHRL stronghold. Some are – emotionally justifiably, when one looks at the past – 
very wary of the military at large. IHL scholars and practitioners often have a closer 
connection to the military and are at least acquainted to a certain degree with their 
mind-set. While the military may be just as wary when it comes to the use of force 
– knowing that their lives will be on the line – they know that all else has failed, when 
they come into play. Being in that position, there is very little room for indecision and 
insecurity. While they know that it is the continued duty of their state to reach a 
peaceful conclusion of the conflict via diplomacy, their focus clearly is on what has 
to be done to achieve their objectives while the conflict persists. IHL is adapted to 
this kind of thinking. It guides the practitioner, weighing his or her objectives with the 
need to protect civilians and others as far as possible and realistic in the 
circumstances. Also, IHL scholars today tend to see a failure of IHRL as a ius contra 
bellum, when observing armed conflicts continuing to engulf many parts of the world. 
With this comes the reluctant acceptance of armed conflict as a – regrettable, but 
seemingly unavoidable – fact of human life, needing IHL to alleviate human suffering 
in these circumstances. Consequently, most IHL proponents just seek workable and 
realistic solutions. The voices and institutions arguing for a stronger role of IHRL in 
armed conflicts have a burden to present such workable solutions that translate to 
practice – situations in armed conflicts. Concerning the relationship between IHL 
and IHRL, progress will only be made by bringing together those different 
perspectives, finding answers that are  
“capable of being applied in situations of conflict and delivering what is seen 
as an acceptable solution by all […] players. A solution which does not satisfy 
such a test will not result in greater application of [human rights law]. It will 
result, at best, in the exclusive application of IHL […] [and] in deadlock 
between states and human rights bodies.”360  
In international law, the acceptance of rules by those having to comply with them is 
a value in its own. This does not mean that the interpretation of norms bow to the 
will of state actors, but when the law continuously progresses into a direction, to 
which state actors are unwilling to follow, this is a potentially dangerous 
                                            
360 Francoise J. Hampson, ‘The relationship between international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law’ in Scott Sheeran and Sir Nigel Rodley (eds) Routledge 
Handbook of International Human Rights Law (Routledge 2013) 185, 187. 
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development.361 Consequently, the observation that the progressing humanization 
of the law of armed conflict is hailed mainly by international and regional 
organizations, which are not directly involved in armed conflicts, while being 
criticized by the state actors who are, carries weight.362 The rise of IHRL has profited 
IHL. One of the main deficiencies of IHL – that it has no effective enforcement 
structure – is today remedied by the courts and institutions established to safeguard 
IHRL compliance.363 The ECtHR, which plays an important role in that regard, now 
itself stands to profit and rise in importance even further, if it manages to incorporate 
IHL coherently into its assessments. In contrast, by ignoring IHL in cases concerning 
armed conflicts, the court will likely continue to suffer from its member states’ 
growing unwillingness to accept its authority and judgments.  
On the other hand, member states also have been too hesitant when it comes to 
IHRL in armed conflicts. They have apparently failed to see that they may play a 
decisive role in shaping the relationship between IHL and IHRL. In doing so, they 
have basically let the ECtHR and UN institutions become the bodies in which the 
relationship between IHL and IHRL is shaped and decided, whilst being reduced to 
(increasingly disgruntled) commentators and observers. With soft law instruments 
such as the Copenhagen Principles on the Handling of Detainees in International 
Military Operations state actors have every opportunity to influence the debate. 
Such instruments evidence state practice as well as opinio juris and – short of 
forming customary law – play a part in interpreting existing obligations under IHRL 
and IHL pursuant to article 31 para. 3 lit. b VCLT. Moreover, seeing the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR on the topic of IHL incorporation, one cannot help to get 
                                            
361 For this observation Stefan Oeter, ‘Fortschrittsnarrative im Humanitären Völkerrecht’ in 
Christian Calliess (ed), Herausforderung an Staat und Verfassung, Liber Amicorum Torsten 
Stein (NOMOS 2015) 1025, 1043; in the same direction Theodor Meron, ‘The Humanization 
of Humanitarian Law’ (2000) 94 Am. J. Int’l L. 239, 241, who extends this to the acceptance 
of legal rules in the armed forces community: “’Excessive’ humanization might exceed the 
limits acceptable to armed forces, provoke their resistance, and thus erode the credibility of 
the rules.”; see also Thomas Winkler, ‘The Copenhagen Process on Detainees: A 
Necessity’ (2010) 78 Nord. J. Int’l L. 489, 495 „the 'humanisation' of war should not lead to 
a naive denial of the harsh realities of warfare”. 
362 Pascal Hector, ‘Das Humanitäre Völkerrecht als lex specialis’ in Christian Calliess (ed), 
Herausforderung an Staat und Verfassung, Liber Amicorum Torsten Stein (NOMOS 2015) 
956, 967. 
363 Dominik Steiger, ‘Enforcing IHL through Human Rights Bodies’ in Heike Krieger (ed), 
Inducing Compliance with International Humanitarian Law: Lessons from the African Great 
Lakes Region (CUP 2015) 263-299. 
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the impression that the Court might have welcomed a bit of such input by its member 
states when it stood to decide those cases. Consequently, the announcement by 
the UK government that it will derogate from the ECHR in coming deployments is 
fundamentally misguided. This strategy only ensures that the citizens and members 
of the armed forces continue to (wrongly) blame the ECtHR and European human 
rights for perceived deficiencies in the law as it stands and safeguards that the UK 
will stay at the side-line and not play a productive part in solving the issues at hand. 
The UK and the other European states would be much better advised, if they were 
to enter into the discussion and bring their expertise to the table. 
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